Efficiency and Social Citizenship:  Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State by McCluskey, Martha T.
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
Summer 2003 
Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal 
Attack on the Welfare State 
Martha T. McCluskey 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Inequality and Stratification Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and 
Gender Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare 
State, 78 Ind. L.J. 783 (2003). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/534 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the 
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare Statet 
MARTHA T. MCCLUSKEY* 
I. AFDC ................................................................................................... 799 
A. Reconstructingthe Economics of Redistribution................. 802 
1.The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism .................................................... 802 
2. The Triumph of the Neoliberal Double Bind ..................................... 805 
B. NeoliberalCitizenshipand Welfare Reform ............................................. 807 
1. AFD C as Moral Hazard ...................................................................... 807 
2. Double Standard of AFDC's Moral Hazard ....................................... 808 
3. From Double Standard into Market Forces ........................................ 815 
4. Reenvisioning Social Citizenship to Reverse Moral Hazard .............. 817 
C. CommunitarianCitizenshipand Welfare Reform ..................................... 822 
1. Resolving Moral Hazard with Moral Control ..................................... 823 
2. Moral Control as M oral Subordination .............................................. 825 
3. Redistributing Moral Control ............................................................. 828 
D. LiberalCitizenshipand Welfare Reform .................................................. 832 
1. Resolving Moral Hazard with Freedom from Responsibility ............. 833 
2. Freedom from Responsibility as Subordinate Citizenship .................. 835 
3. Redistributing Freedom from Responsibility ...................................... 840 
II. WORKERS' COM PENSATION .............................................................................. 847 
A. NeoliberalCitizenshipand Workers' CompensationReform ................... 850 
1. Moral Hazard from Expanded Benefits .............................................. 850 
2. Redistributing Moral Hazard Through Benefit Cuts .......................... 851 
3. Reenvisioning Employers' Moral Hazard as the Beneficial Market... 854 
B. CommunitarianCitizenshipand Workers' CompensationReform ........... 858 
1. Double Standard of Moral Responsibility .......................................... 859 
2. Excusing Employers' Irresponsibility as the Market ...................... 861 
C. Liberal Citizenshipand Workers' Compensation..................................... 863 
1. Separating Compensation from Responsibility .................................. 864 
2. Double Standard of Responsibility ..................................................... 866 
3. Double Standard of Security .............................................................. 870 
III. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 872 
Defenders of the welfare state are struggling to revive social citizenship, the theory 
articulated by British sociologist T.H. Marshall that public well-being in a democratic 
t Copyright 2002 Martha T. McCluskey. All rights reserved. 
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. E-mail: mcclusk@buffalo.edu. 
This Article benefited from comments by Carl Nightingale, as well as from participants in the 
Cornell Law School Feminism and Legal Theory Project, the 1999 Law and Society Association 
Annual Meeting, the 2000 Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-
Economics, and from participants in faculty workshops at Cornell Law School, the University of 
Denver Law School, the University of Massachusetts Political Economics Research Institute, 
and SUNY Buffalo Law School. 
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:783 
society depends on rights to economic security as well as on political and civil rights.' 
Against this social citizenship ideal stands the powerful and pervasive neoliberal (free 
market) ideology 2 asserting that state abstention from economic protection is the 
foundation of a good society.3 Neoliberalism, the core of law-and-economics theory, 
1.According to Marshall, civil rights include "the rights necessary for individual freedom-
liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice"; political rights include "the right to 
participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political 
authority or as an elector of the members of such a body"; and social rights "range from the 
right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social 
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the 
society." T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10-11 (1950). For examples of recent 
efforts to apply (and improve) Marshall's theory in the context of debates about the 
contemporary welfare state, see CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OFT.H. 
MARSHALL (Martin Bulmer & Anthony M. Rees eds., 1996) [hereinafter CITIZENSHIP TODAY]; 
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 
(2001); BRIAN S. TURNER, CITIZENSHIP AND CAPITALISM: THE DEBATEOVER REFORMISM (1986); 
Desmond S. King & Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of 
Welfare Provision, 18 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 415-43 (1988); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, 
Returnof the Citizen:A Survey ofRecent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352 (1994). 
See also Lawrence M. Mead, Citizenship and Social Policy: T.H. Marshalland Poverty, 14 
SoC. PHIL. & POL'Y 197 (1997) (amending Marshall's theory to support a change from social 
citizenship rights to social citizenship obligations). 
2. "Neoliberalism" refers to the contemporary reincarnation of the nineteenth-century 
"laissez-faire" liberalism that advanced the primacy of "the market" over "government 
regulation." See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS 15-16 
(1998) (favorably presenting this new "liberalism" as a reassertion of nineteenth-century ideas 
about the primacy of the market and the importance of property rights); Lisa Philipps, Taxing 
the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization,63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 115 (2000) (defining "neoliberalism" and discussing its effect on 
Canadian tax policy). In American legal scholarship, the term has gained currency primarily to 
describe how this ideology has been applied to international development policy, particularly 
the "structural adjustment" programs imposed on Latin America by the International Monetary 
Fund. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Autonomy of Law, 26 YALE J.OFINT'LL. 517, 518 (2001) 
(describing neoliberalism as a "program for increasing the wealth of nations"); Elizabeth M. 
Iglesias, Human Rights in InternationalEconomic Law: Locating Latinas/osin the Linkage 
Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 361, 384 (1997) (explaining neoliberalism as a 
discourse masking and promoting political and economic subordination based on race and 
class). The term is more commonly used outside of the United States, perhaps in part because 
American scholars and policy analysts tend to present neoliberal international policies simply as 
"globalization" (rather than as one choice among many alternatives for structuring the global 
political economy) and to present neoliberal domestic policies simply as uncontested economics 
rather than as the product of ideology or political movement. 
3. Joel Handler insightfully discusses how the recently powerful conservative economic 
orthodoxy provides an ideological basis for efforts to undermine social citizenship in the U.S. 
and Europe. Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 765,796-
800 (2000). Handler analyzes three parts of the "reigning message of. orthodox liberal 
capitalism": first, the theory that the efficient market is a matter of neutral, value-free laws; 
second, that "government" is the problem and privatization, decentralization, and deregulation 
are the answers; and, third, that victims of poverty are at fault for their problems, not structural 
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establishes economic efficiency-represented by the "free market"-as the primary 
route to public well-being.4 In this view, unfettered market competition produces 
incentives for maximizing overall resources and individual responsibility, thereby 
making society better off in the long run in spite of harsh short-term effects on some 
people.5 
Supporters of social citizenship should squarely contest this neoliberal ideal at its 
flawed foundation. Two leading responses to neoliberal ideology, communitarianism 
and pro-welfare liberalism, both attempt to support economic equity alongside 
efficiency as a separate and complementary societal value. But the problem with the 
neoliberal emphasis on efficiency is not that it promotes individual self-interest over 
community solidarity, or economic growth over social equity. Instead, neoliberalism 
embraces a racialized, genderized, and class-biased vision of social equity and 
community solidarity that favors the interests of the most privileged members of 
society. 6 Welfare state advocates should directly reject, not balance or accommodate, 
economic conditions. Id. at 796-97. See also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE 
RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 13 (1998) (asserting that "one of the most distinctive 
neoliberal traits" is the belief that the welfare state is "the source of all evils"); Michael 
Ignatieff, The Myth of Citizenship,94 QUEEN'S Q. 966, 982 (1987) ("It should be clear that the 
market solution is an attack on citizenship and democracy."); Philipps, supra note 2, at 113-14 
(criticizing the shift from Marshall's ideal social citizenship to "market citizenship"). 
4. See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Globalization, Robert P. Maxon Lecture at 
George Washington Univ. (Dec. 3,2001), in Fed.News Serv., Dec. 3,2001, availableatLEXIS 
FEDNEW file (rejecting the view that "free markets" lack moral or civic virtue by explaining 
that neoliberal policies "reflect the value preferences of consumers," maximize these most-
valued resources, promote quality and excellence, and facilitate "greater political freedom"); see 
also Jon D. Hanson &Melissa R. Hart, Law and Economics, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 311, 312 (Dennis Pattersen ed., 1996) (stating that now "the vast 
majority of law and economics scholarship assumes without hesitation that the goal of law 
should be efficiency."). For a discussion of the role of law-and-economics in promoting 
neoliberalism, see Daniel T. Rodgers, The Revival ofMarket Ideology, in THINKING THROUGH 
THE SEVENTIES (Casey Blake & Kenneth Cmiel eds., forthcoming 2003). This neoliberal 
idealization of an efficient market fits comfortably with--or is even enhanced by-its approval 
of a supporting role for "redistribution." See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
5.See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 13 (reporting the move away from government 
economic involvement "toward reliance on competition in the marketplace as a more efficient 
way to protect the public"). For examples of neoliberal legal arguments, see generally RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1997); see also Steve P. Calandrillo, 
Responsible Regulation:A Sensible Cost-Benefit,Risk VersusRisk Approach to FederalHealth 
and Safety Regulation,81 B.U. L. REV. 957,984 (2001) (asserting that regulatory policy should 
adopt the goal of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency because it "intuitively feels closest to serving our 
nation's best interests by seeking the greatest good for the greatest number"); John 0. McGinnis 
&Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution,114 HARV. L. REV. 511,521-27 (2000) 
(confidently asserting as a "well established" premise that neoliberal "free trade"-as regulated 
by the World Trade Organization-promotes countries' overall social welfare in the long run 
despite harms to "special interests"). For an opposing view, see PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF 
RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET 30-31 (Richard Nice trans., 1998) 
(describing and criticizing the neoliberal message of economic productivity as the ultimate 
human goal and the route to universal liberation). 
6. I do not mean to suggest that the benefits and the harms of neoliberal policies fall 
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neoliberalism's vision of hierarchical citizenship status promoted in the guise of 
efficiency. 
Citizenship defines relationships between society, government, and individuals: 
who belongs to the "public" and what obligations and rights membership in that 
"public" confers.7 On the surface, neoliberalism claims to trim the role of government 
so that the state functions primarily as a value-neutral facilitator of individual choices. 
In this vision, citizens' primary role is to maximize their private rational self-interest as 
buyers and sellers in market exchanges.8 Social well-being flows not from government 
enforcement of moral ideals, but from unimpeded private pursuit of individual 
preferences and interests. 
Accordingly, neoliberal public policy centers on the goal of economic efficiency: 
maximizing aggregate resources, as represented by the sum of individual cost-benefit 
calculations in the (presumably free) market.9 Neoliberalism distinguishes this 
absolutely or strictly along hierarchical class (or gender, race, or other status-based) lines, but 
only that the privileging of economic elites (structured in part by race and gender) is central to 
neoliberalism's overall purpose and effect. 
7. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE 
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF T.H. MARSHALL 31 (Martin Bulmer &Anthony M. Rees eds., 
1996) (defining citizenship as "the rights and obligations associated with membership in a social 
unit of society, and notably with nationality). J.M. Barbalet describes citizenship as "both a 
status and a set of rights" and explains that citizenship rights attach to a person "by virtue of a 
legal or conventional status." J.M. BARBALET, CrIZENSHIP: RIGHTS, STRUGGLE AND CLASS 
INEQUALITY 15-16 (Frank Parkin ed., 1988). See also Linda K. Kerber, The Meanings of 
Citizenship, in DISSENT 33, 37 (1997) ("It is in citizenship that the personal and political come 
together, because citizenship is about how individuals make and remake the state."). 
8. See Ignatieff, supranote 3,at 981 (stating that the rise of market ideal has determined "the 
very language of political community" so that both left and right political rhetoric "addresses 
the electorate not as citizens but as taxpayers or as consumers"); Philipps, supra note 2, at 115-
16 (explaining how just as neoliberalism reimagines the state's role, it reimagines the "terms of 
citizenship" to focus on "individual self-reliance, competition, and consumer choice"). 
Journalist Naomi Klein describes growing resistance to what she sees as neoliberalism's 
substitution of consumerism for citizenship. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO: MONEY MARKETING, 
AND THE GROWING ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT 441-42 (1999); see also Susanna Lobez, 
Selling Ourselves Short, SUNDAY HERALD SUN, Feb. 10, 2002, at 73 (quoting Klein's warning 
that "'citizens [are] rebranded as empowered consumers who are nothing more than a collection 
of their shopping habits'). Another example of the neoliberal transformation of citizenship is 
the idea that Americans should express their patriotism in response to the attacks of September 
11, 2001 by going shopping. See, e.g., Stuart Elliott, MadisonAve. Grappleswith Post-Sept.11 
Era,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001 at Cl. 
9. See POSNER, supranote 5, at 18 (defining efficiency). This definition of efficiency reflects 
what is more technically called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency: resource allocations in which aggregate 
gains outweigh aggregate costs (despite losses for some individuals). See id. In contrast, Pareto 
optimality is a more ideal version of efficiency that occurs when resource allocations increase 
aggregate gains without imposing costs on any individual according to that individual's own 
subjective cost calculation. See id. But true Pareto optimality is at worst a tautology and at best 
of little use in policy debates. By definition, Pareto improvements are only possible when no 
policy debate exists-and if a policy truly has no net costs, it would be logical to assume it 
would already have happened. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 120 
(1987) (describing Pareto efficiency as a "banal" concept); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness 
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efficiency goal from the goal of social equity, which represents the redistribution of 
resources according to particular fairness or equality values.'0 In the conventional 
view, efficiency is about expanding the societal pie; redistribution about dividing it.l" 
This fundamental-and fundamentally flawed-division between redistribution and 
efficiency is the linchpin that enables neoliberals to turn social citizenship from a 
public benefit to a public threat. By distinguishing rights to economic security as 
"redistribution," those rights become implicitly (if not explicitly) suspect and 
subordinate.' 2 If the free market is by definition the system that maximizes overall 
societal well-being (and individual freedom), then redistribution-which by definition 
diverges from that market-inherently risks detracting from overall societal well-being 
(and individual freedom).' 3 Neoliberalism's disadvantage is not, as most critics worry, 
ofPareto:CarryingCoase Further,100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1212 (1991) ("[A]ny given society is 
always or will immediately arrive at a Pareto optimal point" without the need for analysis or 
criticism.). Though some use efficiency narrowly in the sense of wealth maximizing (sometimes 
limited to monetary gain), I use the concept broadly to encompass nonmonetary "resources." 
10. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. 
11. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTnON TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (2d ed. 1989). 
12. See Martha T. McCluskey, SubsidizedLives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 115, 122-23 (2000) [hereinafter McCluskey, Subsidized Lives] 
(comparing the skewed efficiency versus equity opposition to the skewed equal treatment versus 
special treatment opposition in equality theory); see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of 
Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 657, 717-18 (1998) 
[hereinafter McCluskey, Illusion] (explaining and criticizing the implicit favoring of the 
efficiency side of the dichotomy). For example, one scholar explains that because T.H. 
Marshall's social rights count as redistribution, they should be subordinated to political and 
civil rights. Jytte Klausen, Social Rights Advocacy and State Building: T.H. Marshall in the 
Hands of Social Reforms, 47 WORLD POL. 244, 245 (1995) (ignoring the inherently 
redistributive nature of political and civil rights). 
13. See, e.g., POSNER, supranote 5 (giving arguments for the theory that equalizing income 
through government welfare programs often has efficiency costs); POLINSKY, supra note 11, at 
127 (concluding that "income redistribution generally is costly, whether it is accomplished by 
the tax and transfer system or by the legal system") (emphasis in original). This is not to say that 
neoliberalism necessarily rejects redistribution, only that it requires that it be restrained. For 
example, law-and-economics scholarship has devoted much effort to keeping redistribution's 
risks safely in place by segregating it in the "tax and transfer system" so that it will not "distort" 
legal rules. See POLINSKY, supranote 11, at 9-10, 124-27; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why 
the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 667 (1994). Of course, law-and-economics reasoning also criticizes the "distorting" 
effects of using the tax system for redistribution. See POLINSKY, supra note 11, at 120; Duncan 
Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special 
Reference to Compulsory Terms and UnequalBargainingPower,41 MD. L. REv. 563, 613 
(1982) (explaining that any real-asopposed to theoretical-system of taxation will involve 
exactly the same kinds of supposedly wasteful behavior changes as direct regulation of 
behavior). And once redistribution is relegated to the position of direct charity outside the 
supposed normal operation of law and market, neoclassical economic analysis shows that it 
must be further restrained to avoid distorting supposedly normal market rights. See Part I infra 
(discussing neoliberal criticisms of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the classic direct 
transfer program). 
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its inattention to redistribution, 14 but to the contrary, its very obsession with 
redistribution as a distinctly seductive yet treacherous policy separate from 
efficiency. 5 
The preoccupation with extracting redistribution from efficiency grows out of 
neoclassical economics's early-twentieth-century quest for a formal and objective tool 
for measuring societal well-being that could establish economic policy analysis as a 
science. 16 Economic historian Mark Blaug explains that, although this goal of a 
scientific division between equity and efficiency has proved elusive,' 7 without faith in 
the equity/efficiency distinction, the whole "elaborately constructed apparatus" of 
modem economic policy evaluation "collapses like a house of cards."' 8 From the start, 
non-neoclassical economists have questioned the fundamental efficiency/equity 
division as false, 19 and have explained, "[T]he whole point is that global welfare 
14. See Hanson & Hart, supra note 4, at 311,330 (reporting that the most common objection 
to law-and-economics is its failure to consider distribution); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional 
Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592, 594 (1985) 
(criticizing what he describes as law-and-economics's characteristic "disregard of the 
distributionaldimension of any given problem") (emphasis in original). 
15. For insightful arguments and examples showing that the problem of contemporary legal 
discourse is not the focus on economics per se, but instead the "dichotomization of economics 
and politics" as a strategic means of "resist[ing] the democratization of both the state and the 
economy," see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, GlobalMarkets,RacialSpaces, and the Role ofCritical 
Race Theory in the Strugglefor Community Control of Investments: An InstitutionalClass 
Analysis, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1037, 1072-73 (2000). See also Martha T. McCluskey, 
Deconstructing the State/Market Divide: The Rhetoric of Regulation from Workers' 
Compensationto the WTO, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS (Martha A. Fineman 
&Terenqe Dougherty eds., forthcoming) (using literary analysis of the "dangerous supplement" 
to discuss the relationship of government redistribution to the imagined free market in 
contemporary economic rhetoric). 
16. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 549-93 (5th ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1996) (discussing the history of general welfare economics as a struggle to find a measure 
of efficient outcomes separate from distributive judgments); YUVAL P. YONAY, THE STRUGGLE 
OVER THE SOUL OF ECONOMICS 150-53 (1998) (explaining contested attempts to construct 
neoclassical economics as ascience using an objective standard of efficiency). By purporting to 
formally measure efficiency gains separate from distributional changes, the concepts of Pareto 
optimality and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency helped solidify faith in the distinction by mid-century. 
See BLAUG, supra, at 573-79 (discussing Pareto optimality and the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
approach). See supra note 9 (defining these concepts). 
17. BLAUG, supra note 16, at 575 (noting that the "long discussion" of efficiency criteria 
among various theorists Such as Pareto, Hicks, and Kaldor "brought us no further" toward 
"purely 'positive' grounds" for distinguishing efficiency from equity). 
18. See id. at 592-93 (discussing the history of welfare economics and accepting its 
assumption of an equity/efficiency division). 
19. See LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (Warren J. Samuels & A. 
Allan Schmid eds., 1981), cited anddiscussedin NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G.MEDEMA, 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 119 (1997); YONAY, supranote 
16, at 153-56 (discussing early-twentieth-century institutionalist critics of neoclassical 
positivism); see also Calabresi, supra note 9, at 1227-28 (distributional analysis is an 
"inevitable and hence essential" part of efficiency analysis); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Problems:A Critique,33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 420 (1981) (explaining 
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maximization is meaningless." 20 Nonetheless, most mainstream economics and policy 
analysis continues to take this equity/efficiency distinction on faith and to focus instead 
on dissecting the relationship between the two separated goals.2 1 
With this neoclassical distinction as its ground, neoliberalism asserts that 
redistributive policies replace individual market freedom that promotes the public gain 
with paternalist government protection that generally benefits particular groups.22 From 
this problematic premise follows the deduction that redistribution tends to be the mark 
of non-citizens or subordinatecitizens: those who are deemed inadequate to assume 
the responsibilities of freedom because of their incapacity or incivility.23 In short, 
neoliberalism revives the Lochner-eraview that social citizenship is an oxymoron. 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts often ruled that federal 
constitutional rights of due process and equal protection prohibited social and 
economic regulation designed to change market conditions affecting workers and 
consumers. 24 But cases such as Mullerv. Oregon25 reasoned that the Constitution only 
permits legislative protection against market risks (maximium hour regulations, for 
example) for those who. do not count as fully responsible citizens, such as women, 
that "the notion of a 'tradeoff' between the 'hard' datum of efficiency and the inherently 
subjective, 'political' datum of equity is apologetic nonsense"); McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 
12, at 657 (using the example of workers' compensation to show how the distinction between 
efficiency and redistribution is not grounded in objective logic or fact, but instead amounts to a 
rhetorical and political strategy). 
20. A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, in LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 69 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989). 
21. See Suzanne Elise Shanahan & Nancy Brandon Tuma, The SociologyofDistribution and 
Redistribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 733, 734 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Richard Swedberg eds., 1994) (concluding that the prevailing dichotomy between market 
distribution and government redistribution appears arbitrary and part of classical Western 
economic thought's false attempt to construct markets as more natural than governments, but 
nonetheless accepting this division as fundamental to social science). 
22. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The ProperScope of the CommercePower,73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1431 (1987) (questioning child labor legislation as paternalism or as anticompetitive 
protection of some employer interests at the expense of others). For a discussion and 
modification of the conventional theory, see Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency ofPaternalism,84 VA. 
L. REV. 229 (1998). 
23. In his discussions of neoclassical economics in law, Neil Duxbury explains that Milton 
Friedman qualifies his arguments against government intervention in the market by saying that 
paternalism is acceptable for those who cannot be responsible individuals, like children and the 
insane. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 369 (1995) (citing MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 33 (1982, original publication 1962)). T.H. Marshall 
distinguished twentieth-century social citizenship from earlier efforts to grant minimal social 
protections detached from the status of citizenship. "The Poor Law treated the claims of the 
poor, not as an integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them-as claims 
which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in any true sense of the word." 
MARSHALL, supranote 1, at 24. 
24. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hour law 
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process rights). 
25. 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a minimum wage law for women on the ground of their 
special need for protection). 
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children, or immigrant miners. 26 
Of course, changing politics and jurisprudence after 1937 repudiated the Lochner-
era view that social and economic rights were unconstitutional,clearing the way for 
some citizens to exercise their political rights to create a "New Deal" that included 
extensive labor, consumer, and antipoverty protection. With the demise of Lochner 
came the rise of legislation establishing (limited) social citizenship rights in the United 
States.27 From T.H. Marshall's mid-century vantage point, centered on Britain and 
neglecting pervasive race and gender stratification, such social rights seemed to have 
28taken firm root alongside civil and political rights as essential to a "civilized" society. 8 
In the United States, however, the resounding renunciation of Lochner worked to 
impede as well as to advance the cause of social citizenship. The prevailing 
jurisprudential criticism of the Lochnerera centered not so much on its substantive free 
market ideology as on its procedural choice of judicial over legislative and executive 
power. 29 The famous ghost of Lochner helped stifle enthusiasm for expanding 
26. Lochner, which struck down a maximum hour law for bakers, reasoned that 
[t]here is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and 
capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to 
assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state, 
interfering with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in no 
sense wards of the state. 
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. In contrast, the Court distinguished a case upholding a similar law for 
miners by explaining that the "character of the employees insuch kinds of labor [was] such as to 
make it reasonable and proper for the state to prevent the employees from being constrained by 
the rules laid down by the proprietors in regard to labor." Id. at 54 (discussing Holden v.Hardy, 
169 U.S. 366 (1898)). Similarly, the Lochner-era Court upheld antipeonage legislation 
prohibiting contracts for debt service (enacted in part to address African American involuntary 
servitude) on the ground that the particular people protected were not capable contractors. Risa 
L. Goluboff, The ThirteenthAmendment and the Lost Originsof Civil Rights, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1609, 1650 (2001). See also Aviam Soifer, The Paradoxof Paternalismand Laissez-Faire 
Constitutionalism: The United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5L. &HIST. REV. 249 (1987) 
(discussing Lochner-era rulings permitting labor market regulation for sailors, Native 
Americans, and peons). 
27. Important New Deal social and economic rights were designed to primarily benefit white 
male workers and their families. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 253-85 (1994); ROBERTC. LIEBERMAN, 
SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1998). Furthermore, the 
New Deal legislation actually enacted fell far short of the rights many workers supported. 
William E. Forbath, Caste, Class,andEqual Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-61 (1999). 
28. In response to neoclassical economist Alfred Marshall's admonition that "measures 
designed to raise the general level of civilisation of the workers must not interfere with the 
freedom of the market," T.H. Marshall answered, "[o]bviously this limitation on policy had 
since been abandoned. Socialist measures, in Marshall's sense, have been accepted by all 
political parties." MARSHALL, supranote 1,at 80-81. By using the term "civilized" to designate 
the cultural conditions that citizens should share, in place of Alfred Marshall's ideal of the 
"gentleman," see id. at.7, T.H. Marshall implicitly builds on a racialized ideal even as he rejects 
an explicitly class-based and gendered vision of citizenship. 
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874, 882 (1987) 
(explaining that in addition to the "received wisdom" criticizing Lochner for its "judicial 
activism," Lochnercan also be criticized for its substantive choice of a common law baseline for 
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constitutional rights-and in particular placed social and economic regulation outside 
constitutional concern.3 ° In the U.S., therefore, the kinds of broad social citizenship 
rights that Marshall envisioned-ensuring basic income security, education, health 
care, and housing, for example 31-never became elevated to the status of constitutional 
rights on par with constitutionalized political and civil rights. Although courts and 
scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s took some tentative steps in that direction,32 
by the end of the twentieth century, the accepted wisdom in American law pushed 
constitutional social citizenship rights "'off the table' and 'off the wall'," as William 
Forbath and Jack Balkin critically note.33 Forbath quotes Lawrence Lessig's 1996 
comment, for example, that one "uncontested 'background assumption"' of American 
constitutional law is the principle that "'our constitutional tradition' is indifferent to 
constitutional law). 
30. The classic case for the post-Lochnerrule on economic legislation is Williamson v.Lee 
Optical,348 U.S. 483 (1955) (establishing the minimal rationality test, which places economic 
and social regulation outside the scope of judicial scrutiny as long as it is hypothetically 
rational). See generallyRobert G. McCloskey, EconomicDue Processand the Supreme Court: 
An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34. The choice to reject the Lochner-era 
restrictions on Congressional powers by restricting individual constitutional rights rather than 
by expanding constitutional rights for workers was not inevitable, but rather was produced in 
part by the relative power of legal professionals over grassroots labor activists. James Gray 
Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Laborand the Shaping of 
American ConstitutionalLaw, 1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2002) (tracing activists' 
unsuccessful attempts to construe federal labor legislation as the enforcement of fundamental 
human rights grounded in the Civil War Amendments). 
31. See MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 48-66 (discussing British social citizenship rights to 
legal aid, housing, education, and income security). 
32. See Harperv. VirginiaBd. ofElections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ("Lines drawn on the basis 
of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored."); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET 
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 755 (3d ed. 1996) (giving examples of equal protection arguments in 
the cases Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ("In criminal trials a State can no more 
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color."); William E. 
Forbath, ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: A History,CritiqueandReconstruction,69 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1821, 1856-67 (2001) (discussing advocacy for due process rights for welfare 
recipients); see also Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the 
FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (developing a theory of a constitutional 
right to "minimum protection"). 
33. Forbath, supra note 32, at 1824; J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Helland OtherObjects of 
Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1733 (1997). In contrast, socioeconomic rights are 
commonly constitutionalized outside of the U.S. and are incorporated into international human 
rights law. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 221-37 
(2001) (discussing example of socioeconomic rights in the South African Constitution). 
However, even where these constitutional or international human rights protections are 
supported in theory, in practice these rights tend to be irrelevant or ineffective, in part because 
global financial structures often have increased the costs of enforcing these rights. See HEINZ 
KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL 
RECONSTRUCTION 50 (2000) (noting that the globalized capitalist economy imposes challenges 
for new movements for democracy, but rejecting the view that democratic nation states are 
powerless in the face of these international constraints). 
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'economic inequality.' 34 
But the rise of neoliberal ideology in the last decades of the twentieth century has 
done more than throw extra dirt on the grave of constitutionalsocial citizenship rights. 
Neoliberalism digs up a deeper challenge to social citizenship by undermining the 
legitimacy of nonconstitutionalrights to economic security for workers, consumers, 
and families in poverty. To justify their constitutional rulings, Lochner-eracourts 
conferred on some economic interests the status of property and liberty rights grounded 
in prepolitical universal principles while relegating other economic interests to the 
subordinate status of contingent government policy judgments. 35 Lochnerv. New York, 
for example, construed some employers' and workers' interest in making labor 
contracts unrestricted by maximum work hour laws as a natural right to personal 
liberty.36 Lochner did not consider, however, whether others' interest in maximum 
hour laws could also reflect individual political rights or different contractual rights; 
instead, the court debated only whether the law promoted the legitimate policy of 
public health or the illegitimate policy of labor market regulation. 37 In an infamous 
Lochner-eracase,the New York Court of Appeals invalidated that state's workers' 
compensation law by claiming such legislation reflected "philosophical or scientific 
speculation" or perhaps "commendable impulses of benevolence or charity," in 
contrast to what it claimed was a conflicting "right of property" that "has its foundation 
34. Forbath, supra note 32, at 1825 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, Fidelityand Constitutional 
Theory: Fidelityas Translation,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1507, 1509-10 (1997)). 
35. See Sunstein, supranote 29, at 884-86 (explaining that Lochner'sconstitutional theory 
rests on prior definitions of property and liberty interests as neutral and natural baselines). 
Sunstein criticizes Lochner for naturalizing nineteenth-century common law rights at the 
expense of statutory rights. Id. at 885. But these nineteenth-century common law ideas of 
property and contract themselves were hardly static or uncontested. See, e.g., MORTON J. 
HORWlTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977) (describing changes 
and controversies in common law definitions of property and liberty during the nineteenth 
century); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 226-27 (1990) (explaining 
that the Lochnerera's treatment of common law property rights as prepolitical, sacrosanct limits 
on government policy coincided with active judicial transformation of these rights in response 
to historical changes). While this construction of property rights was deeply intertwined with 
class politics, many scholars have concluded that the purpose and effect of this jurisprudence 
was more complex than a simple judicial favoring of "big business" over "the people." See 
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 248-50, 270 (1997) (arguing that this era's 
constitutional due process decisions fostered a shift toward an understanding of property as 
market commodity rather than as a device for social ordering). 
36. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract 
between the employer and employees, concerning the number of hours in which the latter may 
labor in the bakery of the employer."). Of course, this decision stood in the face of a long 
tradition of heavy regulation of labor contracts in Anglo-American law, and even the 
nineteenth-century move toward "free labor" was a product ofsocial and economic legislation 
that paradoxically restricted contractual rights. See ROBERTJ. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, 
AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001) (analyzing historical development of 
regulation of criminal and pecuniary sanctions for breach of labor contracts). 
37. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 64. 
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in the fundamental law." 38 Similarly, Coppagev. Kansasinvalidated a law forbidding
"yellow dog" contracts by characterizing the law as government "interference" with the 
"nature of things" that necessarily and normally requires contract and property rights to 
produce "inequalities of fortune."
39 
Mainstream law and policy still rejects Lochner's theory that social citizenship 
legislation aimed at reducing economic inequality counts as policy that breaches the 
Constitution.40 Nonetheless, mainstream law has thoroughly embraced the neoliberal 
framework, built on Lochner's foundations, that counts social citizenship laws as 
government policy that potentially breaches a naturalized market. Although the 
mainstream view claims to have debunked the Lochner-eramyth of prepolitical rights 
to property and contract, it sustains this myth by generally assuming a prepolitical (or 
at least apolitical) market. 4' This contemporary myth continues Lochner'ssubstance by 
contrasting social citizenship's "redistributive" policies with a presumptively normal 
market distribution, though the ground of the market has shifted from natural "human 
42 .43rights' to natural laws of economics. 
38. Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431, 439-40 (1911). 
39. 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). 
40. The project of resurrecting Lochner is not "off the table" of prominent scholarly 
discussion or powerful legal activism, though it is still mostly at the margins. For an explicit 
endorsement of Lochner's theory of economic liberty, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 5 (1985). The Institute for Justice was 
established in 1991 in part to revive Lochner's theory of economic liberty through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Clint Bolick, Dismantling 
Liberty's Slaughter-House, at http:/www.ij.orglslaughter%5Ffolder/SlaughteiClint.html 
(reprinting paper presented 1995). Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas affirmed this effort 
in his dissent in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999). See also William Greider, The 
Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century, NATION, Oct. 15, 2001, at 21 
(analyzing new corporate rights to be free from certain economic regulation under Chapter 11 of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement as part of a systematic legal strategy for restoring 
Lochner-era corporate rights to be free from social and economic regulation); Steve Louthan, 
Note, A Brave New Lochner Era?The ConstitutionalityofNAFTA Chapter11, 34 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L. L. 1443, 1445 (2001) (describing "the most significant evisceration of state police 
power" since Lochner). 
41. Political theorist Jennifer Nedelsky explains that the Legal Realist critique of Lochner 
has partly taken hold: "Virtually everyone pays lip service to the political nature of the law." 
NEDELSKY, supranote 35, at 255. 
But in ways that remain somewhat mysterious to me, mainstream legal scholarship 
manages to hold those views and proceed comfortably ahead with . .. 
presumptions such as the sharp split between the public and the private that are 
only fully intelligible if law, and property in particular, is something other than a 
set of policy choices backed by the power of the state. 
Id. "[Tihe tacit denial that property is a social construct is the foundation for everything from 
the public/private distinction to the ongoing market versus regulation debate and the debates 
over redistribution." Id. See also Warren J. Samuels, Commentary:An EconomicPerspectiveon 
the CompensationProblem,in LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 193-94 
(Warren J. Samuels &A. Allan Schmid eds., 1981) (criticizing conventional law-and-economics 
for failing to recognize that "[flights are made and remade, through both the law and the market; 
they are not found"). 
42. See Coppage,236 U.S. at 17 (describing the "right of private property" and "freedom of 
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Many have followed T.H. Marshall's lead in imagining this purported opposition 
between market rights and social rights can be bridged through delicate balancing." 
But, echoing Lochner, neoliberalism threatens such a balance by reducing social 
citizenship rights topolicy calculations-arguing that claims to such rights obscure the 
underlying questions about the costs and benefits of particular governmental choices.45 
contract" as human rights that the Constitution protects from state interference). 
43. 
The virtually uniform usage treats the distribution arising from market transactions 
as a given and asks whether reallocating that distribution is justified.... Even 
egalitarian liberals adopt the language that implies that it is rearranging the 
distribution of "the market" that requires justification. This discourse makes sense 
only if the rules of the market are not themselves the product of collective choices, 
but neutral and apolitical. 
NEDELSKY, supra note 35, at 259. See also Warren J. Samuels, Maximization of Wealth as 
Justice:An Essay on PosnerianLaw andEconomics as PolicyAnalysis, 60 TEx. L. REV. 147, 
168 n.145 (1981) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981)) 
(explaining that the law-and-economics critique of "redistribution" is premised on the 
"fallacious assumption that distribution... is independent of the law"). In his book defending 
equity over efficiency as a guide to law and policy, Cass Sunstein insists that "markets should 
be understood as a legal construct" neither natural nor voluntary and that "there is no opposition 
between 'markets' and 'government intervention."' CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 5, 384 (1997). At the same time, Sunstein reinforces Lochner's rhetoric of a 
choice between market freedom and government constraint by presenting the problem as a 
matter of weighing the costs of "government interferences" to promote social justice (in part 
through "command-and-control regulation") against the benefits of "market ordering" which he 
associates with "flexibility, respect for individual autonomy and initiative, and productive 
potential." See id. at 271, 386. 
44. See MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 9 (explaining that the rise of social rights has not 
eliminated the market, just kept it within limits); SUNSTEIN, supranote 43, at 386 (advocating a 
balance between "market ordering" and "social justice" that nonetheless gives social justice the 
priority); Patricia Hewitt, Social Justice in a GlobalEconomy?, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: THE 
CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OFT.H. MARSHALL 249, 260 (Martin Bulmer & Anthony M. Rees 
eds., 1996) (searching for ways to make social rights complementary rather than contradictory to 
civil rights in the global market). 
45. For a discussion criticizing how the prevailing emphasis on cost-benefit analysis 
dominates and trumps social citizenship's attention to rights, see Robin West, Rights, 
Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1921 (2001). In an example of 
the neoliberal argument, Klausen reduces social rights to "redistributive policies" by reasoning 
that social rights are unique in their dependence on a state's fiscal capacity and because they 
represent not individual freedoms against the state but coercion of other citizens through 
taxation. Klausen, supra note 12, at 245-46. Political and civil rights, however, also inherently 
depend on substantial government taxing and spending (reliable courts, domestic and 
international law enforcement, and voting machines are not cheap), as well as on private 
coercion (property rights confer power to restrict others, not just rights against the state). 
A parallel critique of rights from postmodern jurisprudence has perhaps reinforced law-and-
economics's selective cynicism about economic and social rights. Postmodern theory joins with 
law-and-economics in recognizing that rights are regulatory mechanisms that impose costs and 
restrictions as well as freedoms on their recipients. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541 (2001) (using example of regulatory effects of post-Civil War social 
and economic rights for African Americans to question contemporary feminist advocacy for 
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The right to health care, for example, boils down to a decision to divert dollars from 
taxpayers' income or employers' productivity, or perhaps education spending or 
environmental quality-and therefore is best debated as a calculation of the relative 
costs and benefits (health and otherwise) of such a policy. 46 Implementing neoliberal 
ideology, law-and-economics scholarship uses the market yardstick of efficiency-
purporting to measure the aggregate net societal benefits--to strike at the legitimacy of 
social and economic regulation as rooted in subjective moral bromides and partisan 
politics rather than in rigorous and objective rational principle.47 
. Neoliberalism therefore capitalizes on Lochner's legacy in two ways. First, it 
inherits the mantle of process-over-substance that embodies the legal system's 
rejection of Lochner-but shifts the measure of neutral process from democratic 
social citizenship rights for family caretakers). See also BARBARA CRUIKSHANK, THE WILL TO 
EMPOWER: DEMOCRATIC CmZENS AND OTHER SUBJECTS (1999) (exploring how citizenship 
rights discipline as well as empower the subjects they constitute). In theory, such postmodern 
analysis could also challenge law-and-economics's claims that objective cost-benefit 
calculations constitute a freedom-promoting alternative to rights reflecting power distributions 
fixed in some inevitable natural state beyond the reach of law. But Iworry that postmodern legal 
scrutiny of liberal rights tends not to go far enough to similarly challenge the prevailing 
neoliberal alternative to liberal rights. Without doing so, postmodern critics risk implicitly 
promoting the neoliberal illusion that a rights-free zone without (or with fewer) regulatory 
effects awaits those who reject liberal rights claims. For example, in her criticism of feminist 
advocacy for greater economic rights for family caregivers, Katherine Franke agrees that the 
prevailing construction of dependent care as a "private" part of a "natural" family unregulated 
by state or market is fiction. See Franke, supra,at 1544. Yet she nonetheless seems to build in 
this fiction and its mystification of existing economic rights by warning about the disciplinary 
effects of "inviting greater involvement from both state and market actors" into what she 
describes as private family rule. Id. See also Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes ofLaw, orHaleand 
Foucault!,15 LEGAL STUD. F. 327, 327, 357-58 (1991) (criticizing Foucault's postmodernism 
for incorporating a pre-realist understanding of the law that partly undermines its potential to 
debunk the (neo)liberal mystification of the market). 
46. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
CARE? (1997) (arguing that rights to health care mistakenly obscure inevitable tradeoffs); see 
also Hanson & Hart, supranote 4, at 329 (summarizing arguments in defense of the prevailing 
law-and-economics cost-benefit approach to policymaking). Criticizing the classic law-and-
economics arguments about the superiority of cost-benefit calculations as circular reasoning, 
economist Warren Samuels explains that costs are in turn a function of the existing system of 
rights. Samuels, supra note 43, at 159. 
47. See Greenspan, supranote 4; Armond M. Cohen, High-Tech Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
919, 922 (1986) (reviewing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984)) 
(criticizing Ackerman for adopting law-and-economics's false positivism by quoting his 
statements against "muddled efforts to improve upon the invisible hand" and legal realism's 
"loose talk of 'public policy,' 'unconscionability', 'unequal bargaining power' and the like" and 
his preference for the "hard analytic work" of scientific policy analysis); see also Kennedy, 
supra note 19, at 420 (explaining that "the notion of a 'tradeoff between the 'hard' datum of 
efficiency and the inherently subjective, 'political' datum of equity is apologetic nonsense"); 
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275, 1283 (1981) 
(criticizing cost-benefit analysis for its false scientism and for blocking more realistic 
approaches to public policy that would go beyond the typical neoclassical economic claim that 
"real explanation" of "why things are the way they are" is that "they have to be that way"). 
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governance to the market, which supposedly impartially reflects the aggregate of 
individual subjective preferences.48 Second, and more covertly, it embraces Lochner's 
substantive stand by embedding other social and economic rights in a naturalized 
market as baseline civil rights-and therefore not subject to the scrutiny of economic 
49process. 
The recent growth in interest in social citizenship theory, in legal scholarship and 
beyond 50 ° reflects in part a dissatisfaction with the primacy of process ideals in the 
post-Lochner era. Many legal experts and advocates have lost faith, for example, in the 
48. Legal scholar Edward Rubin discusses how legal process theory, which dominated 
American legal scholarship between the New Deal and the 1970s, resurrected from Lochner's 
grave the ideal of law's neutrality by presenting the majoritarian political process as the solution 
to the legal Realist's critique of law as politics. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, The 
Synthesis ofDiscourse, and the Microanalysis ofInstitutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395 
(1996). Rubin traces the demise of this legalprocess theory to the rise of law-and-economics 
along with critical legal scholarship (and related strands of critical "outsider" jurisprudence), 
each of which differently attacked the process school's faith that law can transcend subjective 
private interests. Id. at 1398-403. However, Rubin accepts law-and-economics's basic premise 
of anonpolitical resource-maximizing market, and overlooks critical scholars's arguments that 
market efficiency is incoherent (not just inequitable), because it rests on a false economic 
positivism that masks the political and distributive goals inherent in "efficiency." See id. at 
1402, 1430-31 (describing law-and-economics as focused on efficiency goals separable from 
and potentially complementary to critical scholarship's focus on equality). As a result, Rubin 
misplaces law-and-economics, both by overstating its distance from the legal process theory's 
illusion of formal neutrality, and by overstating its proximity to realist and critical scholars' 
efforts to expose law's formal principles as products of social context that further particular 
utilitarian goals. For some references to critical scholarship deconstructing efficiency concerns 
as logically indistinguishable from equality concerns, see KELMAN, supra note 9, at 142 ("The 
CLS claim, quite simply, is that there is absolutely no politically neutral, coherent way to talk 
about whether a decision is potentially Pareto efficient, wealth maximizing, or whether its 
benefits outweigh its costs."); McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 666 n. 18, 722 n.256. See 
also DUXBURY, supra note 23, at 302-11 (explaining that realism and law-and-economics have 
only superficial affinity). 
49. See Iglesias, supra note 2, at 384-86 (explaining that neoliberalism aims to make Third 
World human rights dependent on market wealth, rather than making market wealth dependent 
on human rights-but that the neoliberal market depends on government protection of elite 
property rights); Kennedy, supra note 13, at 566-70 (explaining the market's so-called freedom 
of contract as produced from a background of substantive legal rights); Duncan Kennedy, The 
Role ofLaw in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism ofCommodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 
939, 959 (1985) (explaining that efficient market outcomes are not "natural" but "decidedly 
artificial and manipulable" and inherently inseparable from distributive policies); Arthur Allan 
Leff, Economic Analysis ofLaw: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 480 
(1974) (criticizing law-and-economics scholarship for selectively removing some government-
enforced distributions of resources from its "economic" scrutiny as rights that form "an 
unquestionable grundnorm upon which to base efficiency analyses"); Samuels, supra note 43, at 
155-56 (criticizing Richard Posner's claim to "efficiency" as the standard for law and arguing 
that the concept of efficiency itself depends on unstated normative decisions to treat certain 
interests as rights). 
50. See, e.g., Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 1 (discussing recent increase in political 
theorists' interest in citizenship); see also sources cited supra note 1. 
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promise of formal equality principles to ease the divisions and hierarchies that have 
long snarled the hopes of American democracy.5 1 And although many share the 
neoliberal belief that the majoritarian political process has lost much of its post-
Lochner luster as a beacon for the public good, many nonetheless find the neoliberal 
market a pale substitute.5 2 For some law and policy analysts, T.H. Marshall's vision of 
substantive socioeconomic rights has cast new light into the perceived formal 
emptiness of political and civil rights. 3 
By picking up the thread of social citizenship, and exploring its possibilities for 
escaping neoliberalism's restraints on the welfare state, I aim to affirm this movement 
back to substantive values as the ground of law and policy. Yet framing the debate 
over economic welfare questions as social citizenship risks solidifying the exclusionary 
boundaries of national citizenship that reflect some of history's biggest moral 
failures.54 I intervene in the debate over social citizenship in hopes that T.H. 
Marshall's vision of citizenship can move beyond its nation-state limits to a vision of 
inclusive membership in a global human society.55 As neoliberalism has pursued a 
vision of global market rights for elite capital owners, questions of social citizenship 
protecting others' economic security similarly should take on global dimensions. 
The supposed triumph of the neoliberal global market56 brings new urgency to T.H. 
Marshall's concern with the potential tensions between what he identified as twentieth-
century social rights and nineteenth-century market rights.5 7 But the debate over the 
51. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1989) (proposing a theory of equality centered on eliminating the substantive 
harms of social caste); ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW (2001) (criticizing the dominant liberal and formalist conception of 
equality). 
52. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 43, at 318-25 (describing the failures of the New Deal 
ideal of a regulatory state that protects the public interest, but arguing for efficiency-oriented 
reforms that also preserve and improve democratic processes and public deliberation). 
53. See, e.g., Ignatieff, supra note 3, at 976 (invoking T.H. Marshall's model of social 
citizenship as an important correction to "purely formal" notions of civil and political 
citizenship). 
54. See Linda Bosniak, UniversalCitizenship& the ProblemofAlienage,94 Nw. U. L. REV. 
963 (2000) (criticizing new interest in Marshall's citizenship concepts for failing to address 
questions of rights for aliens); Nora V. Demlietner, The FallacyofSocial "Citizenship,"or the 
Threat of Exclusion, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35 (1997) (detailing the increasing exclusion of 
resident aliens from welfare programs); Gerald L. Neuman, Rhetorical Slavery, Rhetorical 
Citizenship, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1276 (1992) (criticizing the rhetorical strategy of promoting 
human rights "by enriching the conception of citizenship" because it risks reinforcing exclusion 
of noncitizens from important rights).
55. See Ignatieff, supra note 3, at 984 (advocating expanding citizenship to recognize a 
universal human subject in a world community and rejecting the old citizenship distinction 
between citizens and barbarians); Hewitt, supra note 44. Powerful national governments, 
however, are critical to the project of promoting and protecting global human rights. Ignatieff, 
supra note 3, at 984-85. 
56. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 16 (reporting the "apparent triumph" of"the 
market" over government in the newly liberalized global economy). 
57. See Bryan S. Turner, Outline ofa Theory of Citizenship, in 1CITIZENSHIP: CRITICAL 
CONCEPTS 199, 220-21 (Bryan S. Turner & Peter Hamilton eds., 1994) (describing citizenship 
as "a pressing theoretical issue" in light of global economic changes); Hewitt, supra note 44 
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tensions has focused on the appropriate balance between these rights without 
sufficiently exploring the underlying question of how this division itself shapes and 
limits citizenship ideas. From Lochner to twenty-first-century neoliberalism, opponents 
of the welfare state have aimed not just to defend the market, but also to construct a 
particular substantive vision of the market-and of political and civil rights-by telling 
stories that identify some elite economic interests as natural and necessary to the public 
interest. 
The two leading strands of social citizenship arguments in response to this recent 
neoliberal challenge, communitarianism and pro-welfare liberalism, both mistakenly 
build on, rather than deconstruct, neoliberalism's Lochner-eramyth of a natural and 
neutral market. By taking neoliberal free-market rhetoric at face value, these responses 
tend to misdirect their attention to reforming social citizenship rights in hopes of 
preserving that naturalized market while neoliberals (like their Lochner-era 
predecessors) actively restructure the market itself. 
First, communitarian critics tend to misconstrue neoliberalism as a project to 
promote individual freedom and value-neutral economics at the expense of social 
responsibility and community morality. Many communitarians argue that a new 
emphasis on public morality and individual obligations is the key to renewing or 
revising social citizenship. But this communitarian defense of the welfare state fails to 
understand that neoliberal efficiency redistributesrather than rejects community 
responsibility and moral commitments. 
Second, contemporary pro-welfare liberals misconstrue the neoliberal project as one 
that favors overall public well-being at the expense of individuals who lose out in the 
market. These pro-welfare liberals argue that a good society requires attention to 
shorter-term individual well-being, as well as to the longer-term aggregate gains of the 
market. This view attempts to revive social citizenship by striking a balance between 
the purported aggregate concerns of market efficiency and the individualized concerns 
of social equity. But this liberal response to neoliberalism fails to understand that 
neoliberal efficiency goals do not objectively promote the overall good at the expense 
of some individuals. Instead, neoliberalism promotes a vision of the public good based 
on the interests of the wealthiest individuals at the expense of the majority. 
This Article will explore the neoliberal arguments which have helped mobilize 
restrictive reforms in two U.S. income security programs during the 1990s: first, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), and second, workers' compensation. 
These two programs represent opposite sides of the line between redistribution and 
efficiency: AFDC is the classic redistributive program, while workers' compensation is 
the classic model of an efficiency-based welfare scheme. In both of these programs, 
however, the division between efficiency and redistribution serves to undermine 
rationales for social citizenship. For each program, I will analyze how neoliberal 
reform arguments use this division to obscure and reinforce a hierarchical vision of 
citizenship. 58 I will then examine how communitarianism and pro-welfare liberalism 
(discussing challenges facing social citizenship rights as global market rights expand). 
58. T.H. Marshall believed the term "citizenship" inherently expressed egalitarian principles. 
"Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who 
possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is 
endowed." MARSHALL, supra note 1, at 28-29. I follow others who instead recognize that 
citizenship ideals may not only exclude noncitizens, but also can embrace status hierarchies in 
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respond to neoliberal reform efforts. I argue that, for each social program, both of 
these citizenship visions end up reinforcing, rather than resisting, the antiegalitarian 
values of neoliberalism. 
I. AFDC 
In the United States, the debate over social citizenship has focused on the former 
federal program known as AFDC, which provided income support for single parent 
(and some unemployed two-parent) families in poverty. AFDC developed from the 
1935 Social Security Act's program called Aid to Dependent Children ("ADC");59 it 
then expanded in the 1960s and early 1970s as part of the Great Society's "war on 
poverty. 6 ° In its early years, political and public opinion largely (though tenuously) 
accepted ADC as a program consistent with social citizenship ideals on the theory that, 
by providing economic security for children, ADC would cultivate and protect the 
future citizens on whom society's long-term well-being depends. 61 The government 
committee that initiated the plan for ADC explained that freeing mothers from wage 
earning would help them "rear [their children] into citizens capable of contributing to 
society."62 A congressman explained the value of ADC (along with other child welfare 
programs) by imagining a "careworn, dejected widow" kissing away her children's 
tears as she tells them they will now have the financial aid to buy books and clothes so 
that they can go to public school and Sunday School.63 A 1946 government handbook 
which duties and rights are distributed unequally among members of different societal groups. 
See ROGERS SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 2 
(1997) (analyzing a long history of American law "shot through with forms of second-class 
citizenship, denying personal liberties and opportunities for political participation to most of the 
adult population on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and even religion"); CITIZENSHIP TODAY, 
supra note 1, at 275 (criticizing Marshall for failing to recognize the prevalence of partial 
citizenship status, particularly as applied to women). 
59. See GORDON, supranote 27, at 253-85 (discussing the development of the legislation 
producing ADC). 
60. See MICHAEL K. BROWN, RACE, MONEY AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 205-322 
(1999) (analyzing the development of the 1960s War on Poverty); see also RICKIE SOLINGER, 
BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION AND 
WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 145 (2001) (summarizing the dramatic increase in AFDC 
expenditures and number of recipients from 1958 to 1977). 
61. See GORDON, supra note 27, at 253-55, 293-303 (stating that ADC was among the least 
controversial parts of the 1935 Social Security Act because it was literally equated with the 
presumed benefits of motherhood); see also Linda C. McClain, Careas a Public Value: Linking 
Responsibility, Resources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1702 (2001) 
(explaining the idea of social contribution as "an important root" of AFDC). Nonetheless, this 
consensus in favor of ADC did not prevent itfrom being designed to provide meager benefits as 
a second-tier welfare program that reflected and reinforced women's subordinate citizenship 
status. 
62. 50TH ANNIVERSARY EDITION OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 
OF 1935 AND OTHER BASIC DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ACT 56 (Alan Pifer & Forrest Chisman eds., 1985). 
63. GORDON, supra note 27, at 254-55 (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 5862 (1935) (statement of 
Rep. Claude Fuller of Arkansas)). 
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on ADC emphasized the. social value of giving an impoverished mother the 
opportunity to choose to reject wage work in favor of "staying at home to care for her 
children. ' 64 
But by the end of the century, AFDC had become a prominent symbol of social 
pathology inimical to good citizenship. 65 In 1996, the movement for "welfare reform" 
culminated in the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act, 66 which eliminated AFDC and substituted a more limited and 
restrictive welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF").67 
What transformed AFDC from a means to social citizenship to its antithesis? Many 
scholars have analyzed how popular and political support for AFDC eroded as the 
program moved away from its original discriminatory focus on white widows and their 
children to provide increased benefits to women of color and to nonmarital children of 
all races-a change that accelerated with the civil rights movements of the 1960s.68 In 
short, the story of shifting political support for AFDC exemplifies how dominant 
visions of citizenship in the United States link economic rights to race, gender, and 
sexual status.69 The persistently powerful view that the good society rests on 
maintaining the political, economic, and social dominance of white men tends to limit 
political support for broad-based economic equality. 70 The original ADC's minimal 
64. BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK 
OF PUB. ASSISTANCE Part IV, §§ 3401, 3401.1 (1946), discussedin SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 
148. 
65. See KATz, supra note 1, at 1 (describing AFDC as the most disliked public program in 
America by the 1990s); DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD 
WELFARE 174 (2002). 
66. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105.. 
67. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 317-28 (discussing the political and social events that led 
Congress to end AFDC and enact TANF). 
68. See KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE 
CARD AGAINST AMERICA'S POOR 17-35 (2001) (analyzing the scholarly literature attributing 
declining support for welfare to gendered racism); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: 
How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 117-34 (1994) (analyzing how the 1960s 
expansions of AFDC were undermined by white resistance to African American struggles for 
equality); ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 16 (explaining that beginning in the 1960s, "[tihe image 
of the welfare mother changed from the worthy white widow to the immoral Black welfare 
queen."). 
69. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the ProblemofBlack Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 
1563, 1566 (1996) ("Black citizenship is at once America's chief reason for and impediment to 
a strong welfare state."); see also CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 111-15 (1997) (analyzing how race played a 
"'bridge' role" in breaking apart the New Deal coalition and shifting popular opinion against 
1960s welfare state expansions). 
70. See QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 4-5 (concluding that Americans have sacrificed an 
adequate welfare state as the price Of excluding African Americans from the national 
community); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 38 (concluding that all poor people are 
hurt by the fact that "many whites today will not lend any support to government programs that 
they even suspect might be targeted at helping 'those undeserving' black people"); id. at 31 
(summarizing their thesis that the stigmatization of African American women on welfare is a 
part of a process of racial control to defend white hegemony and patriarchy). 
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support targeted at the marital children and widows of white men somewhat eased 
economic inequality among white families while maintaining a social order stratified 
by race, gender, and sexuality.71 Efforts to expand AFDC's support for families of 
color and for white women and children outside of male controlled families directly 
threatened this hierarchical social order. 72 White supremacist and misogynist politics, 
media images, and popular prejudices-both intentional and unconscious-have been 
central to efforts to restrict AFDC from the 1960s through the 1990s.
73 
Nonetheless, facially neutral rationales have been critical to the political success of 
efforts to change AFDC from an accepted part of social security to a major social 
threat. It is this ostensively neutral ground that I aim to excavate. In particular, a 
change in prevailing economic ideology has covered and legitimated caste-based 
opposition to ADFC by making race, gender, and class stratification seem scientifically 
justified as "efficient." 
71. For descriptions of the pervasive race and gender discrimination in ADC, the precursor 
to AFDC, see GORDON, supra note 27, at 275-85; LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 118-61; 
NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 46-59; QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 119-20. 
72. See, e.g., QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 128 (explaining that Nixon's proposed family 
income support expansion failed because Southern politicians recognized its potential to 
undermine black subordination in southern labor markets and in other political institutions of 
white privilege); George Gilder, The Coming Welfare Crisis, 11 HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV. 
24, 26 (1980) (stating that the "most fundamental" problem with AFDC is that it tends to 
"destroy the key role and authority of the father"). 
73. In the 1960s, AFDC benefit restrictions were used as part of explicit strategies by white 
politicians to maintain racial segregation and white political dominance in Louisiana, 
Newburgh, New York, and Washington, D.C. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 69-114. 
The prevailing media images of the poor changed from white to black in 1965, right after the 
1964 War on Poverty and Civil Rights legislation (and far out of proportion to the actual racial 
distribution of poverty). See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, 
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 113-16 (1999) (surveying magazine pictures of the 
poor in Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Rep. from 1950 through 1992 and finding an 
increase in pictures of blacks from 27% in 1964 to 49% in 1965). From the mid-1960s through 
the 1990s, the mass media continued to disproportionately identify welfare use with African 
Americans and to single out African Americans to illustrate negative coverage of welfare 
(especially welfare fraud) but to use European Americans to illustrate the deserving poor. See 
id. at 121-32. Polling data for the late 1980s through the 1990s show persistent (and sometimes 
increasing) white stereotyping of African Americans as lazy, unwilling to work, and 
undeserving of welfare. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 133-34 (summarizing various 
surveys); Roberts, supra note 69, at 1566 ("white Americans have resisted the expansion of 
welfare precisely because of its benefits to Blacks"). For a discussion of how discussions of 
AFDC policy have relied on and reinforced patriarchal ideology, see MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES 106-25 (1995); SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 67-68; GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S 
END 36-42, 79-87 (1998). 
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A. Reconstructingthe Economics ofRedistribution 
1. The Rise and Fall of Keynesianism 
Defenders and critics across the political mainstream traditionally have agreed that 
AFDC is a classic example of a policy that represents government redistribution rather 
than market efficiency. 74 However, AFDC's rise and fall tracks a dramatic change in 
prevailing economic views about the relationship between these two apparent goals. As 
part of the 1935 Social Security Act's income support programs, ADC developed 
under the growing influence of Keynesian economics, which dominated U.S. theory 
and policy from the mid-1930s through the early 1970s.75 Keynesianism accepted the 
neoclassical economic premise of a scientific division between redistribution and 
efficiency, but it modified neoclassicism's tendency to support laissez-faire "free 
market" policies by repositioning equitable redistribution as a means towardeconomic 
efficiency. 76 In particular, Keynesianism predicted that the size of the overall economic 
pie (efficiency) sometimes could be increased by aggressive public spending aimed at 
increasing income among the working class and poor.77 According to Keynes, under 
certain conditions, this increased income would promote mass consumption-a rise in 
demand-that would lead to expanded production and investment.78 As historian Alan 
Brinkley has explained, policymakers in the late 1930s and early 1940s "fused the idea 
of the welfare state to the larger vision of sustained economic growth by defining 
social security mechanisms as ways to distribute income and enhance purchasing 
power., 79 Embracing the theory it would reject a half-century later, the 1944 
Democratic Party platform presented aggressive spending on social welfare programs 
74. See, e.g., ALAN S. BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS: TOUGH MINDED ECONOMICS 
FOR A JUST SOCIETY 28 (1987) (noting AFDC as an "explicitly redistributive" policy). 
75. Keynesianism is named for the work of John Maynard Keynes, especially his book THE 
GENERALTHEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936). See Alan Brinkley, The New 
Deal andthe Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 96-
100 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (describing how, in his second term, President 
Roosevelt justified new government economic protections for workers as beneficial to business, 
reflecting a shift toward what would become known as Keynesian economic ideas); see also 
BLAUG, supra note 16, at 642 (stating that "[w]ithin the space of about a decade, 1936-1946, the 
vast majority of economists throughout the Western world were converted to the Keynesian way 
of thinking"); GODFREY HODGSON, THE WORLD TURNED RIGHT SIDE UP: A HISTORY OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY IN AMERICA 186-203 (1996) (describing the challenges to 
Keynesianism during the late 1960s and early 1970s that led to its demise). 
76. See YONAY, supra note 16, at 10-11 (summarizing historical arguments about 
Keynesianism as both a revolution against and a continuation of neoclassicism). 
77. See Brinkley, supra note 75, at 97-98 (explaining that, although government subsidies 
had been a central pre-New Deal strategy for promoting economic growth, Keynesian policies 
shifted the focus of government economic development subsidies from production (capital 
owners and farmers) to consumption (workers and the poor)). 
78. For a summary of Keynes's theory of how consumption can drive economic growth, see 
Amy Koritz & Douglas Koritz, Checkmating the Consumer: Passive Consumption and the 
Economic Devaluationof Culture, 7 FEMINIST ECON. 45, 50 (2001). 
79. Brinkley, supra note 75, at 109. 
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as a central means to overall prosperity.
80 
But in the 1970s, amidst global economic changes that confounded standard 
Keynesian policy prescriptions and amidst a white backlash against government 
support for racial equality, a well-funded neoliberal movement coalesced to position 
efficiency more firmly against equity.8 1This movement aimed to replace Keynesian 
demand-side government stimulus policies with increased emphasis on "private 
market" incentives and "supply-side" stimulus policies, including tax cuts, deregulation 
of business, reduced government social spending, and constricted money supply.8 2 This 
newly prevailing economic theory predicted that "free market" policies benefiting 
wealthy capital owners at the expense of others would promote economic growth that 
would, in the long run, trickle down to benefit society as a whole. 
While claiming mathematical ground, anti-Keynesian economic ideas drew on and 
helped refurbish moralistic and antiegalitarian resistance to the 1960s erosion of a 
social order grounded in racial and sexual control.83 For example, in 1977, Nobel 
Laureate economist James Buchanan and coauthor Richard Wagner warned that the 
Keynesian policies favoring inflation over unemployment contributed to "increasingly 
liberalized attitudes toward sexual activities, a declining vitality of the Puritan work 
ethic ... [and the] explosion of the welfare rolls. '84 Anti-Keynesian economic rhetoric 
about the failures of "big government" took root in a sociopolitical context that linked 
a strong federal government with equal protection for African Americans (in contrast, 
80. Id. at 110. 
81. See HODGSON, supra note 75, at 186-215 (explaining "The Strange Death of John 
Maynard Keynes"); ROBERT KUTrNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE 34-35 (1997) (describing the 
intellectual counterrevolution of the 1970s). Godfrey Hodgson describes how major Fortune 
500 corporations formed the Business Roundtable in 1972, which joined with a group of 
conservative foundations to attack Keynesian economic policies and to instead advance the 
interests of wealthy capital owners. HODGSON, supra note 75, at 206-08. For a summary of 
conservative think tanks' effective marketing of opposition to Keynesian welfare state policies, 
see THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS & 
TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 167 (1991); KATz, supra note 1, at 21-23; JEAN STEFANCIC & 
RICHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS 
CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA 82-95 (1996). For an analysis of Keynesianism's failures 
as a problem of insufficient rather than excessive attention to equity, see James Crotty, The Rise 
andFallof the keynesian Revolution in the Age ofthe GlobalMarketplace,in CREATING ANEW 
WORLD ECONOMY 163-80 (Gerald Epstein et al., eds. 1993). 
82. HODGSON, supra note 75, at 194-203 (describing promotion of antitax theories and 
monetarism); see also DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE REVIVAL OF MARKET IDEOLOGY IN THINKING 
THROUGH THE SEVENTIES (Casey Blake & Kenneth Cmiel ed., forthcoming 2003). Some of the 
supply-side policies and theories were quickly discredited, but the general shift in economic 
theory away from Keynes persisted. See HODGSON, supranote 75, at 214. 
83. See HODGSON, supranote 75, at 213 (discussing the "interweaving of developments in 
the world of academia and the intellectuals, on the one hand, and the turning tide of national 
politics"). For discussions of the centrality of mathematical reasoning to economics in the 
second half of the twentieth century, see Robert M. Solow, How did EconomicsGet That Way 
and What Way Didit Get?, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. (Winter 1997) 55-56; YONAY, supranote 
16, at 185-90. 
84. JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT 64-65 (1977) 
(discussed and criticized in BLINDER, supra note 74, at 50-51). 
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Keynesianism had flourished during a period when the growth in the federal 
government often accommodated and sometimes strengthened white supremacy). 
85 
From the late 1970s through 1990s, a substantial portion of prominent experts and 
popular opinion targeted criticism of government spending toward the few (and 
comparatively meager) programs disproportionately aiding racial minorities.8 6 Right-
wing political activists strategized to join this new economic policy with conservative 
social policies as a means of building a new coalition between wealthy beneficiaries of 
"free market" economics and working-class white men threatened by race and gender 
equality.87 Robert Kuttner observes that economic scholarship alleging a scientific 
basis for favoring resource distribution through "free markets" rather than "politics" 
was often heavily subsidized by elites who were simultaneously engaging in concerted 
political action to redistribute government power in their favor.8 8 
Well-organized and well-funded lobbying by organized capital and corporate 
interests helped drain political support for government antipoverty programs, for 
example by promoting policies shifting more of the tax burden for welfare programs 
from corporations and capital owners to low and moderate income workers.8 9 As newly 
85. See generallyNOBLE, supra note 69, at 111-15 (explaining how white opposition to the 
spread of the civil rights movement helped promote resistance to federal government spending, 
weakening support for New Deal liberalism); QUADAGNO, supra note 68 (showing how a white 
backlash against the civil rights movement defeated attempts to extend New Deal government 
antipoverty spending); see also SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 142-43 (suggesting that, as federal 
government spending became linked to the civil rights movement, many white Americans came 
to identify federal social programs with the negative image of the "welfare queen"). 
86. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supranote 81, at 152-53 (analyzing public opinion poll data to 
explain antigovernment sentiment in 1980 as white opposition to programs specifically 
perceived as aiding Blacks and Hispanics); ROBERT RECTOR & WILLIAM F. LAUBER, AMERICA'S 
FAILED $5.4 TRILLION WAR ON POVERTY 44 (1995) (focusing discussion in this highly 
influential think tank paper almost entirely on AFDC while combining its relatively small costs 
with many other welfare state programs to come up with enormous cost figures); STEFANCIC & 
DELGADO, supra note 81, at 82-95 (analyzing think tanks and foundations that promoted 
intellectual experts' attacks on AFDC in particular). The Reagan Administration's social 
spending cuts were focused on the programs serving a large percentage of African American 
beneficiaries and often employing a large percentage of African American staff. EDSALL & 
EDSALL, supra note 81, at 192. In contrast to conservative intellectuals, experts and their 
funders more sympathetic to welfare state programs may have devoted less effort to promoting 
programs like AFDC associated primarily with African Americans (in part out of belief in the 
need to accommodate racism or sexism and to instead focus on more universalist welfare 
strategies). See, e.g., BLINDER, supra note 74 (making unemployment reduction the centerpiece 
of his "soft-hearted" answer to economic insecurity and defending government social spending 
without discussing race or gender inequality or AFDC in particular); see Roberts, supranote 69, 
at 1588-93 (summarizing and criticizing liberals' universalist strategy for defending AFDC). 
87. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 81, at 141 (giving the example of a 1977 speech by 
Ronald Reagan on the importance of linking conservative economic and social issues). 
88. See KUTTNER, supranote 81, at 341-42 (criticizing public choice and law-and-economics 
theories). 
89. See NOBLE, supra note 69, at. 129 (noting that, since the 1960s, both political parties 
have adopted this upwardly redistributive change in the tax burden); see alsoEDSALL & EDSALL, 
supra note 81, at 160-61 (giving data showing how this shift in the tax burden helped 
Republicans and also redistributed the tax burden from whites to blacks during the 1980s). 
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mobilized and newly mobile employers seized a larger share of economic gains from 
workers, 9° influential pro-welfare liberal intellectuals joined conservatives in blaming 
most Americans' economic insecurity on government intervention in the market rather 
than on the particular market and government changes driving American 1970s 
stagflation. 91By 1980, as historian Michael Katz notes, "Keynesian economics, which 
had sustained the welfare state, appeared dead. 92 A new consensus has formed for the 
view that social welfare programs generally exact a tradeoff from overall economic 
growth-though many still disagree about the degree to which equity should be 
sacrificed for efficiency. 
93 
2. The Triumph of the Neoliberal Double Bind 
This post-Keynesian economic orthodoxy continues to present a policy choice 
between the goals of efficiency and redistribution, now simply rearranged as generally 
competing values.94 But neoliberal ideology, which embraces efficiency as the superior 
goal, recognizes and reinforces an implicit double bind in that choice.95 The 
neoclassical framework inherently devalues redistribution as a goal bound to fail.
96 
Based on the definitional opposition between redistribution and efficiency, neoclassical 
economics posits that redistributive policies redirect resources away from efficient 
allocations that maximize aggregate resources to instead increase the share of 
resources received by a particular segment of society. But, in exchanging a bigger 
"pie" overall for a bigger slice for some, the prevailing economic theory predicts that 
redistributive policies will affirmatively increase overall costs by producing incentives 
for further inefficiency. Distorted market price signals risk shrinking the "pie" even 
more. As a result, the beneficiaries of the redistribution may end up with a smaller slice 
90. See NOBLE, supra note 69, at 106-08; see also HODGSON, supra note 75, at 302-04. 
91. See KU'ITNER, supra note 81, at 34-38 (discussing how liberal intellectuals joined 
conservatives in rejecting Keynesianism and promoting the belief that free markets are superior 
to government intervention). 
92. KATZ, supra note 1, at 24 (citing HODGSON, supra note 75, at 214). 
93. See KurrNER, supra note 81, at 35-37 (describing ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND 
EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975) and CHARLES SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE 
INTEREST (1977); see generally ROBERT KUTrNER, THE ECONOMIC ILLUSION (1984) (challenging 
Okun's assumed equity/efficiency tradeoff). 
94. See, e.g., BLINDER, supra note 74, at 30-31 (describing what he sees as an ethical choice 
between principles of equity and efficiency); see POSNER, supra note 5, at 275 (asserting that 
efficiency is "just one value" choice that can be weighed against the competing value ofjust 
distribution); Hanson & Hart, supra note 4, at 329-30 (concluding that while many reject the 
law-and-economics premise that "efficiency should serve as the goal of law" many or perhaps 
most agree that efficiency should be one goal of the legal system to be weighed against 
competing goals such as equity) (emphasis in original). 
95. See McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supra note 12, at 124-25 (explaining how both 
choices in the efficiency/equfty framework work as losing choices for many women,just like the 
losing choices presented by the equal treatment/special treatment dilemma in equality theory). 
96. Id. at 125 (showing how the efficiency/redistribution choice is skewed against 
redistribution, just like the equal treatment/special treatment choice is skewed to privilege 
"equality" over "difference"). 
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than they would have without that redistribution.97 Moreover, those most in need of 
redistribution may be the ones most harmed by the shrinking economic "pie" that 
98redistribution supposedly produces. 
In contrast to this double bind, efficiency goals tend to offer a double benefit, in 
prevailing neoclassical economic theory. By neoclassical definition, efficiency means 
internalizing costs so that the total societal costs are taken into account, thereby 
producing price signals that produce incentives for further maximizing resources. 
Efficient policies increase net aggregate gain regardless of the particular distribution 
among individuals or subgroups. Although some may lose out in the short run, 
neoliberal theory asserts that in the long run, a larger pie will also make it easier to 
make up for those losses with larger slices for all.99 In neoclassical economic theory, 
and the neoliberal ideology that embraces and promotes this theory, efficiency (rather 
than egalitarian redistribution) best leads to long-term equity as well.' ° 
Two prominent post-Keynesian approaches to reviving social citizenship, 
communitarianism and pro-welfare liberalism, join the general consensus by accepting 
the basic neoclassical economic assumption of a tough tradeoff between efficiency 
versus equity. These approaches try to carve out a space for redistribution within the 
neoclassical double bind by taking steps to minimize the harmful societal effects of 
redistribution it predicts. But those strategies for accommodating equity with efficiency 
end up reinforcing rather than resisting the double bind that makes welfare seem so 
costly. Instead, defenders of welfare should challenge the double standard underlying 
the neoliberal double bind, and the hierarchical vision of citizenship it both obscures 
and promotes. This double standard identifies some people's interests in increasing 
their share of the pie as part of an efficient and naturalized market that benefits the 
public, while others' interests in increasing their share of the pie are instead labeled 
redistributive, and therefore potentially harmful to the public well-being. 
In Part I.B below, I will analyze how the neoliberal double bind operated to 
promote and rationalize the welfare reform movement that led to ADFC's demise. I 
will end this Part by contrasting the neoliberal vision of citizenship that underlies this 
double bind with three alternative (but not politically prominent) citizenship visions 
that directly reject the dichotomy that has constrained both Keynesian and post-
Keynesian welfare policy. In Parts I.C and I.D, I will then explore the two more 
prominent responses to the neoliberal critique of AFDC and show how they fail to 
escape the neoliberal double bind. 
97. See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Reality of Redistribution,in POVERTY & INEQUALITY: 
ECONOMICS OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 127-31 (Jon Neill ed., 1997). 
98. Id. 
99. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich-a leader of efforts to end AFDC-argued "that 
emphasizing redistribution is a dead loser in helping the poor, compared to focusing on the 
production of wealth .. " Newt Gingrich, Remarks at Progress and Freedom Foundation 
Conference (Jan. 22, 1996), availableat LEXIS, News Library, Fed. News Service file. The 
objective, historic long-term fact is "that societies which focus on getting rich bring everybody 
up at a dramatically faster rate than societies which focus on redistribution succeed in raising the 
bottom." Id. 
100. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 719-20 & nn.248-49 (discussing and 
criticizing this theory). 
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B. NeoliberalCitizenshipand Welfare Reform 
1. AFDC as Moral Hazard 
In particular, neoliberalism has used the seemingly technical economic tool of 
"moral hazard" to reposition AFDC from social virtue to social vice. This concept is at 
the center of arguments that AFDC benefits do not spill over from individual recipients 
to enhance society as a whole (as originally claimed), but instead produce larger 
negative effects that damage society. 10' "Moral hazard" appears to shift such 
arguments linking welfare to social pathology away from their timeworn foundations in 
race, gender, and sexual status to instead ground them in seemingly more neutral 
questions of costly conduct.1
02 
The term "moral hazard," which developed from insurance industry practices and 
has been incorporated into neoclassical economic analysis, 103 refers to the problem that 
those who are "insured" (protected from bearing costs) tend to take less care to reduce 
those costs, to the extent those costs remain under the "insured's" control. 104 While 
efficient market incentives "internalize" social costs so that self-interested individuals 
also act in the interest of society as a whole, redistribution (by neoclassical definition) 
alters the cost-benefit calculations faced by individuals so that their self-interested 
actions diverge from the overall interest of society. Moral hazard describes the 
problem that those who are protected by redistribution against the costs of certain 
actions will tend to increase those activities more than they would if they faced the full 
costs. 
Applying the moral hazard theory to AFDC, critics often argued that by giving 
needy families income support, AFDC made more families needy.1°5 In the 
conventional economic analysis, AFDC's income protection for poverty-stricken single 
101. This Article benefits from Tom Baker's groundbreaking critical analysis of the use of 
moral hazard in arguments for welfare reform. See Tom Baker, The Genealogy of Moral 
Hazard,75 TEx. L. REV. 237, 237-40 (1996). 
102. For example, Lawrence Mead argues that white opposition to black welfare recipients is 
motivated not by white opposition to blacks' citizenship status, but by white opposition to 
blacks' dependency behavior. Lawrence M. Mead, The Politics of Conservative Welfare 
Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 207-08 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 
2001). 1will show below how this shift from status to conduct runs back to status. See infra 
Parts I.B.2-I.B.3. For discussions of the slippage between status and conduct in the history of 
the insurance industry's use of the term "moral hazard," see Baker, supranote 101, at 250-62; 
CAROL HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985). Scholars of other legal shifts from status to conduct have traced 
a similar slippage, similarly recognizing the interdependence of these two concepts. See, e.g., 
JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 126 (1999) 
(discussing how antigay policies "render status a sign of conduct and vice versa"). 
103. For thorough and excellent analyses of moral hazard, see generally Baker, supra note 
101; HEIMER, supranote 102. 
104. Baker, supra note 101, at 239. 
105. See, e.g., RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 86, at 3. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 319 
(discussing and criticizing these arguments). See generallyBaker, supranote 101 (explaining 
and criticizing the moral hazard rationale for reducing welfare programs). 
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:783 
mothers (who are the vast majority of beneficiaries) reduced their incentives to avoid 
the costs of single motherhood by staying in the wage labor market, by avoiding 
pregnancy and child-rearing, or by marrying wage-earning men. °6 This moral hazard 
theory explains that AFDC created a cycle of dependency whereby more women are 
encouraged to take less care to escape their poverty.10 7 As a result of these "perverse 
incentives," according to this theory, in the long run the increasing reliance on welfare 
support hurts both its beneficiaries and the public in general.1
08 
The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation replacing AFDC with TANF aimed to 
reduce this moral hazard by reorienting the program to a more market-oriented 
approach that minimizes protection from the need to seek wage work. 0 9 For example, 
the replacement TANF program requires states to establish five-year lifetime 
cumulative time limits for receiving welfare (with some exceptions) to ensure that 
families in poverty use income support only as a transition to wage work, not as a long-
term substitute for wage income."0 The reforms explicitly state that welfare assistance 
is no longer an entitlement owed by the federal government to all qualifying citizens, 
but instead is a state-controlled program contingent on funding availability."' In 
addition, TANF requires a substantial portion of each state's welfare recipients (50% 
by 2002) to participate in thirty hours a week of nonfamily work activities (including 
waged work, unpaid workfare, high school education, or short-term job training) while
2 
receiving benefits." 
2. Double Standard of AFDC's Moral Hazard 
Neoliberalism's emphasis on economic efficiency overturns the social citizenship 
rationale of AFDC not because its economic view brings to light previously 
unrecognized incentive effects, but because neoliberal economics values long-
recognized incentive effects differently, based on a different vision of citizenship. 
Deborah Stone explains that incentives produced by protection against losses can be 
"moral opportunities" rather than "moral hazards."" 3 To construct AFDC's incentives 
as public harms, rather than as public gains, the neoliberal "moral hazard" critique 
builds on status-based moral and political judgments. 
106. See, e.g., OKUN, supra note 93, at Ill (noting such incentives as an example of the 
efficiency costs of AFDC). 
107. See RECTOR &LAUBER, supra note 86, at 3. 
108. See McCluskey, Subsidized Lives, supranote 12, at 125-26, 138-49 (explaining and 
criticizing this theory). 
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000 &Supp. 2002) (purpose statement); see KATZ, supranote 
1, at 324 (stating that, as a result of the TANF legislation, "market models now pervaded the 
goals, administration, and philosophy of welfare"). 
110. See 42.U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000 & Supp. 2002); JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL 
HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, & WELFARE 7 (1997). 
111.42 U.S.C. §601(b) (2000). 
112.42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000 & Supp. 2002); see HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 
6-7. 
113. Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard:InsuranceasMoral Opportunity,6 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 11 (2000). 
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a. Recipients' Bargaining Power 
First, the incentive effects neoliberalism calls "moral hazard" boil down to 
questions of relative bargaining power. As one party to a transaction gets more 
bargaining power in relation to another, that party is better able to shift the costs of the 
transaction to the other party. Bargaining power depends on relative elasticity of 
supply and demand: a party with relatively elastic demand for a particular product can 
buy less as the price rises-using substitute products as protection against increased 
costs-while a party with relatively inelastic demand for a particular product will 
absorb more of any price increase. The standard moral hazard principle that protection 
against the costs of certain choices induces more of those costly choices can be restated 
as the theory that protection against the costs of certain choices induces fewer costly 
alternative choices. 
By providing a partial substitute for wage work (or for wage-earning spouses), 
welfare programs like the former AFDC can increase impoverished parents' bargaining 
power-that is, their relative elasticity of demand for wages (or for wage-earning 
spouses). That means welfare makes impoverished single mothers more sensitive to the 
costs of wage income (or marriage): they become less captive "customers" in the labor 
(or marriage) market, able to reduce wage labor (or marriage) as the costs of that labor 
(or marriage) rise so that they are able to hold out for higher quality jobs (or spouses or 
other intimate relationships)." 4 This change in bargaining power that enables families 
to avoid rather than absorb certain costs decreases those families' incentives to reduce 
the costs of poverty by marrying or earning wages-the so-called moral hazard effect. 
Of course, these incentive effects exist only to the extent that impoverished single 
mothers have control overjobs (or spouses), and only to the extent that income support 
such as AFDC provides a substitute for wage income (or for wage-earning spouses). 1
5 
Nonetheless, to some extent and in some contexts, welfare benefits potentially give 
recipients more bargaining power with which to refuse work or family arrangements 
that interfere with their perceived well-being (whether economic, social, physical, or 
emotional). 
The purportedly economic term "moral hazard" begs the inherently political 
114. See, e.g., ANN CRITrENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT 
JOB INTHE WORLD IS SILL THE LEAST VALUED 114 (2001) (giving examples of mothers who 
chose not to leave abusive husbands because of lack of sufficient alternative income supports). 
Similarly, AFDC can improve impoverished mothers' bargaining power in the adoption and 
foster care markets. Family income support policies are thoroughly interwoven with adoption 
and foster care policies, as Dorothy Roberts expertly explains. See generally, ROBERTS, supra 
note 65. For some impoverished women, relinquishing parental rights has been a substitute 
(however inadequate, painful, and undesired) for parental income as a means of meeting the 
financial demands of raising children. Changes in ADC and AFDC availability to white 
unmarried mothers have been directly related to the "supply" of white American babies for 
adoption. See SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 20-32, 76-77, 124-25. The recent welfare reforms 
replacing AFDC with TANF have directly reduced impoverished mothers' ability to retain 
parental rights to their children, and have sharply increased the breakup of African American 
families in particular-transferring many black children into foster care, and to a lesser extent, 
into the (often subsidized) care of wealthier adoptive parents. See generallyROBERTS, supra 
note 65; see SOLINGER, supranote 60, at 183-95. 
115. See infraPart I.D.2. 
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question why any particular change in bargaining power is a dangerous moral problem 
rather than a valuable moral opportunity. Throughout the history of AFDC and its 
precursor ADC, the question whether welfare recipients' increased bargaining power is 
good or bad has turned on prevailing judgments about their citizenship status, typically 
based on moral views about their race, gender, class, and sexuality. AFDC lost its 
virtue in the 1960s not because it changed the behavior of single mothers, but because 
(in the prevailing view) the behavior changes it facilitated were virtuous mainly when 
targeted to white mothers with marital children. 
To the extent it increased the bargaining power of recipients, the income support of 
ADC and AFDC encouraged a change in conduct that threatened social, economic and 
political stratification: more power to negotiate for different choices means more 
power to resist the bad choices that represent and reinforce subordinate status. 
Government officials originally construed the behavioral changes induced by ADC as 
moral opportunities, not moral hazards, because of political interest in protecting the 
citizenship status of white widows and their children (to a limited extent). In 1942, for 
example, government officials advocated more generous benefits free of work 
requirements precisely because they wanted to increase incentives for (presumably 
white) mothers to "stay at home where they were needed."' 16 In theory, more income 
support for certain parents can induce more of those parents not just to choose more 
welfare income over other alternatives (more wage income or less family care), but 
also can induce parents to reduce the costs of those other alternatives-allowing them 
to hold out for better choices among jobs, child care, or intimate partners. In 1946, a 
government handbook described ADC's incentive effects as a socially valuable 
increase in choices for eligible mothers: reduced economic pressure for wage work 
meant white mothers would have more power to decide how best to meet their own and 
their children's needs."17 
In contrast, increased choices for some women and children have counted as moral 
hazards because of political resistance to improving their citizenship status. In what 
legal scholar Dorothy Roberts explains as "a deliberate effort to maintain a Black 
' menial labor market caste in the South," " 8 New Deal politicians and planners carefully 
designed the original ADC to preserve and enhance racial stratification." 9 In 1939, a 
southern field representative reported that race discrimination in welfare reflected a 
unanimous feeling on the part of the staff and board that there were more work 
opportunities for Negro women and to [the welfare board's] intense desire not to 
interfere with local labor conditions. The attitude that "they always have gotten 
along," and that "all they'll do is have more children" is definite.' 
20 
116. SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 148 (quoting BLANCHE COLL, SAFETY NET: WELFARE AND 
SOCIAL SECURITY, 1929-1979, 120 (1995). 
117. BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, 
HANDBOOK OF PUB. ASSISTANCE Part IV, §§ 3401, 3401.1(1946), discussedin SOUNGER, supra 
note 60, at 148. 
118. ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 179. 
119. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 27, at 118-76; NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 53. 
120. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 39 (citing quote from WINIFRED BELL, AID To 
DEPENDENT CHILDREN 34-35 (1965)). 
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Another Southern welfare administrator in the 1930s justified race discrimination in 
ADC by explaining that there is "no reason why the employable Negro mother should 
not continue her usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefinite domestic service rather 
than receive a public assistance grant."' '2 Some western states similarly excluded 
Native American or Mexican American families from ADC and AFDC to help 
maintain the racial caste systems particular to those states.'
22 
In addition to overtly racial exclusions and restrictions, many states have a long 
history of devising facially neutral welfare rules to constrain black workers' labor 
market and family choices. In 1943, Louisiana adopted a policy restricting ADC for 
children when agricultural employers wanted them or their mothers for cotton 
picking. 123 Through the 1960s (when federal courts ruled them unconstitutional), 
residency restrictions on AFDC were designed to decrease African American workers' 
interstate mobility, so that they would have less bargaining power in intrastate labor 
markets. 124 In another example, Dorothy Roberts quotes Senator Russell Long's 1967 
comments on work requirements aimed implicitly ifnot explicitly at encouraging black 
women's domestic service: 
Either I do the housework or Mrs. Long does the housework, or we get somebody 
to come in and help us, but someone has to do it, and it does seem to me that if we 
can qualify these people to accept any employment doing something constructive,
125 
that is better than simply having them sitting at home drawing welfare money. 
These examples of efforts to control AFDC's incentive effects-the so-called moral 
hazard problem-show that reducing welfare's moral hazard is about distributing, not 
maximizing, labor market choices and opportunities. Senator Long worries about who 
does his housework (and perhaps about who has more time for leisure or family care), 
not about making sure more or better work or less unpaid family care or leisure gets 
done. The racial structure of ADC and AFDC has aimed not to promote wage work 
among parents of color, but to channel those parents into low-waged work less 
conducive to good family care. For example, although ADC and AFDC provided 
relatively well-paying administrative and social work jobs, some states refused to open 
these jobs fully to workers of color (at least until civil rights laws intervened).' More 
recently, TANF was designed to increase pressure on women to substitute low-waged 
work for education and training for higher-wage opportunities. 
27 
121. Mary S.Larabee, UnmarriedParenthoodUnderthe SocialSecurityAct, 1939 PROC. OF 
THE NAT'L CONF. SOC. WORK, 454, availableathttp://www.hit.umich.edu/n/ncosw/, quotedin 
BELL, supra note 120, at 35, and cited in MIMI ABRAMOvrrZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OFWOMEN 
318-19 (1988). 
122. See NEUBECK &CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 55-56. 
123. Id. at 58. 
124. See id. at 61. 
125. ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 179 (citing quote in Judith Olans Brown, The Mythogenesis 
of Gender:JudicialImages of Women in Paidand UnpaidLabor,UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 457, 
487 n.134 (1996)). 
126. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 56-57. 
127. TANF prohibits states from counting higher education toward work requirements, 
limits participation in vocational education to twelve months, and prohibits states from having 
more than 20% of their TANF work participants in secondary school or vocational education. 
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Similarly, attention to ADC's and AFDC's incentive effects on family behavior has 
long been a means of preserving a patriarchal social order by redistributing bargaining 
power concerning family formation and family care. States often designed ADC and 
AFDC rules to penalize unmarried mothers so that their families would have less 
power to choose better child care, wage work, and household partners;' 28 TANF 
continues the practice of stressing incentives to reduce unwed motherhood. 129 Rules 
penalizing unmarried women and their children have reflected and reinforced 
prevailing political judgments that women's nonmarital sexuality renders them 
incapable of making good moral choices.' 3 Such restrictions controlled welfare's 
alleged moral hazard (inducing increased unwed motherhood) not by giving unmarried 
mothers and their children better alternatives (for income, child care or parenting 
partners), but by reducing their decisionmaking power so that they are forced to accept 
the costs of poor women's alternatives to single motherhood. 3' Dorothy Roberts 
explains how recent "welfare reform" policies penalizing unmarried black mothers 
continue a long caste-based history of hurting, not enhancing, black families-by using 
welfare restrictions to induce the redistribution of black women's caretaking skills 
from black children to white children, and to redistribute the care of black children 
from their families to inadequate or abusive state custody in foster care and 
incarceration. 132 Rickie Solinger describes how, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
restrictions on ADC and AFDC benefits for unmarried mothers similarly operated 
(along with other policies) to help redistribute mothering choices, shifting bargaining 
power in the adoption market from unmarried white women to social service agencies 
and white infertile married couples.' 3 After legal, political, and social changes 
expanded access to welfare (and other rights) for unmarried mothers,' 34 this income 
support probably helped white unmarried mothers' wrest more control over the 
adoption process from both state agencies and adoptive parents. 
3 5 
42 U.S.C. § 607(d) (2000). See Martha Davis, Testimony of NOW Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, House Education and Workforce Committee, Hearing on "Welfare Reform: 
Success in Moving Toward Work," Oct. 16, 2001 (discussing and criticizing this policy). 
128. See ABRAMOVITZ, supranote 121, at 318-26; MINK, supra note 73, at 44-49. 
129. See Megan Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem":Welfare Reform and the 
PersonalResponsibilityand Work OpportunityAct of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 117, 
126 (1998) (discussing and criticizing TANF's focus on promoting marriage and discouraging 
out-of-wedlock mothering especially among teenagers). 
130. See SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 67, 99; Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" 
Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 345-64 (1996) (discussing how ideas about welfare 
mothers' irresponsibility are tied to ideas about single mothers being fundamentally immoral); 
FINEMAN, supra note 73, at 101-25 (discussing attacks on welfare as reflecting a patriarchal 
construction of single mothers as deviant because of their threat to male authority). 
131. See SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 195-96 (discussing how Reagan Administration 
policies promoting both restrictions on AFDC and restrictions on day care funding were aimed 
at reducing poor women's choices). These costs may include violence. See infra note 236. 
132. See ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 173-200. 
133. SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 68-71, 98-101, 186-87. 
134. See id: at 93-97 (discussing changes leading to more acceptance of single mothers in 
the 1970s). 
135. See Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 490 (1996) 
(explaining that state adoption policies became more open as birth mothers recognized they had 
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Finally, political leaders have criticized and regulated the incentive effects of AFDC 
and other family welfare programs because they viewed recipients' increased political 
bargaining power as a threat to the political racial caste system.' 36 After the 1965 
Voting Rights Act was enacted, for example, southern politicians recognized that 
access to welfare income would create the incentive effect of increased voting and civil 
rights activism by many impoverished African Americans otherwise dependent for 
income on white employers and landowners who had made compliance with black 
political subordination a condition of jobs.' 37 To control this supposed moral hazard 
effect, southern politicians opposed expansion of family income assistance and state 
officials attempted to exclude African American voters from existing welfare 
programs--explaining that benefits would be restored only when blacks "surrendered 
8their uppity ideas about changing the local balance of power."'13 Although the term 
"moral hazard" tends to be used in contexts where it can more easily mask the moral 
values it promotes, this example dramatizes how inherently moral citizenship visions, 
rather than impartial "efficiency" calculations, determine whether the bargaining power 
to resist bad choices is hazardous or helpful to society. 
b. Employers' Bargaining Power 
Neoliberal "moral hazard" arguments deceive not only by repackaging caste 
constraints as individuals' market-based conduct, but also by narrowing our view of 
costly market behavior. A second problem with the moral hazard concept is that it 
tends to obscure the reciprocal nature of the incentive changes at issue.' 39 If AFDC 
increases impoverished parents' bargaining power relative to employers, it reduces 
employers' bargaining power relative to workers and families. Other things being 
equal, if AFDC provides a substitute for wage-earning, employers in certain labor 
market sectors will have to offer higher wages or better working conditions to employ 
parents who can substitute welfare for work--or they will lose their supply of labor for 
some jobs. 
"a desirable commodity in short supply" and therefore could "think through the terms under 
which they might be willing to part with it"); MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, 
MAKING FAMILIES 33 (2001) (explaining that with open adoption "the birth mother changed 
from supplicant to partner in making a decision about the placement of her child; the terms of 
adoption, once thought to be absolute, became negotiable to some extent"). In the Reagan-Bush 
era, Republican politicians responded to the decline in white babies available for adoption by 
trying to revive policies pressuring mothers on welfare to relinquish their children. See 
SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 198-99. 
136. See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 71-73 (discussing the role of AFDC 
policies in Louisiana's resistance to movements for desegregation and civil rights in the early 
1960s). 
137. See QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 129 (discussing evidence that black voter turnout 
between 1965 and 1970 depended heavily on blacks' freedom from dependence on white 
employers or landowners for income). 
138. Id. (quoting U.S. Congress, Hearings on H.R. 16,311, p. 1512; Lester M. Salamon, The 
Stakes in the RuralSouth, THE NEW REPUBLIC 18 (1971)). 
139. Tom Baker has explained the reciprocal, or multisided nature of moral hazard. Baker, 
supra note 101, at 275. However, as Baker observes, discussions of AFDC and social insurance 
programs tend to oversimplify moral hazard by assuming it works only in one direction. 
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The goal of protecting the bargaining power of employers dependent on cheap labor 
has long motivated opposition to family income support programs. 140 Dorothy Roberts 
reports that in the early 1970s, a Georgia Congressman opposed proposals to expand 
AFDC into a guaranteed income system by warning, "There's not going to be anybody 
left to roll these wheelbarrows and press these shirts." 141 This comment incorporates 
unstated assumptions about welfare's effect on employers' choices. The congressman's 
fear of a labor shortage depends on the premise that employers cannot or should not be 
pressured to maintain the supply of labor by raising wages to a level competitive with 
minimal welfare Support. That is, the congressman appears to assume that employers of 
this cheap labor, rather than their low-waged workers, have a right to choose among 
options that better suit their self-interest. 
By considering incentive effects of AFDC on employers, as well as on 
impoverished parents, neoliberalism's double standard becomes clearer. Increased 
bargaining power for impoverished single mothers, but not for employers, counts as 
moral hazard in the neoliberal view. As welfare for impoverished parents becomes less 
available or less adequate, employers have more protection against the costs of labor 
because the increased supply of labor (and of particularly needy labor) allows for 
lower wages (up to the point of any mandated minimum wage) and for working 
conditions less favorable to workers (for instance, less regular or convenient hours, less 
comfort and safety, or higher productivity requirements). 42 This protection for 
employers potentially increases costs to workers and others, leaving them with worse 
choices. For example, this protection for employers' bargaining power might 
encourage less care to avoid risks to the long-term physical and emotional health of 
workers and their families, thereby impairing their future productivity as workers, 
family members, and citizens; it might encourage workers to increase their demands on 
charities, or to increase the social problems from children whose parents' low-waged 
work leaves them without adequate parental supervision, nutrition, or housing; and the 
increased supply of low-waged workers and resulting downward wage pressure might 
trickle up the wage scale to increase economic insecurity for struggling middle class
43 
families. 
Without such protection against labor costs, other things being equal, employers 
would have more incentives to reduce the costs of production in other ways, perhaps 
through lower executive salaries, lower investor returns, more cost-effective 
operations, or even by forgoing certain lines of business that are unprofitable without 
cheap labor. For example, if better welfare benefits provided an alternative to low-
wage work for black domestic workers, the men who wear the shirts the Georgia 
Congressman feared would not get pressed might instead do the pressing themselves, 
replacing some of their unproductive leisure time. Perhaps the shirts would be replaced 
by apparel needing less costly maintenance. Or perhaps the shirts would be pressed by 
more productive mechanized commercial laundries employing fewer but more highly 
140. See GORDON, supra note 27, at 266, 276; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE 
POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 261 (1996). 
141. Roberts, supra note 69, at 1584 (citing QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 130 (quoting Rep. 
Phillip Landrum)). 
142. See Robert M. Solow, Lecture II: Guess Who Pays for Workfare, in WORK AND 
WELFARE 23, 26-30 (Amy Gutman ed., 1998). 
143. See id. 
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paid workers. Or, without international trade and human rights rules to control 
incentives for cross-border cost-shifting, perhaps the shirts would be pressed by 
workers in countries where wages were even lower and social welfare systems even 
more inadequate. 
Just as moral hazard by welfare recipients can create a "cycle of dependency," 
moral hazard by employers from the protection of inadequate welfare can create a 
comparable vicious cycle, often termed the "race to the bottom," whereby employers 
are increasingly dependent on keeping workers in poverty to maintain profitable 
production. If cheap and docile labor provides an easy means of avoiding changes and 
innovations that would lower overall costs in the long run by providing better working 
conditions along with better profits, then that cost-protection will encourage employers 
to choose investments and business plans that make such "high-road" production 
strategies even more difficult to achieve, locking them into arguably less efficient 
behavior. 
3. From Double Standard into Market Forces 
Neoliberal ideology rationalizes its double standard of moral hazard by attributing 
employers' increased bargaining power from welfare restrictions to the efficient 
market while attributing poor families' increased bargaining power from more 
expansive welfare benefits to inefficient redistribution. How do we know which 
incentive effects are efficient market results and which are redistributive? By deciding 
whether the incentive effects internalize costs (as efficient market prices) or whether 
they externalize costs onto others. But how do we distinguish costs that are internalized 
from costs that are externalized? According to standard economic analysis, costs are 
internalized to parties in a transaction when the private costs of the transaction 
incorporate the total societal-costs of the transaction-thereby creating incentives to 
maximize overall societal resources. If any costs of the transaction spill over to others, 
then those costs are externalized-so that resources are redistributed rather than 
maximized. But to decide what costs belong to whom (and therefore which are 
internalized versus externalized), neoclassical economics tells us to look to efficient 
markets for the answer---costs are internalized if a transaction represents efficient 
market conditions. 
Following this circular reasoning, neoliberal ideology assumes that the incentive 
effects of employers' increased bargaining power from welfare reform are cost-
internalizing incentives, because any resulting benefits to employers reflect overall net 
gains to society as a whole rather than a transfer of resources to employers at a net loss 
to others. In neoliberal ideology, the premise that employers' increased ability to 
escape labor costs takes place within the "market" also serves as a conclusion that 
society as a whole benefits from this transaction. That premise locating employers' 
increased bargaining power in the "market" correspondingly serves as a conclusion 
that any resulting costs to workers are their private responsibility-the price internal to 
a mutually beneficial labor contract. Similarly, the premise that increased bargaining 
144. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Contractand Care,76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1424 
(2001) (explaining how the idea of the "market" separate from family or state has been a means 
of constructing a misleading distinction between public and private). 
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power for impoverished single mothers from AFDC is nonmarket "redistribution" 
serves as a conclusion that the transaction comes at the expense of society as a whole. 
This tautological reasoning masks the underlying citizenship question: Whose 
ability to get more of what they want by shifting costs to others should count as a 
societal gain, and whose should count as a private gain at the expense of others? By 
making the market stand for the public gain, neoliberalism implicitly confers superior 
citizenship status on those centrally identified with the market-they are members of 
the public whose gains count. For example, if welfare cutbacks provide owners of a 
credit card telemarketing company with more cheap labor, inducing increased earnings 
from increased promotion of credit card debt, then the neoliberal view presents this 
gain as the product of market "efficiency" that benefits the public, notjust particular 
shareholders or executives-regardless of the possible public harms from, for instance, 
those families' inability to provide adequate care for their children. On the other hand, 
if impoverished families gain from AFDC by escaping low-waged jobs, inadequate 
child care, or abusive spouses, then neoliberalism tends to count those gains as 
redistribution for private gain at the expense of the public-regardless of the possible 
spillover benefits to overall economic or social well-being. By designating employers' 
cost-savings from welfare reform as the efficient market price, not the result of 
(upward) redistributive policies, the neoliberal analysis constructs this government-
created employer windfall as a cost-savings "earned" as part of a mutually beneficial 
exchange that contributes to overall well-being. 
Neoliberal reasoning presumes employers' protection from the costs of cheap labor 
counts as a normal and voluntary resource-maximizing market, despite the role of 
government policies in shaping the market price of that labor and in constraining the 
choices of workers. And neoliberal reasoning presumes AFDC recipients' protection 
from the costs of cheap labor counts as coerced government intervention, despite the 
role of market incentives and rational self-interest maximizing in shaping their 
choices. 45 Accordingly, welfare recipients do not have a right to cost-savings and 
resulting behavior changes from cheaper, or better, child care comparable to 
employers' right to cost-savings and resulting behavior changes from cheaper labor 
costs from welfare reform. Which gains count as normal and voluntary and which as 
abnormal and coerced interventions depend on unstated moral judgments about who 
has the right to benefit from others' constrained choices in a normal market. 
By locating employers', but not welfare recipients' gains, within the market, 
neoliberal reasoning obscures its moral judgments about the distribution not only of 
rights to personal gain, but also of responsibilities to avoid losses to others. In the 
neoliberal moral hazard analysis, welfare reforms restricting benefits do not seem to 
give employers inefficient protection against their labor costs-because this analysis 
assumes that employers have no responsibility to cover the costs of working (aside 
from minimum wage requirements and other wage laws, perhaps). In particular, the 
neoliberal view assumes that capital owners do not owe workers, or the public, a living 
145. For some examples of legal scholarship explaining the political contingency and 
indeterminacy of the conventional division between market "freedom" and government
"coercion," see Robert L. Hale, CoercionandDistributionin a SupposedlyNon-CoerciveState, 
38 POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Force andthe State:A Comparisonof "Political" 
and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 149 (1935); STEINFELD, supra note 36, at 14-
15. 
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wage capable of supporting workers' families or even single workers. In this view, any 
cost-savings to employers resulting from cheaper labor due to welfare restrictions 
belongs to employers as a matter of right without any reciprocal obligations: employers 
can change their wage-paying behavior in response to this protection without being 
perceived as irresponsible or dependent. In contrast, by identifying impoverished 
families' benefits from AFDC as government redistribution, outside of the market, 
neoliberal theory constructs the cost-savings from welfare received by those families as 
protection against costs that are the moral responsibility of those families alone. The 
moral hazard criticism of AFDC assumes that welfare recipients have a societal 
obligation to assume the costs of supporting children themselves without compensation 
(or to forgo the children). Their cost-savings and resulting behavior changes from 
welfare benefits, therefore raise the possibility of dependency and potential
46 
irresponsibility that threatens good citizenship. 1 
4. Reenvisioning Social Citizenship to Reverse Moral Hazard 
This distribution of societal rights and responsibilities is by no means an inevitable 
or uncontested vision of citizenship. This Part will highlight three examples of 
alternative social citizenship visions that escape the double bind of neoliberal moral 
hazard by rejecting its double standard, based on its hierarchical vision of citizenship 
rights and responsibilities. 
First, legal scholar William Forbath explains that, during the New Deal period, a 
powerful and broad-based (though divergent) popular movement expressly called for a 
new understanding of citizenship in which the government and capital owners were 
obligated to support workers and their families and in which citizens were entitled to 
"decent work, a measure of economic autonomy and democracy, and social 
' provision."' 47 Though this social citizenship vision was not implemented in the New 
Deal social security legislation that produced AFDC, it offers a counterpoint to the 
currently prevailing neoliberal assumptions by suggesting that a work-centered view of 
citizenship can embrace rather than constrain workers' bargaining power, based on a 
citizenship vision where workers are given rights and status to promote their well-
being. 
The Supreme Court partly recognized this alternative citizenship vision when it 
overturned its Lochner-era reasoning to uphold a minimum wage law in West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish.48 In part, Parrishexplained that the law was a reasonable (and 
therefore constitutional) effort to correct for the harmful public effects of employers' 
superior bargaining power. Previous doctrine in Muller v. Oregon had upheld 
maximum hour laws for women as special protection deviating from a market 
presumed to promote the public well-being. 149Part of the Court's opinion in Parrish 
146. See Fineman, supra note 144, at 1410 n.17 (comparing welfare "dependency" to 
institutional support of armed forces members who are not labeled "dependent" as a result of 
their rights to government compensation and other benefits for their service). 
147. Forbath, supra note 27, at 4. 
148. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
149. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Another Lochner-eracase, Adkins v.Children'sHosp., 261 U.S. 
525 (1923), struck down minimum wage laws for women on the ground that the Nineteenth 
Amendment meant special protection for women was outdated. 
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took the different approach of questioning the citizenship responsibilities incorporated 
in the market. The Court rejected the view that employers had a constitutional right to 
their gains from low-waged labor, and instead supported as reasonable (and therefore 
constitutional) state legislators' view that employers are obligated to pay workers a 
living wage. In effect, the Court portrayed the minimum wage law as reducing rather 
than creatingmoral hazard, reasoning that the law internalized costs that employers 
had wrongly spread to society. The Court explained, "[t]he community is not bound to 
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers" and that the 
community may "correct50 the abuse which springs from [employers'] selfish disregard 
of the public interest.' 
Second, alternative citizenship visions have questioned neoliberalism for its 
problematic moral judgments not only about the distribution of the rights and 
responsibilities of work, but also about what should count as work that makes a 
valuable contribution to society. Feminists have long argued that family caretaking 
work performed primarily by women in the home should be recognized and rewarded 
for its important social, political, and economic benefits.151 For example, legal scholar 
Martha Fineman makes a powerful case for expanding social citizenship rights to 
include economic support for dependent care on the ground that such work provides a 
substantial subsidy from family caretakers-most of whom are women-to the state 
and market that is not sufficiently recognized or compensated.' 52 Fineman reverses the 
neoliberal moral hazard analysis by explaining that the state and market are dependent 
on unpaid or underpaid caretaking work that produces and reproduces society, and that 
government and employers have avoided their responsibility to recognize and support 
caretaking labor. 53 Fineman (and other feminist scholars) have renewed and improved 
the early-twentieth-century maternalist social citizenship visions (expressed in original 
ADC and earlier mothers' pensions programs) by making the family's value to society 
depend on its caretaking labor rather than on the family's race, gender, marital, and 
sexual status.1
54 
Third, alternative citizenship visions have challenged the neoliberal assumptions 
about how the value of both market work and family care should be distributed among 
families and workers. Scholars and advocates focusing on race and citizenship have 
long presented the problem of subordinate citizenship for people of color not as a 
matter of exclusion from state, market, and family, but as a problem of inclusion in a 
state, market, and family defined and structured to privilege whites according to a 
racial vision of citizenship.' 55 This vision suggests that strong social citizenship rights 
support political and civil rights not because impoverished people lack personal 
150. Parrish,300 U.S. at 399-400. 
151. See McClain, supra note 61, at 1697-702; Reva B.Siegel, Home as Work: The First 
Woman'sRights ClaimsConcerningWives' HouseholdLabor,1850-1880, 103 YALEL.J. 1073 
(1994). 
152. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 Am.U. J.GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13 (2000). 
153. Fineman, supra note 144, at 1410-11, 1410 n.17. 
154. See Linda C. McClain, Citizenship Begins atHome: The New Social Contract and 
Working Families,in PROGRESSIVE POLITICS INTHE GLOBAL AGE 95, 101-04 (2001). 
155. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1575 (explaining America's unequal welfare state as a 
problem of adherence to a racial definition of citizenship). 
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capacity for participating in state and market,' 56 but because egalitarian social rights 
help create incentives for a state and market that values equal political and civil 
rights. 57 
Legal scholar Dorothy Roberts, for example, explains that African American 
women criticized for receiving AFDC have lacked full citizenship status because their 
extensive contributions to society through work, family care, and political activism 
have been valued less than white citizens' contributions. 58 Roberts reverses the 
neoliberal moral hazard arguments by portraying the problem of AFDC as a cycle of 
dependency among white citizens who have long relied on government protection for 
cheap labor by people of color to maintain both market production and family 
reproduction. 159 In this vision, white citizens have sought to achieve the supposed 
"autonomy" and "responsibility" associated with good citizenship by constraining and 
stigmatizing the economic gains of racialized others. 60 Welfare reform, in this view, is 
156. See King & Waldron, supra note 1, at 428 (discussing a long history of political 
theorists who argue that the poor cannot be good citizens because "desperate need is conceived 
to interfere with the processes of reflection and deliberation that civic politics requires").
157. Discussing Jill Quadagno's history of the Great Society programs, Dorothy Roberts 
notes the interdependence of social, civil, and political rights for both black activists and for 
their white supremacist opponents. Roberts, supra note 69, at 1584-86. For example, Quadagno 
explains that access to housing affects access to political representation-not because people 
who lack safe houses are necessarily any less enlightened politically than people who live in 
mansions or suburbs, but because residential segregation acts to systematically fragment and 
impede effective political organization and coalition building by those denied residential 
mobility. QUADAGNO, supranote 68, at 59. Similarly, barriers to equal employment impeded 
black voting in the South not because exploited low-waged (or unwaged) workers with no other 
income options lacked political awareness or civic virtue but because their employers could use 
economic and physical coercion to systematically discourage their voting. See Roberts, supra 
note 69, at 1585-86 (discussing QUADAGNO, supra note 68, at 129). 
See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The MoralExclusivity of the New CivilSociety, 75 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 555, 561-62 (2000) (discussing barriers to political participation in poor Black 
neighborhoods as a problem not of individual character problems but of illegitimate legal and 
economic institutions that systematically deprive poor residents of their well-being). Contrary to 
standard social citizenship arguments, supranote 156, many impoverished peoples around the 
globe have demonstrated high levels of political awareness and participation when offered the 
hope of a government responsive to their material needs-for example, in 1999 millions of 
impoverished South African blacks waited in long lines to exercise their newly won rights to 
vote, outshining U.S. voting rates. See TOM LODGE, CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY: SOUTH 
AFRICA'S SECOND POPULAR ELECTION 206, tbl.2 (1999) (reporting voter participation rates of 
68% in South Africa's 1999 election and similarly high rates in a number of other African and 
Eastern European countries); id. at 166 (describing voters in a black township waiting patiently 
in a three-kilometer-long line to cast their ballots). 
158. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1576 (discussing how Progressive Era reformers 
advocating for maternal assistance ignored the value of black women's family care); id.at 1584 
(discussing how welfare policies have been designed to minimize black wages); id. at 1572-73 
(discussing how opposition to AFDC for black families in the 1960s was tied to opposition to 
black political activism). 
159. Id. at 1584 (explaining how welfare policy has been designed to maintain "a Black 
menial labor force" that sustains white privilege). 
160. Roberts contrasts AFDC with social security programs to demonstrate how a racially 
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part of a long history of government policies targeted directly toward controlling the 
freedom of people of color to make work and family choices in their interests, based on 
a racial definition of the public interest. 
For example, Roberts explains recent welfare reforms as part of a broader policy 
change aimed not at withdrawing government support for families of color to make 
them "independent," but rather at redirecting government expenditures on children of 
color toward an expensive system of discriminatory state intervention designed to 
reduce black families' power to support their own children and to increase their 
children's dependence on a state that devalues their care.' 6' As part of a racially 
stratified system of economic protections that limits many people of color to bad 
choices, welfare reform helps to reinforce stereotypes of people of color as bad 
choicemakers, thereby rationalizing the racially stratified citizenship vision that 
produces such policies. 62 Roberts argues that ending the racial caste system in the 
United States requires an explicitly antiracist system of broad supports for families and 
for workers, including an increased minimum wage, guaranteed minimum income, 
national health insurance, subsidized high-quality child care and preschool education, 
paid parental leaves, and affordable housing. 
63 
All of these alternative visions of social citizenship reject Lochner's substance by 
recognizing "the market" as an inherently moral--or immoral-institution organized 
around a particular and politically contingent distribution ofrights and responsibilities. 
Because these alternative visions refuse to define existing market structures as 
necessarily and naturally efficient-in the overall societal interest-they escape the 
problem that alternative distributions of rights and responsibilities are inherently 
harmful to aggregate well-being. Each shifts the debate about the immorality of 
government protection from assistance for those at the bottom of the social hierarchy 
(based on class, gender, and race) to assistance for those at the top. Each reconstructs 
stratified system of economic protections directs stigma and restrictions to welfare for families 
of color based on their status as subjects, not citizens. "The very relegation of subjects to 
inferior programs that supervise and humiliate them reinforces their lack of citizenship qualities 
while bolstering the virtues of the citizens who receive dignified entitlements." Id.at 1578. Judy 
Scales-Trent explains that dominant groups lose the moral autonomy they pretend to achieve 
through their oppression of others: "How dependent are white Americans on the existence of 
this group, black Americans, that they keep on the bottom?" Judy Scales-Trent, Oppression, 
Lies, and the Dream ofAutonomy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 857, 863 (1999). 
161. ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 174-207 (explaining how welfare reform works together 
with recently changed child protection and criminal justice policies, administered in racially 
discriminatory ways, to break up black families in particular and to transfer black children into 
often inadequate, abusive, and costly state custody in foster homes and prisons). 
162. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 5-6 (1997) (describing how AFDC "reforms" aim to restrict African 
American reproductive choices as part of a broader policy to blame African Americans for their 
own inequality in order to justify the racist structures that perpetuate that inequality). 
163. ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 268-69; Dorothy E. Roberts, Irrationalityand Sacrifice in 
the Welfare Reform Consensus, 81 VA. L. REV. 2607, 2623-24 (1995). Citing the history of 
racist administration of supposedly neutral welfare programs, Roberts rejects a "universalistic" 
strategy of designing such social supports to appeal to white self-interest and instead rests the 
hope for an inclusive welfare system on directly confronting white privilege. Roberts, supra 
note 69, at 1591-92. 
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the increased bargaining power resulting from government protection for impoverished 
families as socially beneficial moral opportunity, not moral hazard. And because each 
focuses on poverty as a problem of harmful market privilege as well as harmful market 
disadvantage, each of these citizenship visions includes not just a right to be free from 
the most severe economic disadvantages, but a right to share in broader economic 
privileges. 164 
And these alternative visions each go further than the Keynesian justification of 
"redistribution" because they each show that government protections altering existing 
market behavior do not necessarily constitute an alternative to the market 
(redistribution), or a correctionto an otherwise neutral market (efficiency), but instead 
can be an alternative approach to structuring the market itself. As Fineman explains, 
government protection of rights should not be viewed as a means of responding to 
market failures, but as means of creating and sustaining particular markets. 165 These 
visions recognize government "interference" with the market as the norm, not the 
exception. They present the market as thoroughly structured by laws and ideologies 
that represent and enforce particular citizenship values. Forbath explains how the law 
of "laissez-faire" capitalism has not simply facilitated free-market contracts, but has 
used coercive redistribution to enforce caste: for example, by giving employers' 
property interests in workers' labor and obedience, by criminalizing unemployment, 
and by restricting workers' collective bargaining rights. 166 Fineman argues that 
ideologies and laws governing the family are integral to the market.167 Roberts 
recognizes that the long history of government policies engendering black poverty 
(from slavery through Jim Crow and the more recent backlash against civil rights and 
welfare) stem not from irrational prejudice that deviated from free market self-interest 
maximizing, but from a political economy rationally and often successfully designed to 
maximize white power.' 
68 
Although predominant public opinion may not go as far as Forbath, Fineman, and 
Roberts in reenvisioning the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, there is hardly a 
clear popular consensus in favor of the neoliberal assumption that the social good 
requires markets structured to increase employers' bargaining power relative to 
workers with children. 169 Nor is it obvious that the popular support for welfare reform 
reflects general agreement that society will benefit from providing incentives for more 
164. See Forbath, supra note 32, at 1887 (distinguishing true social citizenship that 
transforms the labor market to provide broader economic equality from minimal welfare 
assistance for those outside the labor market). 
165. Fineman, supra note 144, at 1425. 
166. See Forbath, supra note 27, at 21-22. 
167. See Fineman, supranote 152, at 13-15. 
168. See Roberts, supra note 69, at 1589, 1596 (arguing that the problem of social 
citizenship is a problem of institutionalized white privilege that pervades current economic 
arrangements). See also NEUBECK &CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 180-87 (analyzing evidence 
that the late 1990s welfare reforms were designed to exacerbate racial control and race 
discrimination in employment). 
169. Roberts describes some ways in which welfare state proponents could capitalize on 
broad interests in increasing government support for working families. Roberts, supranote 163, 
at 2623. See also infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text. 
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low-wage jobs and less parental child care. 170 Although white racism and patriarchal 
values undergird much popular sympathy with neoliberal reform arguments, popular 
disillusionment with AFDC's "redistribution" also may partly reflect the problem that 
AFDC failed to go far enough to change the distribution of bargaining power of those 
left insecure by the prevailing market. The three alternative visions of women on 
AFDC take this popular criticism of welfare "dependency" in a different direction: they 
recognize that social citizenship programs like AFDC have failed to support full 
citizenship for its recipients but explain the problem as a failure to sufficiently increase 
(not constrain) recipients' bargaining power (in state, market, or family). 
Exposing the market as a construction of politics will not in itself change the class, 
race, and gender antipathy that has helped construct the current market. However, by 
removing the economic mask that has sheltered that antipathy and its resulting 
privileges from direct debate, perhaps we can better challenge the inegalitarian 
citizenship vision it represents. Defenders of social citizenship should look beneath the 
line between redistribution and efficiency to directly address the question of which 
distribution of private gains, encouraged through which government protections, will 
produce the greatest public good. 
C. CommunitarianCitizenshipand Welfare Reform 
Communitarianism presents one of the most politically powerful alternatives to 
neoliberalism's emphasis on market efficiency.' 7' Although this ideological movement 
takes a variety of overlapping but differing directions across a spectrum of political 
views,172 in general, communitarians aim to balance individual rights with community 
obligations and to promote social institutions that actively cultivate moral character 
and community solidarity. 1
73 
170. For example, in a 1995 poll, 61% of respondents supported exempting from work 
requirements single mothers on welfare with children under three years old. GILENS, supranote 
73, at 187, 186 tbl.8. 1.However, Gilens shows that pervasive white racist beliefs that blacks 
lack a strong work ethic mean that many whites single out blacks as undeserving of welfare and 
are less likely to support welfare programs identified with black recipients. Id.at 67-79. Dorothy 
Roberts argues that popular support for maternal care is racialized: predominant white racism 
constructs black children as inherently unworthy of care and black mothers as inherently unfit 
caretakers (unless under white control as domestic workers). See ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 
179-180. 
171. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY AND ITS CRITICS 63 (2000) (asserting that "The 
communitarians have had a direct and visible influence upon the New Democrats and New 
Labour, as well as upon social democratic parties elsewhere."). 
172. See Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2000) (analyzing and criticizing different strands of 
conmunitarian ideas related to the "civil society" movement). Michael Sandel, for example, 
distinguishes his civic republican ideas from "communitarianism" more generally. MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE ix-xvi (2d ed. 1998). For a discussion of 
communitarian critiques of liberal rights-based discourse, see generally Linda C. McClain, 
Rights and Irresponsibility,43 DUKE L.J. 989 (1994). 
173. See Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and 
Responsibilities, in THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE 
COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 253 (1993). 
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Communitarians have often singled out AFDC and its reform as particularly 
important to community well-being. They tend to join (or overlap with) neoliberals in 
criticizing AFDC as a source of moral hazard, although communitarians typically use 
overtly moralistic rather than economic terms to describe the problem of welfare's 
destructive incentives. 
But while neoliberal critics attribute moral hazard to policies that fail to give free 
reign to market incentives, communitarian critics instead attribute moral hazard to 
policies that fail to sufficiently restrainmarket incentives. Commentators often cite 
AFDC to illustrate the problems of retreating from an emphasis on public obligations 
of moral responsibility in favor of individual self-interest and entitlement.174 Like pro-
welfare liberals, communitarians reject the neoliberal claim that community well-being 
is solely a matter of individual preference-maximizing determined through market 
competition. Instead, communitarians generally believe that some degree ofprotection 
against economic need and insecurity can benefit communities. 
75 
1.Resolving Moral Hazard with Moral Control 
The communitarian answer to the moral hazard problem of AFDC, therefore, is not 
to reject policies promoting economic security, but to tie them to stronger regulation of 
morality. 176 In theory, moral hazard can be reduced not just by reducing protection 
against costs, but also by controlling the "insured's" behavior to prevent the effects of 
incentives for increased costs. 177 In the predominant communitarian view, reviving 
174. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A 
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 285-89 (1996) (discussing liberal individualist justifications for AFDC); 
William A. Galston, CivilSociety, Civic Virtue andLiberalDemocracy,75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
603, 605, 609-10 (2000) (criticizing liberal notions of a "right to welfare" and defending the 
1996 welfare reform legislation that eliminated AFDC); Douglas J.Besharov, The Moral Voice 
of Welfare Reform, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring 1994, at 13 (criticizing emphasis on 
rights rather than moral guidance by AFDC caseworkers); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights and 
ResponsibilitiesViewedfrom Afar: The Caseof Welfare Rights,THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, 
Spring 1994, at 33. 
175. A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS 4-5 (Institute for 
American Values 1998) (criticizing growing economic inequality); Etzioni, supranote 173, at 
264 (stating the "Responsive Communitarian Platform" position that "the community is 
responsible for ...ensuring the basic needs of all who genuinely cannot provide for 
themselves."); Philip Selznick, Social Justice: A CommunitarianPerspective,in THE ESSENTIAL 
COMMUNITARIAN READER 62 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1998) (asserting that "collective responsibility 
includes obligations of care for the vulnerable and disadvantaged"); see also SANDEL, supra 
note 174, at 333 (communal provision of economic security would affirm civic identity of rich 
and poor alike). Although Sandel disavows the communitarian label and distinguishes his civic 
republican views, see supra note 172, he shares the interest in turning from individual rights to 
community values that is relevant to my discussion here. 
176. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, Introduction to THE GLOBAL THIRD WAY DEBATE 1, 8 
(Anthony Giddens ed., 2001) (arguing for maintaining welfare rights by linking those rights to 
responsibilities in order to reduce welfare's moral hazard and "culture of deceit"). 
177. See Steven Shavell, On MoralHazardand Insurance,93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541 (1979) 
(describing two economic solutions to moral hazard as, first, incomplete coverage against loss, 
and second, regulation by the insurer of loss-producing behavior). 
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social citizenship depends on moving away from AFDC's individual rights-based 
approach to welfare to an approach grounded in enforcing responsibility and 
morality. 178 For example, Anthony Giddens, advisor to Britain's New Labour party, 
advocates a "Third Way" that claims to steer a course between what he says is the 
left's failure to sufficiently regulate families and neoliberals' failure to sufficiently
79 
regulate the economy.1 
In particular, communitarians have advocated conditioning welfare assistance for 
parents of dependent children on requirements for wage work or unwaged
"workfare."' 80 For example, the Responsive Communitarian Platform introduces its 
section on "Social Justice" with the statement, "At the heart of the Communitarian 
understanding of social justice is the idea of reciprocity: each member of the 
community owes something to all the rest, and the community owes something to each 
of its members."' 8' The first and foremost responsibility this platform lists for 
individuals is "to provide for themselves and their families: honorable work contributes 
to the commonwealth and to the community's ability to fulfill its essential tasks." 182A 
Heritage Foundation publication recommends "reciprocity and work" as a major theme 
of welfare reform.' 8 3 Left-leaning economic theorists Samuel Bowles and Herbert 
Gintis argue that deeply rooted moral values of reciprocity could provide strong 
popular support for welfare programs if these were redesigned to encourage social 
contributions such as employment. 1
84 
Though many communitarians would no doubt disagree with the details, the 1996 
federal welfare reforms embrace the general communitarian emphasis on linking 
family income assistance to reciprocal obligations for wage work in addition to family 
caretaking.18 5 Single parents of children under six receiving TANF are expected to 
contribute twenty hours a week of work activities other than caring for their own child 
(with some exceptions to account for child care problems),' 86 and are expected to 
return to wage work (or marry a wage earner) after a cumulative total of five years of 
benefits. 1
87 
In addition to conditioning welfare on participation in wage labor, communitarian 
178. See, e.g., MARVIN OLASKY, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN COMPASSION (1992); Etzioni, 
supra note 173, at 263-64. For analysis and criticism of such communitarian calls to replace 
rights (particularly welfare rights) with responsibility, see McClain, supranote 172, at 1014-17, 
1023-24, 1014-17; McClain, supra note 130, at 372-95. 
179. GIDDENS, supra note 171, at 49-50; see also Giddens, supra note 176, at 8 (warning 
that giving welfare rights without welfare responsibilities "creates major problems of moral 
hazard in welfare systems"). 
180. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP .124-26 (1986). 
181. Etzioni, supra note 173, at 263-64. 
182. Id. 
183. RECTOR & LAUBER, supranote 86, at 4. 
184. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe? Homo Reciprocans and the 
Futureof EgalitarianPolitics,BOSTON REV., Dec./Jan. 1998-99, at 4. 
185. See supranotes 109-112 and accompanying text; McClain, supra note 154, at 97-99 
(explaining and criticizing the mid-1990s welfare reforms as a new social contract based on 
"Third Way" theories demanding mutual contributions in the form of wage work). 
186. 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(2)(B) (2000). 
187. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 7; 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000). 
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efforts to control welfare recipients' behavior have focused on regulating sexuality and 
family composition. For example, many communitarian arguments for reviving social 
citizenship stress the importance of redesigning welfare to promote marriage, to reduce 
pregnancy and sexual behavior by teens and unwed mothers, and to encourage paternal 
income support. 188 TANF, along with the state welfare reform legislation it encourages, 
incorporates this theme as well. For example, TANF requires states to give special 
emphasis to reducing teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births. 18 TANF prohibits 
federal welfare funds from supporting teen parents who do not live under adult 
supervision or attend school.190 In addition, TANF requires states to reduce benefits to 
mothers who fail to cooperate with efforts to establish paternity.' 9' Furthermore, many 
states have taken advantage of TANF's discretion to implement other measures to 
regulate families, such as "family caps" denying increased benefits for recipients who 
have additional children while on welfare.1
92 
2. Moral Control as Moral Subordination 
But this communitarian strategy of reducing AFDC's moral hazard through moral 
control reinforces rather than resolves the conflict between good citizenship and 
protection against poverty. Even if regulation succeeds in reducing the incentive 
effects of welfare, countering its presumed public harm, the communitarian approach 
to welfare still assigns recipients of family income assistance subordinate citizenship 
status. 
The communitarian approach to welfare implicitly measures good citizenship 
according to the existing market. Although communitarians claim to value community 
moral obligations over (or in addition to) market values of self-interested 
individualism, they tend to make economic self-reliance a central moral obligation to 
the community. And they define economic self-reliance as successful participation in 
the existing labor market, without welfare assistance. That is, communitarian defenders 
of social citizenship accept the core neoliberal assumption that government protection 
of families through AFDC or TANF counts as "redistribution": a one-way transfer 
external to and distinct from the reciprocal exchanges of the "market." Moreover, 
communitarians, like neoliberals, generally assume that this unilateral, extramarket 
gain provided by welfare is a detriment to others. 
In this reasoning, welfare recipients can only be good citizens by accepting a 
position of failed citizenship that requires correction. By using moral control to solve 
the moral hazard problem, the communitarian approach to welfare remains within the 
double bind of the neoliberal welfare critics: redistribution undermines the citizenship 
qualities it seeks to promote. To make redistribution acceptable as a transition to self-
sufficiency and moral responsibility, welfare recipients must sacrifice their autonomy 
and moral agency-the very characteristics that have traditionally distinguished 
188. RECTOR & LAUBER, supra note 86, at 36-37; A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY, supranote 175 
(recommending that states design their welfare reforms to promote marriage). 
189. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 210. 
190. Id. at 206; 42 U.S.C. §608(a)(4), (5) (2000). 
191. HANDLER & HASENFELD, supranote 110, at 206; 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2000). 
192. Thomas L. Gais &Cathy M. Johnson, Welfare Reform, ManagementSystems &Their 
Implicationfor Children,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1327, 1337 (1999) (eighteen states have family caps). 
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citizens from subjects. Echoing Muller v. Oregon,193 the communitarian approach 
carves out a space for redistribution for those undeserving of full citizenship status. 
Socioeconomic rights stand opposed to civil and political rights as a mark of 
subordinate membership in society. 
The promise of communitarian social citizenship is that refashioning welfare into a 
regulatory tool will help lead recipients from dependent status to full citizenship. 
However, the communitarian emphasis on welfare as transition to social inclusion 
obscures how communitarian moral regulation aims to revise not just welfare recipients 
but also the market and society into which they are to be included. The communitarian 
approach constructs the good society as one in which poor families-especially single 
mothers-have relatively little bargaining power. By characterizing AFDC's incentives 
for substituting wage work with parental child care as harmful "moral hazard," 
communitarians join with neoliberals in supporting an ideal of a society with less, and 
lesser, child care (especially by parents) and more, and cheaper, wage work. 
194 
The moral discipline promoted by many of the more conservative communitarian 
approaches to welfare explicitly aims to correct not just AFDC's incentives for 
replacing parental child care with wage work, but also to correct AFDC's incentives 
for raising the market value of wage work-especially for African American 
workers. 195 One study of the 1996 welfare reforms shows that tougher state work 
requirements correlated with states with tighter labor markets and with states that had 
high rates of incarceration of workers of color. 196 The "work first" approach, 
advocated by some communitarians and incorporated into some states' welfare 
reforms, promotes the idea that welfare recipients benefit from taking any job rather 
than seeking training or education to secure better jobs.197 Marvin Olasky, whose 
"compassionate conservative" approach to welfare influenced presidential candidate 
George W. Bush, 198 writes that welfare programs went wrong during the 1960s when 
"[s]uddenly it became better to accept welfare than to take in laundry" and when 
"young men were told that shining shoes was demeaning, and that accepting 
government subsidy meant a person 'could at least keep his dignity."" 99 Olasky is one 
of several conservative communitarians who advocate making welfare shameful again 
193. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
194. Linda McClain argues that the "Third Way" model of citizenship based on mutual 
responsibility "requires a more explicit focus upon the public value of care and upon care work 
as socially valuable work, work that the market insufficiently 'honours' or 'rewards."' McClain, 
supra note 154, at 99. 
195. Mississippi used tough work requirements in the 1990s to reduce largely African 
American caseloads by 71% despite high poverty rates in that state, leading some commentators 
to describe that policy as a racialized attempt to provide a "desperate and docile labor force, 
with workers prepared to take slave wages." NEUBECK &CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 191-92 
(quoting Kensington Welfare Rights Union, The New Welfare Reform: Delivering Slaves to the 
Auction Block 3(1998), availableat http://www.universityofthepoor.org/library/kwruw-r.htm). 
196. Joe Soss et al., Setting the Terms of Relief: Explaining State Policy choices in the 
Devolution Revolution, 45 Am.J. POL. So. 378, 391 (2001). 
197. See Davis, supra note 127. 
198. Alison Mitchell, Bush Draws Campaign Theme From More Than the Heart, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2000, at Al. 
199. OLASKY, supra note 178, at 168-69. 
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to correct this purported harm. 
2°° 
This approach to moral control enforces a vision of citizenship in which "some 
people"-often racially coded, as in Olasky's shoe-shining and laundry examples-
must accept low-waged work as their place in society. 20' This vision aims to value 
work not through policies designed to improve pay or working conditions, but by 
reducing the citizenship status accorded those who do not engage in wage work 
(increasing welfare's relative stigma). Although this vision offers persons in poverty 
moral rewards-better citizenship status-for low-waged labor, that status comes at 
the cost of forgoing material and emotional interests in different work and family 
choices. As some advocates of welfare reform insist, beingpoor means being morally 
obligated to refrain from bearing or raising children you cannot afford to support.202 
Having a family becomes a privilege allocated by class, race, and gender status, rather 
than a basic expectation of citizenship.20 3 
200. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 
178-84 (1984) (criticizing attempts to take the stigma out of welfare, and arguing that stigma 
and status provide appropriate incentives for shaping the behavior of the poor); MYRON 
MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE SIxTIEs' LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS 143 
(1993) (arguing that the poor should not be viewed as victims of economic structures, but 
should be morally judged because "if it is not blameworthy not to work, no definitive praise 
attaches to someone who works and supports his [sic] family" (emphasis in original)). 
201. The punitive approach to welfare reform correlates highly with the percentage of 
African Americans receiving welfare. See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 184-87; 
Soss et al., supra note 196, at 191. 
202. See Kevin Butler & Charles Murray, Welfare's Woes and the Ills of Out-of-Welfare 
Births, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 1, 2000 (quoting Murray's discussion comparing the 
decision to bear a child "even though you have very little money, very little education and are 
very young" to child abuse and neglect); Galston, supranote 174, at 608 (criticizing births by 
poor, single teenaged mothers on the grounds that "[i]t is wrong to bring a child into the world 
if one is not adequately prepared to raise the child"). For critical discussions of such arguments, 
see McClain, supranote 130, at 352-57; Christopher Jencks &Kathryn Edin, Do PoorWomen 
Have a Right to Bear Children?,AMERICAN PROSPECT, Winter 1995, at 43. 
203. See ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 182-93 (discussing welfare reforms as part of a racially 
driven policy of breaking up black families and penalizing black motherhood); SOLiNGER, supra 
note 60, at 183-224 (explaining how welfare reforms have contributed to the ideology that 
"motherhood [is a] class privilege in America"); CRITTENDEN, supranote 114, at 252 (reporting 
that a business executive denied a high-level employee a work day reduced to eight hours by 
saying that "any woman who can't afford a nanny shouldn't have children"); id. at 172 
(contrasting divorced men's assumption of a right to a second family despite their financial 
inability to continue supporting their existing children). A television documentary of welfare 
reform in New York interviewed a woman who lost her children to state custody after losing her 
welfare benefits, despite agreement that she was a good mother. See Julie Salamon, When Their 
Bootstraps JustAren't Long Enough,N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2001, at E5 (reviewing Take it From 
Me, PBS television broadcast, July 24, 2001). Joan Williams has analyzed how domesticity 
historically has been a class-based privilege. Joan C. Williams, Notes ofaJewish Episcopalian: 
Gender as a Language of Class; Religion as a Dialect of Liberalism, in DEBATING 
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN POLITICS, LAW, AND PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
105-06 (Anita L. Allen & Milton C. Regan, Jr. eds., 1998). For a discussion of the centrality of 
freedom of family choices to citizenship, see generally PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED 
STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997). 
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Even when formulated in more supportive and less punitive terms, the emphasis on 
welfare recipients' reciprocal obligation to work tends to undermine the citizenship 
status communitarians hope it will build. The more progressive versions of 
communitarian welfare reform attempt to reduce the degree of sacrifice required from 
parents taking low-waged work by redirecting (or even increasing) government 
protection to provide work-based assistance. Some welfare policies also take this 
approach, for example through the Federal Earned Income Tax Credit for low-waged 
workers.2° Wisconsin and other states have incorporated welfare reforms that offer 
child care, transportation, health care, and training to low-waged workers or welfare 
recipients seeking work.2°5 
3. Redistributing Moral Control 
But reconstructing welfare as assistance with the obligation to work for wages still 
divides government support for the poor from good citizenship because it retains a 
double standard of moral hazard: poor families, but not employers and others, threaten 
the public well-being when they have the power to bargain for a greater share of the 
benefits of waged labor. That double standard creates a double bind that limits work-
based social citizenship: employers and wealthier others, not families in poverty, have 
the moral right to increased gains from increased wage work. Communitarian policies 
of employment assistance tend to aim to increase welfare recipients' contributions to 
the community through more wage work, not to make poor families better off 
economically from wage work.20 6 
204. See Jared Bernstein, Two Cheersfor the Earned Income Tax Credit, AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, Summer 2000, at 64; HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 106-10. See 
generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Creditand the Limitationsof Tax-Based 
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995) (questioning the EITC for attempting what she 
sees as redistribution through the tax system). 
205. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 110, at 117-26 (discussing programs 
implemented prior to TANF); Governor Tommy Thompson, featured speaker, Manhattan 
Institute, Next Steps in Welfare Reform Conference (1999), at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/next.stepS_4.htm. 
206. One analysis of state welfare reforms analyzes two possible purposes of employment 
assistance: improving resources for poor families and improving families' supposed moral or 
cultural environment through increased wage work. Gais &Johnson, supra note 192, at 1329. 
They conclude that most states reforms are designed to promote the latter goal. Id. at 1346-47; 
see also KATZ, supra note 1,at 337 (discussing evidence that welfare reforms moving families 
from AFDC to wage work have left many working parents in poverty). One study of the effects 
of TANF in three cities showed that 75% of women in 1999 who had been on welfare (TANF) 
for two years or less had incomes below the poverty line. William Julius Wilson &Andrew J. 
Cherlin, The Real Test of Welfare Reform Still LiesAhead, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at A21. 
Although a number of welfare recipients found jobs in the booming late- 1990s economy, many 
of these jobs did not result in a long term net increase in spendable family income. See 
ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 182-83 (summarizing studies). And although some studies suggest 
that one-half of families leaving welfare for work may be better off financially, this result is 
probably due to acombination of astrong economy, increased child care, and EITC assistance. 
Wendell Primus, Comment, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 131 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron 
Haskins eds., 2001). Black families are particularly likely to be worse off economically from 
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If the purpose of employment-based assistance is to lead nonworkers into the 
economic self-reliance that constitutes good citizenship, then those in need of 
economic assistance to sustain their wage work will retain suspect status as citizens. 
20 7 
And if family-supporting wage work is the key to demonstrating personal responsibility 
for public well-being, work-based family assistance will need to be limited and heavily 
regulated to prevent recipients from benefiting at the expense of others.208 In practice, 
state welfare programs that have implemented employment assistance programs have 
made this assistance a short-term means to reducing welfare caseloads, and have 
imposed cumbersome and often racially discriminatory reporting and recertification 
requirements on recipients to determine eligibility and compliance with work 
obligations.2 °9 In 2002, President George W. Bush proposed to increase most TANF 
recipients' work requirements from thirty to forty hours a week and from 50% of a 
state's adult welfare recipients to 70%, without increased funding for child care or 
210 
other assistance. 
Employment-based assistance protects employers as well as low-waged workers 
from the costs of labor. Yet communitarian arguments for employment assistance 
generally do not advocate comparable regulation of employers to ensure that their 
individual gains are matched by community contributions. Instead, they implicitly 
equate employers' gains from assistance with public gains, taking their good 
citizenship status as an unconditional given regardless of effects on others. 
work requirements because of race discrimination in employment and in state administration of 
job requirements. See NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 177-214 (discussing Gooden's 
work along with other examples); Susan T. Gooden, All ThingsNot Being Equal:Differences in 
Caseworker Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV. J. AFR.-AM. PUB. 
POL'Y 23-33 (1998); Susan T. Gooden, The Hidden Third Party: Welfare Recipients' 
Experiences with Employers, 5 J. PUB. MGMT. & SOC. POL'Y 75 (1999). 
207. For many, "leaving welfare" has meant a shift in welfare from TANF benefits to low-
waged labor supported by food stamps and the earned income tax credit. See Wilson &Cherlin, 
supra note 206 (reporting results of a study of TANF in three cities). Numerous reports have 
linked welfare reforms to dramatic increases in demand for charitable assistance for food and 
housing. See ROBERTS, supranote 65, at 183. In contrast, Linda McClain argues for a view of 
personal responsibility that makes improving families' ability to provide care for children a 
community moral goal on par with participation in the workforce. McClain, supra note 154, at 
101. 
208. See McClain, supra note 154, at 100 (warning of "a real risk of the problem of 
childcare being inadequately addressed if it continues to feature merely as incidental to 
'supporting work"'). 
209. Gais & Johnson, supranote 192, at 1347-48; KATZ, supra note 1, at 332 (discussing 
administrative problems of work assistance programs, including high rates of incorrect benefit 
cuts for failure to comply with rules); see alsoNEUBECK &CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 186-89 
(discussing examples of race discrimination in local administration of TANF requirements, such 
as requiring more documentation from Latina applicants than from white applicants); Gooden, 
supra note 206, at 32 (reporting from a study of Virginia's welfare reforms that caseworkers 
used discretion to provide assistance, such as job referrals and transportation aid, to white 
welfare recipients far more than to black recipients). 
210. Robert Pear, Study by GovernorsCalls Bush Welfare PlanUnworkable,N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2002, at A8; see also Amy Goldstein, Bush Presses Lawmakers to Back Welfare 
Changes, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2003, at A4 (reporting the President's plans to pressure the new 
Congress to adopt increased work requirements for TANF). 
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Other things being equal, government assistance with working expenses such as 
transportation and child care allows employers to benefit from increased reliability and 
productivity from workers without raising wages or otherwise improving working 
conditions, thereby encouraging a cycle of dependency on government assistance with 
the costs of low-waged labor.211 Yet in the communitarian vision, employers' 
additional profits from low-waged labor, even if facilitated by government assistance, 
remain a matter of basic right requiring no additional community obligations in return. 
If this assistance allows capital owners to gain at the expense of workers and their 
families, by keeping wages lower than they would be otherwise, then they are simply 
pursuing market self-interest maximizing which presumably maximizes resources for 
all. Even the more progressive communitarian view of work obligations tends to 
reinforce poor families' subordinate citizenship status by continuing to identify 
employers' interests with a beneficial market but to identify poor families' interests 
with socially deviant withdrawal from the market. And even the progressive 
communitarian proposals for generous work assistance tend to incorporate an 
individualized vision of workers as job consumers rather than as collective producers 
of better jobs and communities. For example, one study of the impact of welfare 
reform in Massachusetts found that some community-based organizations have 
redirected their resources toward providing individual services for the transition from 
welfare to work and away from strengthening neighborhood institutions, building 




civic participation aimed at long-term community economic 
and social development. 
The alternative social citizenship visions of Forbath, Fineman, and Roberts differ 
from prevailing communitarian views not because they reject the importance of work 
and responsibility to community well-being, but because they value responsibility for 
more egalitarian communities and work. Dorothy Roberts envisions antipoverty 
programs that incorporate a vision of the poor not just as dependent individuals to be 
included in "the community" through economic assistance, but as political and civic 
actors deserving of the power to build communities to better meet their interests.213 For 
example, the Great Society's social citizenship program provided not just individual 
aid, but also government support for community action groups run by black activists.
2 14 
Similarly, the New Deal-era social citizenship vision that William Forbath describes 
focuses not just on individual economic rights, but on the importance of government 
support for workers' collective political and economic action through policies 
211. Anne Alstott discusses such market-changing effects from employment subsidies 
designed to induce welfare recipients to increase their wage labor. Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. 
Freedom:A LiberalChallengeto Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 1006-07 (1999). 
My criticism, however, is not that such incentive effects are an artificial distortion of some 
"real" market incentives, but that they represent a policy choice to favor a market structure that 
reflects and reinforces a hierarchical vision of workers' and employers' citizenship status. See 
infra notes 242-58. 
212. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supranote 68, at 203-04 (discussing study by James Jennings, 
The End of Welfare As We Know It? Or EndingNeighborhoodsAs We Have Come to Know 
Them?, NEIGHBORHOOD FUNDERS GROUP REPORTS (Washington, D.C.), Winter 1999, available 
at http://www.nfg.org/reports/64welfare.htm). 
213. Roberts, supra note 69, at 1596-97. 
214. Id. at 1571. 
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promoting cooperation and democratic community in the workplace. 1 5 
Like contemporary communitarians, that New Deal-era social citizenship vision 
asserted that public morality and good citizenship depend on work. Yet that previous 
vision of work-based social citizenship differed from contemporary communitarian 
visions by making employers' obligations the key to full participation in society.2 16 
Similarly, Martha Fineman's feminist social citizenship vision stresses public moral 
.217 -bsdlbraresponsibility toward caretakers. She not only redefines family-based labor as 
"work" central to a good society, but also advocates shifting responsibility for 
sustaining that work from caretakers and low-waged workers to the state and the 
broader market by obligating employers and governments to accommodate and reward 
caretaking.21 s Dorothy Roberts analyzes how black feminist activists often have 
presented welfare rights not as a substitute for either market rights or market 
obligations, but as a means of transforming labor market rights structured to promote 
white and male supremacy. 219 For example, late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century 
African American reformers advocated family assistance that would support wage-
working mothers as fully deserving citizens and that also would support family 
caretaking by treating that as work deserving of wages. 220 In an antiracist citizenship 
vision, income support that allows parents of color to withdraw from racially 
discriminatory waged labor can be a moral opportunity (not a moral hazard) increasing 
pressure on employers and on white families to take responsibility for better valuing 
workers of color both in and out of the home.22 
In short, these three visions differ from the communitarian call to ground social 
citizenship in public morality, because all demand additional moral responsibility from 
those identified with the market. By challenging the morality of the market, these 
alternative social citizenship visions shift deviance and blame for public harm away 
from those who lose out under existing market conditions. Moreover, these alternative 
visions recognize markets as fundamentally moral institutions-not fixed as a matter of 
natural law, but shaped by ideology and power. Dorothy Roberts, for example, argues 
that the prevailing communitarian emphasis on morality fails to recognize and redress 
the immorality of economic institutions that perpetuate poverty through longstanding 
barriers to housing, jobs, and political participation. 222 
215. See Forbath, supranote 27, at 61. 
216. Id. at 73-75. See MINK, supra note 73, at 26 (arguing that congressional feminists 
supporting welfare reform "conflated their own right to work outside of the home with poor 
single mothers' obligationto do so") (emphasis in original). 
217. See Fineman, supra npte 144, at 1409-11; see also McClain, supra note 154, at 101 
(arguing for a recognition of childcare as a component of responsible self-government so that 
parents deserve societal help in providing both parental and nonparental child care). 
218. Fineman, supranote 144, at 1436-39 (arguing for restructuring workplaces to support 
family caretakers, not just as a "special" treatment, but as a basic right to work). 
219. See Roberts, supranote 69, at 1570-71 (discussing early-twentieth-century activism). 
Id. at 1571-72, 1585 (discussing 1960s activism). 
220. See id. at 1570-71; GORDON, supra note 27, at 136-37; Eileen Boris, The Power of 
Motherhood: Black and White Activist Women Redefine the "Political", 2 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 25, 26 (1989). 
221. See NUEBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing how 
welfare reforms reinforce racially discriminatory labor markets). 
222. Roberts, supra note 69, at 560-61. 
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The predominant communitarian vision fails to rescue social citizenship from the 
neoliberal double bind, because it construes government support for poor families as 
"redistribution" that departs from market responsibility,223 implicitly accepting the 
given distribution of market responsibilities as generally moral or at least beyond 
moral scrutiny. While more egalitarian communitarians such as Anthony Giddens 
theoretically advocate enforcement of responsibilities from the rich as well as the 
224 poor, in practice they tend to accept the bargaining power of wealthy citizens as 
market facts that must be accommodated, while condemning the bargaining power of 
poor citizens as a cultural problem that must be regulated. 
For example, Giddens notes that "entrenched interest groups" will resist welfare 
reform aimed at controlling moral hazard among poorer citizens, but that enforcing 
such responsibilities "is an absolute necessity" to sustain and strengthen those welfare 
225 G programs. In contrast, when Giddens discusses the question of taxing billionaires 
like Bill Gates to support "redistribution" to those facing increased economic 
insecurity, he explains that high income tax rates for the rich are "no longer feasible or 
desirable" because the rich have the power to evade taxes. 226 Giddens accepts a system 
that imposes greater responsibility on the poor than on the rich for curtailing their self-
interest in maximizing personal gain, because Giddens assumes that the personal gains 
chosen by the rich are inherently more moral-more conducive to the good society-
than the personal gains of the poor. He explains that when the poor evade low-waged 
work, they hurt society through excessive leisure (without considering the societal 
value of increased child care or pressure for better jobs),
227 and when the rich evade 
taxes they help society by producing jobs (without considering the societal value of 
those jobs or the possibility that tax evasion by the rich supports short-term speculation 
or luxury consumption rather than productive investment). 228 By identifying welfare 
recipients' gains as inefficient moral hazard and tax cuts for the wealthy as promoting 
an efficient market, Giddens implicitly affirms a citizenship vision in which the poor 
have subordinate moral status. In contrast, by questioning rather than presuming the 
moral superiority of those the market has traditionally privileged, Forbath, Fineman, 
and Roberts provide stronger justifications for expanding individual social and 
economic rights for impoverished families as a means of more fully enhancing 
community responsibility. 
D. Liberal Citizenshipand Welfare Reform 
The prevailing pro-welfare liberal approach to social citizenship rejects both 
communitarian and neoliberal attempts to justify government economic support on the 
223. See, e.g., Giddens, supranote 176, at 180 (arguing that equality ofopportunity requires 
"redistribution" for those "left behind" by the market). 
224. Id. at 8 (arguing that the call for more responsibilities for people with welfare should be 
extended to elites). 
225. Id. at 11. 
226. Id. at 184-85. 
227. Id.at 180 (noting that high levels of social welfare encourage unemployment associated 
with low self-esteem and an "oppression of surplus time"). 
228. Id. at 185 (arguing that high taxes "penalize effort and therefore job creation and 
economic prosperity" and that tax cuts can "create more profit and more disposable income"). 
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ground of overall societal benefits, whether moral or economic. Instead, liberals tend 
to defend social citizenship on the theory that the good of society depends on 
individual well-being, not simply on aggregate gain or public virtue.229 In contrast to 
mid-twentieth-century pro-welfare liberals, contemporary liberals generally have 
moved away from relying on the Keynesian theory that redistribution promotes 
aggregate gain. 
Like neoliberalism, pro-welfare liberalism claims the goal of "state neutrality 
toward competing visions of the good life., 230 Liberalism assumes a citizenship norm 
of individuals who have the power to govern themselves by making choices as 
autonomous agents. And like neoliberalism, liberalism assumes a market that generally 
promotes the public well-being by allowing individuals to maximize their own welfare 
through freely chosen exchanges. But liberals tend to depart from neoliberalism by 
arguing that the aggregate good produced by market freedom is sometimes inconsistent 
with individual well-being. 
In the pro-welfare liberal view, state support can augment rather than diminish 
freedom for individuals who lose out when the market produces aggregate gain. For 
example, Anne Alstottargues for a liberal revision of welfare founded on the principle 
that providing basic resources gives each individual "realfreedom to shape her life."
231 
In their book True Security,Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw justify their ambitious 
proposal for a comprehensive social safety net on the ground that the market's success 
in achieving overall well-being should be balanced with individual security. 232 Framing 
their proposal with the story of the three pigs, whose houses provide different degrees 
of protection against wolves, they conclude that "[d]espite our nation's affluence,.... 
too many little pigs are still being gobbled up. 
233 
But contemporary liberals, like communitarians, tend to accept the two central 
premises of the neoliberal attack on social welfare. First, the liberal defense of welfare 
assumes that the market stands for efficiency principles that promote the overall 
good-the public interest. Second, liberals tend to assume that AFDC's assistance for 
single mothers in poverty deviates from those market principles to promote 
redistribution, not efficiency. As a result, the liberal response to neoliberal welfare 
criticisms, like the communitarian response, must grapple with the problem that 
welfare threatens to harm both the public and, in the long run, its beneficiaries-the 
moral hazard problem. 
1. Resolving Moral Hazard with Freedom from Responsibility 
The primary liberal response has been to defend or redesign AFDC as protection 
against costs not attributable to individual behavior. If limited moral autonomy or 
229. Alstott, supra note 211, at 980 ("In contrast to utilitarians, whose goal is to maximize 
aggregate utility, liberals seek to ensure that every individual has the greatest possible freedom 
to shape her own life."). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. (citing and discussing egalitarian theories of Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, 
John Rawls, and Philippe Van Parijs) (emphasis in original). 
232. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN 
SOCIAL INSURANCE 8, 15-25 (1999). 
233. Id. at 320. 
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economic agency makes welfare recipients unlikely to significantly affect public costs, 
welfare is possible without the harsh moral or economic discipline of either the 
communitarian or neoliberal approaches. In the typical contemporary liberal view, 
welfare recipients are not irresponsible agents of public harm; instead, they are freed 
from responsibility for harm. 
In reply to charges that welfare produces incentives for more children, less 
marriage, and less wage work in impoverished families, liberals tend to argue that 
these incentives do not in fact significantly affect welfare recipients' behavior. In True 
Security, for example, Graetz and Mashaw explain that the problem of moral hazard 
need not defeat comprehensive public assistance because incentives do not translate 
directly into behaviors. 4 Liberal critics of restrictive welfare reforms often cite 
empirical evidence suggesting that recipients of AFDC have not significantly altered 
family composition or other behavior in response to benefits.235 
In one explanation of the gap between the moral hazard theory and the actual 
behavior of welfare recipients, decisions about childbearing, child raising, marriage, 
and wage work are to a great extent out of recipients' control. For example, some 
women on AFDC are forced to remain out of the work force or to bear children 
because of violence, particularly by intimate partners. 236 Single mothers may resort to 
welfare from lack of marriage or job opportunities, rather than from strategic choices 
to substitute public assistance for wages or husbands. Poor physical or mental health, 
failed contraception, random misfortunes, or absent, noncontributing fathers may put 
families in unanticipated economic need. All of these arguments present women on 
welfare as victims of external, arbitrary, or systemic forces, which prevent them from 
exerting individual responsibility for their choices. 237 
In another explanation of the gap between incentives and behavior, even if 
recipients sometimes have control over their decisions about marriage, childbearing, or 
wage work, they tend to make these decisions based on irrational or extrarational 
grounds where economic incentives hold little sway. For example, women in poverty 
might attempt to raise children and forgo job opportunities because of love, other 
emotional needs, mental illness, addiction, or religious values. 
Or, liberals sometimes try to present welfare recipients as innocent of any harmful 
incentive effects by construing childrenrather than single mothers as the beneficiaries 
of assistance. Graetz and Mashaw, for example, justify income support for 
234. Id. at 296. 
235. See JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 106 (1995); Lucy A. 
Williams, The Ideology of Division:BehaviorModification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 
YALE L.J. 719, 739-40 (1992); McClain, supra note 130, at 382. 
236. See Lisa D. Brush, Harm, Moralism, and the Strugglefor the Soul of Feminism, 3 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 237,249 (1997) (explaining the problem that abusive partners use 
violence to prevent women on welfare from gaining economic independence); Lucie E. White, 
No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency"from a Different Ground,81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1987-
89 (1993) (describing examples of how violence-by family members, coworkers, employers 
and others-restricts women's ability to escape from poverty and welfare). 
237. In contrast to standard pro-welfare liberal efforts to focus on structural rather than 
individual causes of economic need, Linda McClain uses liberalism and feminism to develop a 
more sophisticated analysis of welfare mothers' choices that recognizes the interrelationship 
between personal responsibility and social structures. See McClain, supranote 130, at 434-53. 
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impoverished families as protection against "the risk of being born into the wrong 
family,, 238 or more impassively, the risk of being raised by parents of limited earning 
capacity.239 
2. Freedom from Responsibility as Subordinate Citizenship 
But these contemporary pro-welfare liberal arguments fail to escape the neoliberal 
double bind that makes redistribution a threat to good citizenship. If welfare is 
assistance for passive victims of circumstance who fail to achieve the liberal norm of 
market autonomy, then welfare will be a mark of noncitizenship. Communitarians 
make this argument when they criticize liberals for failing to treat people in poverty as 
capable of taking personal moral responsibility as full citizens.24 ° While liberal 
arguments discounting incentive effects offer an alternative to the subordination 
implicit in communitarian moral control, these liberal arguments tend to support 
welfare as a means of self-determination only for those whose self-determination is 
limited. Once again, as in Mullerv. Oregon,241 the price of redistribution is status as 
"others" not capable or deserving of full membership in society. 
In addition, because liberalism tends to make market autonomy the model for good 
citizenship and to distinguish welfare support from market autonomy, it reinforces as 
public-interested a market in which those in poverty have limited bargaining power. 
For example, Anne Alstott makes a strong liberal case for basic income assistance 
without work requirements as a means of enhancing individual self-determination, 
particularly individual freedom to choose between work and family care or other 
pursuits not valued in the existing labor market. 24 2 Alstott argues that work-based 
assistance programs like TANF designed to encourage wage work by mothers in 
poverty rely on a paternalistic moral vision that wrongly romanticizes low-wage 
work.24 3 By constructing increased alternatives to wage work for poor mothers as a 
beneficial moral opportunity-an increase in individual freedom of choice-rather 
than as harmful moral hazard, she begins to a construct a liberal vision of welfare that 
does not depend on denying recipients' freedom to reshape the market in their interest. 
Nonetheless, Alstott backs away from such a vision by advocating an income 
assistance program designed to accommodate (or even to exacerbate) a market in 
which low-income families are limited to the tough choice between below-subsistence 
24 245government income 4 and low wages. She argues that income assistance should be 
238. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 124. 
239. Id. at 119. 
240. See Mitchell, supra note 198, at 24 (reporting President George W. Bush's campaign 
remarks praising charities that use "demanding love" to treat aid recipients as "moral 
individuals, with responsibilities and duties," and criticizing liberal welfare programs that 
consider recipients "wards or clients or dependents or numbers"). 
241. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
242. Alstott, supra note 211, at 988-89. 
243. Id. at 1011-12 (arguing that policies increasing low-waged work in place of maternal 
child care do not necessarily enhance either societal well-being or individual freedom). 
244. Id. at 979 (proposing a $6000 cash grant invariant to family size and below poverty 
levels). 
245. Id.at 1005-09 (explaining that no one "has the right to sell her labor for more than her 
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combined with "deregulation" of the labor market,246 which she explains as eliminating
"regulatory barriers" such as minimum wage laws that keep wages "artificially high for 
low-skilled workers., 247 Her approach seems to depend on keeping basic income 
grants, along with wages, low enough so that this assistance does not substantially 
distort what she assumes are beneficial market incentives. 248 This part of her plan 
embraces rather than rejects the moral premise that policies increasing low-waged 
work enhance both overall social utility and individual freedom.2 4 9 She defends this 
vision of the citizenship virtues of low-waged work by arguing that "[r]eal freedom 
does not demand that everyone be given unlimited choices or that everyone be happy 
....Every individual is free to decide whether to work for the wage she commands, or 
250 
to use her time elsewhere if the wage seems too low. 
By assuming individual workers, not politically structured markets, "command" the 
low (or high) wages they receive, she adopts the Lochner-eraview that the market 
naturally operates through voluntary, resource-maximizing exchanges rather than 
through government distribution and enforcement of rights and responsibilities. And by 
singling out minimum wage laws as a central barrier to virtuous labor market 
freedom-rather than, say, laws that prohibit wages for spousal housework,25' laws that 
252 
protect employers who discriminate against mothers, laws that provide large 
subsidies to wealthy married men whose wives replace wage-earning with family 
care,253 or laws that discourage strong labor unions254--Alstott assumes as natural a 
free counterparts will pay"). 
246. Id. at 1008. 
247. Id. at 1004-05. Alstott does advocate strong enforcement of civil rights laws against 
race discrimination in employment, implicitly distinguishing those laws from "artificial" 
regulatory barriers, but she does not offer any specific details about how to prevent employment 
discrimination from hindering her liberal vision of free choice between wage work and family 
care. Id. at 1008. For discussions of how race and sex discrimination in employment prevent 
such free choices, see NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 193-95; Vicki Schultz, Life's 
Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1898-99 (2000). 
248. See Alstott, supranote 211, at 1008 (explaining elimination of "mandates" such as the 
minimum wage as a way of making "transparent" the "real wages for low-skilled labor"). Alstott 
says she is leaving aside the question whether basic income shouldbe set at a subsistence (rather 
than below subsistence) level, id. at 979 n.46, but her justification for the income grant as 
freedom-enhancing seems to rest on keeping the cash grant low.enough to avoid significant 
reductions in income for upper earners (i.e., substantial economic equality), in part on the theory 
that upper earners' income contributes more to society. See id. at 984-86. 
249. Id. at 1008 (describing such a market as "freer"). 
250. Id. at 1006. 
251. See generally Siegel, supra note 151 (discussing case law imposing status-based 
contractual constraints on women's ability to negotiate for wages for family caretaking); Amy 
Wax, Is There a Caring Crisis?, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 340 (1999) (book review) 
(considering the reasons why societies have "uniformly frowned on the very notion of a free 
market in women's work"). 
252. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment DiscriminationLaw, Women's 
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits ofEconomic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 371, 391-419 (2001) (showing how narrow interpretations of sex discrimination law 
have perpetuated employment discrimination against pregnant women and caretaking mothers). 
253. The federal income tax law's marital income-splitting scheme provides a tax shelter, 
worth about $33 billion annually, for middle and upper income wage earners married to 
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market governed by policies that constrain the bargaining power of many family 
caretakers and low-waged workers compared to wealthier others.255 While her plan 
challenges neoliberal citizenship norms by demanding a "little bit of extra freedom and 
nonearning or low-earning spouses. Congressional Budget Office, For Better or Worse: 
Marriage and the Federal Income Tax (1997), discussedin Lawrence Zelenak, DoingSomething 
About MarriagePenalties:A Guidefor the Perplexed, 54 TAX. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000); Deborah 
Sandorfy, The "MarriagePenalty" and Innocent Spouse Provisions,71 CPA J. 66 (2001) 
(describing the income splitting bonus as a tax shelter). The taxpayers who gain financially from 
this provision are disproportionately upper-income white men (and their families). See also 
Dorothy A. Brown, The MarriagePenalty/BonusDebatein BlackandWhite, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTs. 168 (1999) (analyzing the racial disparity in subsidies for marriages that do not share 
wage-earning equally and the failure of proposed reforms to correct it). This bonus provides 
incentives for the lower-earning spouse to withdraw from substantial wage labor especially in 
upper income families (and it encourages lower earning parents to remain single). See EDWARD 
J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 17-19, 66, 218-19 (1997) (discussing incentive effects of the 
federal income tax law's marriage bonus and marriage penalty). While recent legislation 
gradually phases out the related marriage penalty on many married couples with two relatively 
equal earners, it increases the marriage subsidy so that high-earners are still better off married to 
a noneamer than they are if they remain single or if they divide wage earning and family care 
equally. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 
§§ 301-303 (codified at various sections of 26 U.S.C.); Marvin J. Williams, The Marriage 
Penalty Dilemma:Some Reliefon the Way, 46 NAT'L PUB.AcCr. 32 (2001) (explaining that this 
law reduces tax penalties on low and middle income married couples but retains the joint filing 
system and related rate structures that provide the marriage bonus). While some construe the 
marriage bonus as a recognition of the value of women's caretaking labor, see Anne L. Alstott, 
Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices,96 COLUM. L. REV. 
2001, 2032 (1996), others argue that this scheme's direct effect is to reward breadwinners in 
certain families with unequal labor division and that women's caretaking labor (both waged and 
not) would be more directly and equally rewarded by taxing married persons as individuals. See 
JULIE A. NELSON, Feminist Theory and the Income Tax, in FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND 
ECONOMICS 97-117 (1996). 
The Social Security system similarly subsidizes the traditional breadwinner/homemaker 
family, arguably penalizing married women's work both in and out of the home. See NANCY 
FOLBRE, INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND FAMILY VALUES 98-99 (2001). "A large majority of 
women pay social security taxes for years, but.., receive the same benefits they would have 
had had they never held a paying job at all" because of rules assigning benefits based on a 
choice between primary breadwinner or "dependent" status. CRITrENDEN, supranote 114, at 
297-98 n. 12 (citing How WELL Do WOMEN FARE UNDER THE NATION's RETIREMENT POLICIES?, 
H.R. DOC. No. 102-879, at 12 (1992)). 
254. See, e.g., James Atleson, ConfrontingJudicialValues: Rewriting the Law ofWork in a 
Common Law System, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 435 (1997) (giving an overview of the moral 
assumptions that have shaped U.S. labor law so that it restricts workers' freedom and control 
relative to employers). 
255. Another "regulatory barrier" Alstott mentions is import restrictions. Alstott, supranote 
211, at 1008. Again, this view singles out government protections for some workers as 
"barriers" and "mandates" that impede market freedom while not questioning government 
protections for wealthy capital owners like new international regulatory protections for 
intellectual property rights. See McCluskey, supranote 15 (criticizing the assumptions of "real" 
versus "artificial" market prices in the debate over international trade policies). 
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dignity" for "low-earners ' 256 it also accommodates those norms by accepting that 
freedom and dignity must still largely vary by economic class (and possibly by race 
and gender)217-implicitly associating a market that fosters high rates of inequality 
with good citizenship. In sum, Alstott's social citizenship scheme would increase low-
income individuals' freedom to choose low-income family care (or other activities) 
over low-income wage work, while embracing a market designed to constrain 




In contrast, Graetz and Mashaw adopt a liberal vision ofwelfare that would increase 
impoverished parents' power to support their family through wage work, but would not 
substantially increase their power to choose family caretaking over wage work. Graetz 
and Mashaw acquiesce in TANF's work requirements on the traditional liberal theory 
that welfare must aim to benefit those perceived as "innocent," like children, and to 
avoid too much freedom for those perceived as "indolent or inattentive parents. 259 
They would support children in poverty through comprehensive assistance with 
housing, health insurance, and child care costs for working families.26 ° This scheme, 
like Alstott's, falls short of its liberal ideals not because it reflects a moral preference 
for wage work over family care (or family care over wage work in Alstott's case), but 
because both liberal visions continue to assume that the public benefits from a market 
which constrains workers' and parents' power to bargain for substantially better 
choices for both wage work and family care. Neither challenge the neoliberal double 
standard of moral hazard that makes employers' increased dependence on low-waged 
labor an efficient market and families' increased dependence on government support 
potentially inefficient redistribution. 
Graetz and Mashaw's liberal effort to target welfare to support true "innocence" not 
256. Alstott, supra note 211, at 984. 
257. See id. at 1008 (acknowledging that income assistance will do little to counter race 
discrimination). 
258. Abasic income guarantee of $6000, as Alstott describes, would add some significant 
support to low-waged workers by providing supplemental income that could offset the costs of 
low-waged work. Id. at 1008 (noting that the grant could help pay for low-waged workers' 
transportation and child care). It would also provide incentives for employers to improve wages 
and working conditions: in an effect that could be described as a "moral opportunity" (rather 
than "moral hazard"), the guaranteed income would serve as a substitute for work that allows 
workers to "strike" to improve their power to bargain for better wages and working conditions. 
See id. at 1011 (noting that the cash grant would help the poor "weather a period of 
unemployment"). But if the minimum wage law were eliminated, this would provide a 
somewhat countervailing increase in employers' power to bargain for low wages-an effect 
which Alstott's plan embraces as a moral opportunity (rather than moral hazard) on the theory 
that a market with more jobs at lower wages is more "free" and beneficial (at least as long as the 
government provides a low-income alternative to low-income jobs). The net effect of these 
changes on individuals' ability to "choose" work that allows them to escape poverty would 
depend (among other things) on what other "regulatory barriers" were removed to enhance 
employers' "market freedom" and on what other government protections for low-waged workers 
remain available (Medicaid, food stamps, housing assistance, and child care assistance). 
259. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 229, 312 (asserting that political support for 
family income security is easier because "[miost people view children as economically 
vulnerable through no fault of their own"). 
260. See id. at 227-54. 
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only requires restricting single parents' choice of child care over work. Their attempt 
to carve out a claim for innocence as the basis for public support seems destined to 
remain a losing battle, since welfare critics almost always can respond by describing a 
plausible way in which different and arguably more responsible individual choices 
might have avoided the need for welfare support. If TANF's work requirements reflect 
the premise that impoverished parents (unlike children) are responsible for engaging in 
wage work to support themselves in the market, then (as neoliberals and conservative 
communitarians would ask) why should we protect impoverished parents against the 
costs of market work? After all, if it is good to discourage parental moral hazard by 
restricting support for those who do not work, then it might seem even better to further 
discourage parental moral hazard by restricting support for those who do not work hard 
enough or well enough to support a family, or who do not constrain their family 
choices to fit their market earnings.26 ' 
Moreover, if the goal is to truly separate support for innocent children from support 
for irresponsible parents, and if parents who have children they cannot support are 
irresponsible, then some will logically conclude that the solution is to remove children 
from parents incapable of supporting them. Graetz and Mashaw are wrong when they 
that support for children must necessarily be provided through parents.262assert 
Historically, policies removing children from impoverished parents to state custody or 
to work or adoption in wealthier families have often been a means of enforcing the 
subordinate citizenship status of poor families, Native Americans, and other racial and 
ethnic minorities. 263 Dorothy Roberts shows that recent welfare reforms have worked 
together with changes in child welfare policy to create a system particularly aimed at 
breaking up black families. 264 Rickie Solinger reports that, in the 1980s, Republican 
policymakers promoted adoption of poor children by wealthier families as a strategy265 
for reducing welfare costs. 
In short, popular ideas of welfare recipients' "innocence" have long depended on 
racial, gender, and sexual status. Without directly challenging the inegalitarian 
ideologies underlying beliefs about who deserves economic protection, it is likely that 
the generous and comprehensive family income support systems Graetz and Mashaw 
advocate will be skewed or limited by the assumption that some children are more 
261. In 2002, for example, President Bush stated he was making a priority of pushing for 
further welfare reforms that would strengthen Work requirements. Robin Toner & Robert Pear, 
Bush's Planon Welfare Law IncreasesWork Requirement,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2002, at A23. 
Although Bush's plan would allow states additional flexibility to count substance abuse 
treatment or job training toward work requirements, it made no mention of additional funding 
for assistance with family needs. Id. 
262. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 314. 
263. See, e.g., LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION (1999). 
264. See generallyROBERTS, supra note 65; see also id. at 186 (giving example of California 
county which uses TANF sanctions cutting welfare payments as a trigger for scrutiny by child 
protection services); Nina Bernstein, Side Effect ofWelfare Law: The No-ParentFamily,N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2002, at Al (reporting that research on the effect of welfare reforms shows that 
a rising share of black children receiving welfare live in no-parent households); Jason DeParle, 
WisconsinWelfare OverhaulJustifiesHopeandSome Fear,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at Al 
(reporting that 5% of mothers removed from welfare were forced to "abandon their children"). 
265. SOLINGER, supra note 60, at 198. 
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innocent than others, and that those "others" may be more deserving of incarceration, 
state supervision, or work than of family assistance. 
3. Redistributing Freedom from Responsibility 
Graetz and Mashaw do, however, partially recognize the importance of ideology 
about citizenship status in deciding whose economic need is considered beyond their 
control and therefore deserving of assistance. They support the change from AFDC's 
support for nonworking mothers to TANF's preference for maternal wage work on the 
ground that the change reflects new social norms about moral responsibility for wage 
work. 266 Now that most middle-class mothers depend on their own wage labor to 
support their families, Graetz and Mashaw agree that the public as a whole will no 
longer accept AFDC's premise that mothers in poverty need protection from wage
267 
work. 
But by concluding that "working mothers [have become] the norm for all 
families, 268 Graetz and Mashaw make maternal wage work requirements seem to be a 
benign matter of equalizing moral responsibilities for wage work across class lines and 
perhaps across gender lines. This egalitarian construction of TANF's work 
requirements belies the deeper class, race, and gender inequalities that these 
requirements reflect and reproduce. The increased substitution of wage work for 
parental child care in white middle-class families is not simply a matter of changing 
gender roles but of the declining economic security of middle-class breadwinners, as 
Graetz and Mashaw appear to recognize. 269 To a great extent, the rise in working hours 
by middle-class mothers (and many fathers) at the expense of family care in the United 
States has been the result of employers' increased bargaining power in relation to many 
workers, due to falling or stagnant wages throughout the 1980s and 1990s, increased 
job insecurity from downsizing, deunionization, and changing global competition.270 
Consistent with the theory that rising class inequality (not just falling gender 
inequality) has increased mothers' wage work, responsibility for child care remains 
heavily gendered-as does primary responsibility for family wage earning. 271 Of 
266. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 230. 
267. See id. 
268. Id. 
269. See id. at 30-3 1. 
270. See id. at 31-33. By the 1990s, Americans worked for wages nine weeks more each 
year, on average, than Europeans--even though in the 1960s, Americans averaged shorter work 
weeks than any other industrialized nation. Louis Uchitelle, How to Succeedin PoliticsWithout 
Really Working, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1999, §4, at 3 (citing Labor Department data), discussed 
in CRITENDEN, supra note 114, at 260; see alsoROBERT PERRUCCI &EARL WYSONG, Prefaceto 
THE NEW CLASS SOCIETY x (1999) (concluding that the American class structure has changed to 
replace the large middle class of the mid-twentieth century with a society bifurcated into a new 
working class comprised of 80% and a wealthy privileged class consisting of 20% of the 
population). 
271. In her study of contemporary motherhood, journalist Ann Crittenden concludes that 
"rising income inequality in the United States has brought with it increasing genderinequality" 
in work/family choices (emphasis in original). CRITTENDEN, supranote 114, at 117. See also id. 
at 139-40 (stating that most married Americans with children still have a "semitraditional 
arrangement, with the husband the primary breadwinner and the wife the primary homemaker-
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course, traditional gender norms never exempted all American women from 
responsibility for noncaretaking work to sustain their families. Women of color have 
been traditionally expected to combine parenting with wage work (or to forgo 
motherhood).272 Most American women traditionally engaged in substantial productive 
noncaretaking labor at home as farmers, craftspersons and entrepreneurs.273 AFDC 
even if she also works outside the home"). For example, a study on Social Security estimated 
that even by 2030, only 40% of women will earn enough to qualify as earners rather than as 
"dependents" for purposes of old age benefits. See How WELL Do WOMEN FARE UNDER THE 
NATION'S RETIREMENT POLICIES?, H.R. Doc. No. 102-879, at 12 (1992), discussed in 
CRITTENDEN, supra note 114, at 195, 297-98 n.12. More than one-quarter of American wives 
with children earn nothing, and the average married woman earns only about half of what her 
husband earns. CRITrENDEN, supranote 114, at 110, 290 n. 1 (citing unpublished data for 1995, 
Current Population Survey, U.S. Bureau of the Census). More than one-third of married women 
with children under six earn no wage income. Kessler, supra note 252, at 386 (citing Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment Characteristics of 
Families in 1997, tbl.4 (May 21, 1998), available at http://stats.bls.gov/blslnewsrels.htm). 
Families at the top of the economic scale, where two incomes are not necessary for survival, 
show a strong, and increasing tendency toward traditional gender divisions of labor: in 1998, 
nearly half of upper income marriages had just one breadwinner, and 90% of the breadwinners 
were men. Nancy Ann Jeffrey, The New-Economy Family, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at W1, 
discussed in CRITrENDEN, supra note 114, at 117, 291-92 n.15 (citing statistics that at the 
highest income levels, male-breadwinner/female-homemaker marriages are even more 
predominant). A survey of college-educated women in 1991 showed that fewer than 20% had 
achieved both motherhood and career by their late thirties or forties. CLAUDIA GOLDIN, CAREER 
AND FAMILY: COLLEGE WOMEN LOOK TO THE PAST (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 5188, 1995) (studying 1,200 college graduates and defining a career as earnings of 
$11 an hour), discussedin CRITrENDEN, supranote 114, at 32. On the other hand, rising class 
inequality may sometimes contribute to gender equality in lower-income married couples with 
children. See FRANCINE M. DEUTSCH, HALVING IT ALL: How EQUALLY SHARED PARENTING 
WORKS 169-94 (1999) (analyzing results of interviews with working class dual-earner married 
parents who, despite embracing traditional gender ideologies in theory, often demonstrated more 
actual equal sharing of housework, child care, and job investments than wealthier couples who 
professed more egalitarian gender beliefs). 
This is not to deny that changing laws (and norms) have reduced gender inequality in the 
workplace, thereby encouraging more women to work. However, many barriers to women's 
equal employment still persist, particularly for women who do not conform to the dominant 
norm of the ideal worker as a man without family responsibilities (or much of a nonwork 
personal life). See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK 
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 1-6 (2000) (proposing eliminating the "ideal-worker 
norm" in market work and family entitlements); Schultz, supra note 247, at 1894-97 (arguing 
that women's lower pay and labor market participation is due to discrimination and segregation 
rather than to women's "choice" of family care over wage work). 
272. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 203-07 (1997) (discussing how black women have generally been 
excluded from policies designed to support women's caretaking labor); ABRAMOVITZ, supra 
note 121, at 123-24 (discussing how black women were unable to fit new nineteenth-century 
gender ideals emphasizing women's role in the home). 
273. See CRITrENDEN, supra note 114, at 45-53 (tracing the historical development of the 
idea that housewives' labor is economically unproductive); Reva B. Siegel, HomeAs Work: The 
FirstWoman's Rights Claims ConcerningWomen's Household Labor 1850-1880 103 YALE 
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benefits are set low enough so that most welfare recipients need to engage in (often 
unreported) waged or bartering work for others to help their families survive.274 In the 
1990s, much of the political support for work-based welfare reforms was based on a 
highly inegalitarian citizenship vision that valued not maternal wage work, but instead 
the redistribution of mothers' work to benefit some families at the expense of others. 
275 
Contrary to Graetz and Mashaw's benign picture, the prevailing citizenship vision 
driving welfare reform appears to make poor single mothers, especially mothers of 
color, morally responsible for replacing care for their children with wage work for 
others, but to make married middle class mothers, especially white mothers, morally 
responsible for forgoing substantial wage work to care for their own children. 
276 
But while Graetz and Mashaw accommodate what they perceive to be changing 
L.J. 1073, 1086-91 (1994) (describing women's critical role as workers in the antebellum 
economy and explaining that industrialization did not displace home-based nonwaged 
production). 
274. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS 
SURVIVE WELFARE AND LoW-WAGE WORK 6 (1997) (reporting that interviews with nearly 400 
welfare-reliant mothers show that all but one engaged in income-generating activities, and the 
one exception who did not, risked losing her child for neglect because she could not provide 
enough food and clothing). 
275. See MINK, supra note 73, at 109 (criticizing TANF as grounded in an ideology "giving 
social approval to [single mothers'] care-giving work only when it is provided for other people's 
children"); id. at 129-31 (criticizing welfare-to-work requirements for "institutionalizing [poor 
and single] mothers as a caste of providers for other people--of goods, services, and care for 
other people and their children"). Dorothy Roberts quotes a cartoon that shows how TANF's 
work requirements aim to promote a redistribution of work's value, rather than simply 
increasing valuable work: A politician explains that an AFDC recipient is a bad mother because 
she "hang[s] around the house taking care of the kids" and that she will be cut off welfare if she 
doesn't take ajob. "Doing what?" the welfare mother asks. "Taking care of someone else's 
kids," the politician answers. ROBERTS, supra note 65, at 180 (quoting Wasserman's View, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 25, 1995, at 10). See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black 
Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871-73 (1994). 
276. Similarly, Amy Wax explains TANF's work requirements as a way of making the 
division between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor gender neutral, ignoring how these 
requirements reflect new race, class, and gender norms aimed at constructing many women as 
deserving of fewer rewards from both work and family. Amy L. Wax, Somethingfor Nothing: 
Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 02-11 2 (Mar. 2002). See MINK, 
supra note 73, at 23-25 (explaining that "Many welfare reformers view work requirements as 
necessary not because all mothers should be in the labor market, but because poor single 
mothers ought to be" and because prevailing racial mythology cast black women in the role of 
"other people's workers rather than their own families' mothers."). See also NEUBECK & 
CAZENAVE, supra note 68, at 174-76 (arguing that popular support for welfare's work 
requirements had the purpose and effect of maintaining racial stratification rather than 
advancing gender equality for poor mothers). Rickie Solinger similarly shows that the political 
view driving welfare reforms in the 1990s aimed not to promote anew class equality based on a 
public norm favoring working mothers, but to making motherhood a class privilege unavailable 
to poor women and to encourage middle class women to stay at home with their kids. SOLINGER, 
supranote 60, at 216-17 (contrasting Congressional glorification of nonworking middle class 
mothers with Congressional castigation of welfare mothers' caretaking). 
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popular values making welfare mothers' caretaking a moral hazard, they dismiss 
changing popular values about others' responsibility for labor market changes 
perceived as harmful to society. Many Americans view the rising economic insecurity 
of the middle class as a problem not only of irresponsible families, but also of 
irresponsible markets and irresponsible political processes. For example, one 1996 
survey found that 83% of average (nonwealthy) Americans agreed (and almost three-
fifths strongly agreed) that "average working families have less economic security 
today, because corporations have become too greedy and care more about their profits 
than about being fair and loyal to their employees." 277 Popular opinion has shown 
substantial concern about the harmful effects of policies governing international trade 
and campaign finance on families dependent on wage income.278 
Graetz and Mashaw acknowledge that economic changes have produced hardship 
for many American families, 279 but they assume this hardship is the product of 
inevitable, and generally beneficial, market forces. 280 By identifying widespread 
economic insecurity as a problem of random market risks.28 Graetz and Mashaw take 
the typical liberal strategy of attempting to relieve impoverished families from 
responsibility for their hardship to justify government aid in the face of moral hazard 
concerns. But by failing to attribute responsibility to anyone else for that hardship, this 
liberal defense of welfare undermines its case. 
If economic insecurity comes from the market, and if the market is taken as 
277. Robert L. Borosage & Ruy Teixeira, The PoliticsofMoney, NATION, Oct. 21, 1996, at 
21-22, discussedin PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 270, at 174. In a BusINEss WEEK/HARRIS 
poll of 1100 Americans, 95% said they agreed more strongly with the statement that "in 
addition to being concerned about shareholders, corporations should be concerned about their 
employees, the communities in which they operate, and sometimes they should sacrifice the 
interests of shareholders for the benefit of employees and the communities in which they 
operate" rather than the statement that "corporations should only be concerned with maximizing 
profits for shareholders, and if they do, everything will be right with the American economy." 
Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, A Corporate Lawyer Speaks Out, available at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/corp-focus/2002/0001 10.html. 
278. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, GovernmentResponsiveness in Decline, 
12 PUB. PERSP. 50 (2001) (arguing that government policies increasingly fail to reflect public 
opinion, and giving public views about campaign finance reform and trade policies as 
examples); Deepak Gopinath, Rewriting the Rules, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 2001, at 45 
(reporting polls showing that 52% of the public sympathized with Seattle protests against the 
WTO while 39% were opposed); The Politicsof Trade,THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1999, at 27 
(reporting popular resistance to "free trade" and support for human rights, labor, and 
environmental standards instead, and citing poll data showing 46% of respondents agreed that 
"the U.S. should slow the trend toward globalisation because it hurts American workers"); see 
also PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 270, at 123-26 (discussing working class resistance to 
economic protections for the privileged class in trade policy and election reform policy). 
279. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 31-33. 
280. See, e.g., id. 219-20 (summarizing how a changed political economy has "heightened 
our anxieties about our individual economic fortunes, notwithstanding our strong economy" but 
concluding that "[d]espite our nation's affluence, we have yet to adequately protect Americans 
from the many wolves that come to call-both inevitably and unannounced"). 
281. See, e.g., id. at48 (describing the purpose of their social insurance scheme as protection 
against "the risk that circumstances or events will make one unsuccessful in the free market for 
labor"). 
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beneficial to the public in general, then deviating from the market to assist market 
"losers" will appear to risk deviating from the public good-no matter how excusable 
the failings of those who lose. And by relieving others--employers, wealthy capital 
owners-of responsibility for increased burdens on workers' families, this liberal 
strategy assumes these market "victors" deserve to pursue self-interested gains at the 
expense of many others' well-being. In contrast, this liberal strategy concedes that 
welfare recipients' self-interested gain-seeking produces undeserved harmful moral 
hazard. The liberal vision affirms a double standard of self-interested gain by which 
support for those harmed by the market is suspect while support for those identified 
with the market is normal and publicly beneficial. 
Graetz and Mashaw view policies creating incentives for capital owners to shift 
costs to low-wage and middle-class workers not as harmful moral hazard, but as 
beneficial moral opportunity. For example, they insist that protecting employers' 
"flexibility" to control workers' hours and other working conditions (without, for 
example, accommodating family care demands) will promote economic growth that 
will trickle down to benefit the public.282 Their vision accommodates popular 
disapproval of low-income parents who seek to reduce work in favor of family time, 
but dismisses popular disapproval of capital owners who seek to reduce wages and 
workers' flexibility in favor of greater shareholder wealth. 
It is true that Graetz and Mashaw's expansive income security proposals would 
require wealthier taxpayers to take more responsibility for the social costs of a market 
structured in their favor.283 But their vision depends on the willingness of those 
wealthy taxpayers to view others' market losses as worthy of their sacrifice. They hope 
to expand the potential for political support by designing their work-support system to 
benefit much of the shrinking middle class as well as the working poor. But their 
proposals will also require substantial sacrifice from politically powerful upper-class 
and upper-middle-class taxpayers 28 because their scheme redirects government 
support away from upper-class and upper-middle-class families (who 
disproportionately benefit from current tax breaks for housing, dependent care, and 
health insurance).285 They hope to sell this redistributive change as a benefit for the 
public in general on the theory that the risks of income loss are widely shared.286 In 
their view, market success or failure is a product not only of individual effort and 
merit, but of luck and random circumstances; 287 those who are now affluent would 
therefore benefit from a society that protects those who are not. 
But the success of the currently affluent may reflect not just their superior luck and 
merit, but their superior power to establish comprehensive government policies 
promoting upward redistribution and protection against market risks for the wealthy. 
288 
282. See id. at 284-85. 
283. See id. at 304 (explaining that some of their policy proposals would "shift support from 
the affluent to the less affluent"). 
284. They acknowledge that "[slupports for the affluent must be redirected, at least in part, 
to the needy." Id. at 231. 
285. Id. at 290, 304. 
286. See, e.g., id. at 23, 304-05. 
287. See id. at 284. 
288. See PERRUCCI & WYSONG, supra note 270, at 121-36, 143-76, 252-62 (explaining the 
many ways the privileged class of wealthiest Americans has mobilized the media and other 
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If those who might lose by sharing economic protections more broadly understand their 
wealth as a product of political design as well as market accident, the prospect of 
redirecting income protection to low-waged and lower-middle-class workers seems a 
difficult sell. This liberal political project seems particularly difficult given that it rests 
on a liberal vision that accepts the premise that, unlike impoverished families, those 
who succeed in the market have no citizenship obligation to sacrifice their self-interest 
for others. Instead, the political viability of broader support for working families 
probably depends on the political power of those who would directly gain from 
downward redistribution. However, the policies that might remove current barriers to 
shifting political power from the more affluent minority to the struggling middle and 
working class-such as campaign finance reform and limits on capital mobility2 -- lie 
outside the scope of Graetz and Mashaw's social citizenship vision as matters of the 
market separate from redistribution. 
In sum, contemporary liberal efforts to defend social citizenship as a departure from 
the market to support individual well-being conflict with liberal efforts to defend that 
market as the ultimate route to maximum individual freedom and well-being. In 
contrast, the visions of social citizenship offered by Fineman, Forbath, and Roberts 
aim to defend individual freedom and well-being by changing the market. AFDC and 
TANF both have failed to promote social citizenship not because they have 
encouraged mothers to make the wrong choices between work and family, but because 
neither affirms as socially valuable the increased bargaining power that would allow 
mothers (and others) more freedom to control the conditions, timing, and rewards of 
both their wage work and their family formation and care. 
Legal scholars Vicki Schultz and Linda McClain both show how liberal notions of 
individual dignity (or communitarian notions of societal responsibility) can be used to 
push for a richer vision of citizenship that would allow more mothers to avoid tough 
tradeoffs between wage income and family care. In McClain's citizenship vision, 
policies that better recognize the societal value of family caretaking will better enhance 
individual freedom and fulfillment (as well as community well-being).29 ° In Schultz's 
citizenship vision, policies that better recognize the societal value of wage work will 
better enhance individual freedom and fulfillment (as well as community well-
being). 29 1 But both visions converge by recognizing that either approach to good 
citizenship requires major government restructuring of the market and family to better 
value mothers' work both in and out of the home, both waged and unwaged. 
For example, McClain argues that meaningful government support for caretaking 
must go beyond either individual income or capital grants that would allow individual 
mothers (or others) to opt out of wage labor for family care.292 Instead, she advocates a 
resources to increase government protection of their interests at the expense of most 
Americans). 
289. See, e.g., id. at 262-73 (describing efforts to resist the policies promoting class 
inequality by changing rules governing labor organizing, media concentration, elections, and 
corporate charters). 
290. See generallyMcClain, supra note 154. 
291. See Schultz, supra note 247, at 1886-92. 
292. Linda C. McClain, Towarda PormativeProjectofSecuring Freedom andEquality,85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1221, 1251-53 (2000) (discussing BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE 
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999)); see also Handler, supra note 3, at 799 (arguing for a social 
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government and market restructured to give public support to recognize family care as 
a public, rather than just an individual value, based on its importance in creating a 
society of self-governing individuals: for example, she advocates enhanced public 
health and education services to support parents,293 and employment law changes that 
would allow individual parents to better combine wage work and family care.294 Vicki 
Schultz recognizes that meaningful government support for wage workers must go 
beyond assistance that encourages individuals to substitute wage work for other 
pursuits; she advocates policies that encourage a shorter work week as standard to 
allow both men and women to integrate wage earning with caretaking, community and 
political involvement, and pleasure.29 5 As many black feminists have long suggested,296 
poor mothers' have lacked equal citizenship status not from insufficient participation 
either in work or family care, but from a market designed to limit their individual 
freedom and dignity for the benefit of others. Without challenging the market as well 
as welfare as a source of government constraint and redistribution, as McClain and 
Schultz both do, the conventional liberal approach to welfare remains caught within the 
double bind that defeats social citizenship goals. 
For most of its history, Western citizenship theory has presented market labor as a 
major barrierto the individual autonomy and responsibility it deemed necessary for a 
democratic society. 297 Recognizing the employment relationship as a status of legal and 
economic dependency, political theory and practice traditionally made capital 
ownership a key to good citizenship. 29 It was this traditional vision-embraced in 
American law--of citizenship centered on capital rather than labor that was challenged 
by the early-twentieth-century labor activists Forbath describes. 299 Despite the now 
prevailing rhetoric of wage work as freedom, 300 it is this traditional vision privileging 
citizenship vision that recognizes the importance of collective solutions to poverty, rather than 
the individualized stakeholder solution proposed by Ackerman &Alstott). 
293. McClain, supra note 292, at 1256. 
294. See McClain, supra note 154, at 102-03, 96-107; see alsoWILLIAMS, supranote 271, at 
64-113. 
295. Schultz, supra note 247, at 1955-57. In addition to proposing that the right to work 
include aliving wage, she proposes "vigorous anti-discrimination, affirmative action, and pay 
equity measures" to ensure equal access to fulfilling work. Id. at 1955-56. 
296. See, e.g., GORDON, supranote 27, at 136-43 (discussing black women activists' views 
of collective support for mothers in the early 1900s). 
297. King &Waldron, supranote 1,at 429-31 (giving examples from the theories of Plato, 
Locke, Burke, and Hegel). 
298. See id.; see alsoForbath, supra note 27, at 19-20 (noting that "The political theories of 
the Framers confirmed that the hireling's status of dependence and submission disqualified him 
for citizenship" and that even after white working men won political rights they retained 
subordinate status shared-though not equally-by women of all races and men of color); 
Nancy Fraser &Linda Gordon, A Genealogyof 'Dependency':A Keyword of the U.S. Welfare 
State, 19 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 309 (1994) (tracing historical 
understandings of the term dependency). 
299. Forbath, supra note 27, at 19-23 (describing the subordinate caste status of"free" white 
male wage laborers), 66-67, 89-91 (describing an unimplemented New Deal Constitution ideal 
based on an alternative distribution of citizenship rights more favorable to workers). 
300. See generallySTEINFELD, supranote 36 (discussing the modem conception of free wage 
labor as a relatively recent construction of state policy and of contingent historical and 
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capital citizenship-intertwined with race and gender privilege-that continues to 
undermine egalitarian social citizenship ideals. 301 Without questioning the prevailing 
norms that equate market and state freedom with capital owners' freedom to remain 
dependent on constraining employees' and unpaid caretakers' bargaining power, 
liberal citizenship visions will perpetuate the subordinate (and gendered and racialized) 
citizenship status of both wage work and unpaid family caretaking. 
II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
The neoliberal critique of social citizenship has reached beyond AFDC to a broad 
array of welfare programs. Workers' compensation, the state program protecting 
against income loss from work-related disability, also has been the target of a powerful 
benefit-cutting reform movement in the late-twentieth-century United States.3" 2 
Although workers' compensation contrasts sharply with AFDC, its purported 
differences have not shielded it from neoliberal attack. 
Looking at these parallel welfare reforms together underscores the flaws of both the 
communitarian and liberal attempts to defend social citizenship without disrupting 
neoliberalism's core premise of the primacy and impartiality of the market. This 
broader view of welfare state reform gives further evidence that the neoliberal-inspired 
policy change from AFDC to TANF does not reflect a new social citizenship ideal 
emphasizing wage work as the means to full membership in the community. Instead, 
the parallel attack on workers' compensation again shows how neoliberal policies 
represent and reinforce a vision of citizenship in which wage workers, not just welfare 
recipients, are also subordinate and suspect members of the community, deserving of
30 3 
only minimal public economic support. 
Workers' compensation is a classic example of a program promoting social 
citizenship rights grounded in wage work. Workers' compensation traditionally has 
been viewed as conferring benefits based on market contributions, not government 
charity. 304 In the conventional story, workers' compensation is a voluntary compromise 
where injured workers give up their right to tort suits against employers in exchange 
ideological judgments about what constitutes labor market freedom). 
301. See Forbath, supra note 27, at 89-91. 
302. See McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12. 
303. For an analysis of how recent restrictive changes in another social welfare program, 
unemployment insurance, also rely on reconstructing workers as deviant, see Lucy A. Williams, 
Unemployment Insurance and Low-Wage Work, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN.THE 
POST-WELFARE ERA 158-74 (Joel Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999). 
304. REP. OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 36 (1972) 
[hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N REP.] ("Workmen's compensation must be an insurance program, 
not a welfare program."); DAVID A. MOSS, SOCIALIZING SECURITY: PROGRESSIVE ERA 
ECONOMISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 57 (1996) (explaining history of 
workers' compensation as part of a broader effort to establish social insurance distinct from 
poor relief); John D. Worrall & David Appel, Some Benefit Issues in Workers' Compensation, 
in WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS: ADEQUACY, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY 11 (John D. 
Worrall & David Appel eds., 1985); Emily A. Spieler, Assessing Fairness in Workers' 
CompensationReform: A Commentary on the 1995 West Virginia Workers' Compensation 
Legislation, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 23, 130-31 (1995). 
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for more limited no-fault compensation of medical costs and lost wages:305 
This story portrays workers' compensation as an economically efficient "bargain": a 
reciprocal exchange that produces an overall gain, not a redistributive one-way 
transfer.30 6 According to the traditional theory, workers' compensation maximizes 
overall resources compared to the prior fault-based tort system, because it simplifies 
claims administration (reduces disputes), and because it improves safety incentives by 
regularly and predictably internalizing some of the costs of work injuries to employers 
0 7 and consumers. 
Workers' compensation's distinction as economically efficient reflects and confers 
a perception that it deserves superior status among welfare programs in the United 
States.308The story of the efficient workers' compensation bargain affirms workers' 
standing as virtuous citizens. As equal cocreaters of a "social compact," 30 9 workers are 
autonomous and rational citizens participating in governing society. Workers "earn" 
their protection through a reciprocal contribution, the sacrifice of workers' civil right 
to tort damages. By accepting a compromise, workers demonstrated responsibility for 
society and shrewdly cut a better deal for themselves at the same time. 
Nonetheless, the history of workers' compensation is one ofsocial citizenship rights 
subject to continuous challenge and rarely delivered. From the beginning, narrow 
definitions of covered injuries meant many work-related injuries and illnesses were not 
compensated at all, despite persistent efforts by workers. 310 Disability benefits often 
consisted of temporary subsistence or token payments rather than meaningful wage 
replacement, 311were often limited by procedural and evidentiary barriers, 312 and were 
305. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of 
IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 71-72 (1967). 
306. See, e.g., ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD BRIFFAULT, WORKERS' COMPENSATION: 
STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT 3 (1991) ("society as a whole benefits" from workers' 
compensation); McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 672. 
307. At its origins, proponents of workers' compensation explained it as internalizingthe 
costs of work accidents into the costs of production and resulting consumer prices so that "the 
price of the product bears the blood of the workingman." HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE 
RAMSAY SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHABILITATION 
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 282 (1954). In the typical explanation, this cost internalization 
produces incentives that promote overall cost-savings, since consumers seeking cheaper 
products will pressure employers to improve safety. See KRAMER &BRIFFAULT, supranote 306, 
at 2. 
308. See McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 672. 
309. See KRAMER &BRIFFAULT, supranote 306, at 1(describing workers' compensation as 
"a truly great social compact"). 
310. See McCluskey, Illusion,supranote 12, at 770. It is a mistake to think that this narrow 
view of injury reflected a cultural consensus or ignorance that failed to recognize the potential 
work-relatedness of occupational illnesses and gradually-occurring injuries. Id. at 771, 771 
nn.449-50. 
311. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 306, at 23 (asserting that the goal of early workers' 
compensation systems was to prevent hardship, not to replace lost wages); LINDA DARLING-
HAMMOND & THOMAS J. KNEISER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 8 
(1980) ("[T]he goal of compensation was not to reimburse the injured worker for all of his 
losses but to 'tide him over' until he could return to work."); See PHILIPPE NONET, 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE: ADVOCACY AND CHANGE IN A GOVERNMENT AGENCY 19-20 (1969). 
2003] EFFICIENCYAND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
significantly eroded due to inflation during the decades after 1940. 3 13 
In 1972, a bipartisan national commission found that state workers' compensation 
systems provided grossly inadequate benefits, and recommended comprehensive state 
reforms, or if those failed, a new federal workers' compensation system.314 That report 
helped push state legislatures to increase and improve workers' compensation benefits 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, though nationwide benefits still fell short of the 
recommended expansions. However, those benefit expansions sparked a reform 
movement led by employers and insurers that produced the most significant period of 
benefit cutbacks in the history of workers' compensation. From the late 1980s through 
the 1990s, the majority of states enacted comprehensive reform legislation that has had 
the effect of reducing disability benefits (especially for permanent injuries), restricting 
or eliminating compensation for certain types of injuries, and reducing procedural 
protections for claimants whose claims are denied.1 6 
The example of workers' compensation shows the difficulties of defending social 
citizenship on economic efficiency grounds. Workers' claim to protection against work 
injury costs at the expense of employers rests uneasily next to employers' claim of 
rights to maintain profits and control productivity. Even though the efficiency rationale 
explains workers' protection as a public benefit, that rationale at the same time 
supports restricting that protection to avoid public harm. As a result, workers' 
compensation remains caught in the double bind that makes social citizenship 
inconsistent with good citizenship. 
Workers' sacrifice of their civil rights in tort law is what justifies workers' 
compensation as a publicly beneficial reciprocal exchange instead of a redistributive 
transfer. Yet, in the conventional understanding, that exchange of a civil right for a 
social citizenship right relocates workers' claim for benefits outside of the efficient 
market. From that position, protection for workers at the expense of employers will 
tend to appear inefficient and, therefore, detrimental to the public. Without going 
further to question the Lochner-eratheory that employers' right to a market structured 
in their favor is a fundamental citizenship right, workers' claims for government-
mandated protection in the employment relationship will remain suspect and 
subordinate. 
The example of workers' compensation, like AFDC, helps show how the question 
of social citizenship rights does not simply raise the tension T.H. Marshall famously 
described between supplementing the market with substantive economic protection and 
contradicting the market's emphasis on civil rights based on individual contractual 
freedom. 317 More fundamentally, the question of social citizenship poses the problem 
312. See Glenn Merrill Shor, The Evolution of Workers' Compensation Policy inCalifornia, 
1911-1990, 119 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) 
(available from the UMI dissertation reprint service). 
313. See NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 304, at 19 (stating that, in most states, from 1940 
to 1972 maximum benefit levels decreased in proportion to average wages). 
314. Id. at 119. 
315. See McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 683-84. 
316. See id. at 684-90, 809-16. 
317. See MARSHALL, supranote 1,at 68 (describing how "social rights... imply an invasion 
of contract by status"); KATz, supra note 1, at 344 (explaining that "Marshall stressed the 
conflict between civil and social citizenship at the heart of the welfare state."). 
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of which rights should count as "civil"-part of normal market freedoms-and which 
as "social"-part of political protections external to that market.318 The example of 
workers' compensation shows how neoliberal ideology aims not just to reject social 
rights, but to redefine citizenship rights as a whole by constructing certain market 
structures as essential civil rights (employers' immunity from workers' torts) and 
others as expendable social subsidies (employers' strict liability for workers' 
injuries).319 
A. NeoliberalCitizenshipand Workers' CompensationReform 
1. Moral Hazard from Expanded Benefits 
In recent state campaigns for benefit restrictions, reform advocates often relied on 
neoliberal economic theory to argue that workers' compensation deviated from its 
efficiency-based origins to become a redistributive "welfare" program. How did 
workers' compensation, like AFDC, change from being perceived as a program 
producing positive to negative spillover effects on society-from a means of enhancing 
to eroding good citizenship? Just as with AFDC, the neoliberal concept of moral 
hazard was key to this conceptual change. In particular, reformers stressed that 
increased protection for workers created a moral hazard problem.
320 
Reformers argued that benefit expansions increased coverage of claims for which 
the cause or severity of the disability appears uncertain-occupational diseases, 
gradually developing strains, or psychological stress, for example.: In the 
conventional moral hazard analysis, as more generous and accessible benefits provide 
a less costly alternative to work, they produce incentives for workers (and their 
advocates) to exploit this uncertainty in their favor by filing more claims, and by filing 
claims for greater losses. 322 Reform advocates argued that, because of expanded 
benefits, workers are more likely to seek compensation for nonwork injuries (including 
problems from general health conditions, leisure activities, or aging) 323 or for wage 
loss unrelated to disability (such as from economic downturns or lack of motivation to 
318. Marshall did recognize that one answer to the question of the conflict between social 
and civil rights is that "the replacement of free bargain by the declaration of rights" is a 
principle "entrenched within the contract system" ofthe market. MARSHALL, supranote 1,at 68. 
319. See Baker, supra note 101, at 275 (explaining that assumptions about which market 
distributions count as legal entitlements and which count as political "redistributions" underlie 
recent economic arguments about the harmful incentive effects of expanded workers' 
compensation benefits). 
320. See id. at 238-39, 273 & n.178; McCluskey, Illusion,supranote 12, at 744, 816-17; see 
also PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
ORIGINS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 201-02 (2000) (explaining recent reforms limiting 
benefits as an effort to reduce moral hazard problems created by the benefit expansions of the 
1970s). 
321. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 767-88. 
322. See id. at 742-45. 
323. See id. at 788-94. 
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return to work). 324 
As a result, the expansion of workers' compensation benefits in the 1970s and 
1980s became an example of the standard neoliberal theory that departing from 
economic principles for social welfare purposes, however well-intentioned, leads to 
public harm. Insurers, employers, and other supporters of reforms complained that 
benefit expansions have threatened jobs and economic competitiveness by burdening 
employers with costly benefit costs beyond their control,325 and that expanded 
opportunities for filing illegitimate claims have added costly "friction" to the process 
of administering claims.326 Reform advocates insisted that although individual workers 
might suffer harm from benefit restrictions, such sacrifices are the price of protecting 
overall economic growth and of keeping the system affordable for the benefit of 
injured workers and society as a whole.327 
In response to these concerns, many states have attempted to reduce claimant moral 
hazard by restricting compensation for losses perceived to result primarily from cost-
increasing by workers rather than from workplace harms or actual disability. For 
example, some reforms change disability benefit calculations to reduce or restrict 
payment for wage losses exacerbated by workers' skill levels, age, or education.
328 
Other recent law revisions require claimants to prove that work is a "primary" or 
"major" or "substantial" cause of their injury, changing the traditionally loose 
causation requirement that (in theory) had allowed compensation for injuries with any 
329nontrivial connection to work. 
2. Redistributing Moral Hazard Through Benefit Cuts 
But the late-twentieth-century problem of moral hazard in workers' compensation 
(as in AFDC) was not a problem of a change in incentive effects but of a change in 
moral judgments about the social value of those incentive effects. By attempting to 
distinguish and control claims attributable to workers' "personal" attributes or 
behavior, recent neoliberal reform arguments helped reshape the goal of workers' 
compensation from a purportedly no-fault system that partly compensates work injuries 
regardless of workers' responsibility to a system which holds workers responsible for 
avoiding a larger share of accident costs. By weeding out claims for injuries to which 
workers' lifestyle, skill levels, leisure activities, age, preexisting health conditions, or 
job choice may have contributed, recent reforms reintroduce employers' nineteenth-
century fault-based defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, to
33 
some extent. 
324. See id. at 809-43. 
325. See id. at 689-90. 
326. See id. at 857-60. 
327. One lawmaker responded to concerns about harm to injured workers from benefit cuts 
by saying, "Is it a perfect system? The answer is no. But it's as fair as the system can afford." 
Stuart Steers, Still Hurting: Injured Workers' Have Borne the Brunt of Workers' Comp 
"Reform" in Colorado, DENVER WESTWORD, Mar. 28, 1996 (quoting Colorado House Majority 
Leader Tim Foster). 
328. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 830-34. 
329. See id. at 792-93. 
330. See id. at 798-99; Martha T. McCluskey, Rhetoric of Risk and the Redistributionof 
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In the traditional theory of workers' compensation, those old fault-based tort 
defenses were the source of inefficient moral hazard, not its solution. According to the 
old theory, the public benefits fromprotectingworkers from responsibility for accident 
costs because the old fault-based defenses encouraged employer moral hazard by 
providing incentives for the employer to take less care to avoid accidents or wasteful 
litigation. 331 In the conventional wisdom, this original no-fault theory was based on a 
system where the consequences and causes of traumatic industrial injuries were more 
certain and therefore less subject to claimants' cost-inflating "moral hazard"
332 
behavior. 
But the change from the traditional no-fault approach to the recent fault-based 
reforms does not reflect a change in the difficulty of weeding out illegitimate claims 
for injury compensation. In fact, workers' compensation developed from a period of 
vigorous controversy about the legitimate causes and effects of workers' injuries) 
33 
The prevailing early-twentieth-century advocates of workers' compensation rejected a 
fault-based approach precisely because they believed the industrial revolution had 
introduced great uncertainty over responsibility for work accidents. Just like today, 
early disputes about work injuries were impossible to resolve with "objective" medical 
evidence, because, both then and now, the underlying "uncertainty" about causes and 
effects of work accidents inherently involves questions of moral responsibility. 335 For 
example, strongly contested issues in the early debate over workers' compensation 
included whether to attribute limbs severed by industrial equipment to employers' 
failure to spend money on safer machines or to workers' failure to work more 
carefully, to choose a safer occupation, or simply to workers' bad luck;3 36 or whether 
to consider workers' post-injury loss of wage income a cost of workers' preinjury 
wages, a cost of employers' decision to profit from a risky workplace, or a cost of 
workers' failure to procure alternative income sources. 
337 
Social Insurance, in EMBRACING RISK: CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
146, 157-58 (Tom Baker &Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) [hereinafter Rhetoricof Risk]. 
331. See CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS AND THE LAW 14-15 (1910) (arguing that 
replacing this tort system with workers' compensation would protect valuable labor resources 
and reduce charity); Moss, supra.note 304, at 64-65, 74-75 (discussing economic arguments 
that workers' compensation would better internalize the costs of work and therefore would 
prevent accidents and reduce injury costs). 
332. KRAMER &BRIFFAULT, supra note 306, at 18 ("Since the place and physical cause of 
most injuries are readily apparent [in the early industrial accident case], it was assumed that 
employers and administrators could easily distinguish between'work-related and non-work-
related accidents, without resort to protracted dispute resolution processes, litigation or 
attorneys."). 
333. For an example of a famous effort to discuss and resolve this debate, see EASTMAN, 
supra note 331. 
334. Moss, supranote 304, at 121. 
335. For discussions of how legal disputes over "causation" are about questions of value, 
despite attempts to construct them as questions of scientific fact, see MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-1960, 51-53 (1992); Mark Kelman, The Necessary 
Myth of Objective CausationJudgments in LiberalPoliticalTheory, 63 CHi.-KENTL. REv. 579, 
580 (1987). 
336. See McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 796-97. 
337. See EASTMAN, supra note 331, at 128-31 (disputing arguments that workers' actual 
2003] EFFICIENCYAND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 
The early-twentieth-century change from tort law to no-fault compensation for 
occupational injury represented a moral judgment to resolve those uncertainties about 
responsibility for work accident costs partly in workers' favor, on the theory that the 
public as a whole will benefit from treating the costs of work injuries as an inevitable 
fact of industrial employment regardless of workers' cost-avoiding efforts. 338 In 
workers' compensation, as in AFDC, recent reforms supposedly directed at reducing 
moral hazard instead are directed at redistributing moral hazard. The reforms change 
the relative distribution of bargaining power through which workers or employers can 
exploit uncertainty at the expense of others, reflecting and reinforcing a change in 
prevailing views of workers' and employers' relative citizenship status. 
As workers' compensation benefits become high enough (or accessible enough) to 
substitute for wage income, they become an alternative to wage work that increases 
workers' elasticity of demand for work.3 -9 That increased elasticity means workers 
have the bargaining power to pay a smaller share of the costs of work: the alternative 
income source afforded by workers' cohpensation allows them to work less when 
work imposes greater health costs. For instance, workers may extend their recovery 
period after an injury to lessen the risk of further health problems, or they may seek 
compensation for injury costs that they would otherwise have suffered on their own. Or 
their increased elasticity of demand for work may allow them to pressure employers' to 
raise wages or otherwise improve employees' rewards from work.
34 
In contrast, the recent workers' compensation reforms (like AFDC reforms) 
increase employers' (or insurers') moral hazard by increasing their bargaining power 
relative to workers (assuming other things are equal). As disability benefits become a 
less adequate or accessible alternative to work for workers, employers (and insurers) 
will have more power to pay less of the costs of work injuries. Lower (or less 
accessible) disability benefits give employers (and insurers) more incentives to avoid 
work disability costs: they have more power to substitute minimal or no compensation 
for prevention, to force workers back to work before they are sufficiently recovered, or 
to avoid mitigating injury costs by providing good and prompt medical care or work 
modifications to accommodate disabled workers. 34 As benefit restrictions shift 
bargaining power from workers to employers, the ability to take less responsibility for 
reducing work injury costs shifts from workers to employers.342 
economic loss was insignificant because wage premiums for risky work already compensate this 
loss). 
338. See Rhetoric ofRisk, supra note 330, at 158; McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 
898-99. 
339. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 760-62; see also Emily A. Spieler, 
PerpetuatingRisk? Workers' Compensationand the Persistenceof OccupationalInjuries,31 
Hous. L. REv. 119, 217-20 (1994) (arguing that high costs of filing claims often affect this 
benefit calculation). 
340. See McCluskey, Illusion, supranote 12, at 762; see also MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. Kip 
VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS 67-68 (1990) (explaining this 
redistribution of bargaining power but attempting to construct it instead as a problem of 
inefficiency to justify benefit reforms). 
341.See Baker, supranote 101, at 274-75, 280; McCluskey, Illusion, supranote 12, at 747-
48. 
342. See McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 764-65. 
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3. Reenvisioning Employers' Moral Hazard as the Beneficial Market 
Just as with AFDC, reducing moral hazard--or bargaining power-for benefit 
recipients increases moral hazard-or bargaining power-for employers. By counting 
workers', but not employers', increased cost-shifting as inefficient moral hazard, 
neoliberal arguments for reform incorporate a double standard that measures workers' 
increased bargaining power as a civic threat and employers' and insurers' increased 
bargaining power as a civic virtue. As in AFDC, this double standard for moral hazard 
is grounded in moral judgments about workers' and employers' relative rights and 
responsibilities as citizens. And like the neoliberal AFDC reform arguments, the 
workers' compensation reform arguments rationalize these citizenship judgments by 
identifying employers' interests with a market that furthers the public's interest while 
identifying employees' interests with deviations from that market. 
343 
In the traditional theory of workers' compensation, workers earned the no-fault 
system's limited freedom from responsibility (elimination ofemployers' fault defenses) 
by granting tort immunity to employers and accepting limited damages. In contrast, as 
a result of some recent state reforms, workers owe even more for their workers' 
compensation benefits: they must contribute not just tort immunity but also (for 
instance) good physical and mental health not hampered by nonwork demands, pre-
existing weaknesses, or age; and they must contribute the skills, attitudes, occupational 
choices, and labor market value sufficient to prevent most permanent injuries from 
resulting in substantial income loss.
344 
The one-sided view of moral hazard incorporated into recent reforms not only 
increases workers' obligations in the imagined social compact, but also diminishes 
employers' obligations. Recent reforms partially adopted the idea that payment of no-
fault compensation (claims that workers arguably could have avoided) is an inequitable 
burden on employers instead of their reciprocal responsibility. In the prevailing 
analysis, employers' tort immunity became not a government protection subject to 
inefficient moral hazard and contingent on mutual social contribution, but a right basic 
to the normal free market. 345 During the recent period of benefit-cutting reforms, states 
generally have sustained or even strengthened strict employer tort immunity rules, 
often cutting off tort remedies even for work injuries excluded from workers' 
compensation. 346 
Neoliberal "economic" arguments singling out workers' moral hazard are about 
redistributing citizenship status, not maximizing aggregate growth, because these 
arguments are about revaluing workers' and employers' relative worthiness as 
343. See RhetoricofRisk, supra note 330, at 164-65 (using workers' compensation as one of 
several examples of how neoliberal ideology has reconstructed self-interest maximizing by some 
as harmful moral hazard while glorifying similar risk-increasing behavior by others as market-
enhancing activity). 
344. See id. at 151-58 (discussing how reforms making physical "impairment," rather than 
lost wages, the standard for determining disability awards represent a policy of requiring 
workers rather than employers to bear the costs of many of the uncertainties in workers' 
compensation). 
345. See Baker, supra note 101, at 275; Spieler, supra note 339, at 232. 
346. See McCluskey, Illusion,supra note 12, at 893-95. 
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members of the public.347 By moving back toward the nineteenth-century tort system 
that made employers' protection from most occupational torts a civil right and 
workers' protection from most occupational injury a personal responsibility (or at best 
a public charity), recent reforms reflect and reinforce what historian Christopher 
Tomlins explains was the traditional legal assumption that workers were not citizens, 
but servants excluded from membership in the deserving public.348 In the early 
twentieth century, in contrast, proponents of workers' compensation helped justify 
better protections for workers by idealizing injured workers as heroic veterans who 
have strengthened the nation by braving the risks of waging the Industrial 
Revolution.349 
The late-twentieth-century reformers revised this image of injured workers by 
justifying reductions in workers' bargaining power with anecdotes of claimant fraud, 
demonizing workers as greedy criminals. Widely publicized fraud stories frequently 
used prejudicial race, class, gender, and other stereotypes to portray claimants as 
deviant others with antisocial morals.350 For example, an NBC news story exposing an 
allegedly fraudulent workers' compensation payment identified the claimant as "a 
recent Polish immigrant., 351 This news report quoted an insurance company 
investigator's angry comment, 'This is the only job this guy ever had in America, and 
this is what he did with it," and concluded that he has now learned that "in this 
country" being caught at such behavior "can get you jail time.' 352 
While these moral hazard stories depict workers as selfish and antisocial when they 
pursue benefit claims, they depict employers and insurers as public-spirited good 
citizens when they contestclaims. In the same NBC report, news anchor Tom Brokaw 
automatically identifies the insurance industry's interest in reducing claims fraud, and 
employers' interest in reducing insurance premium costs, with the public interest.353 He 
describes the alleged claimant fraud as "an outrageous example of the fleecing of 
America," that such fraud costs insurance companies "more than five billion dollars a 
year" (relying on insurers' highly speculative numbers), 354 and that "we all end up 
347. See Rhetoric of Risk, supranote 330, at 155-58. 
348. CHRISTOPHER L. ToMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 384 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 1993). 
349. For example, in 1893 Interstate Commerce Commission Secretary Edward A. Moselely 
compared "hardworking and faithful railway employees" to Civil War casualties, saying that 
"more of the grand army of railway men of this country were cut and bruised and maimed and 
mangled last year than all the Union wounded and missing on the bloody field of Gettysburg." 
Melvin L. Griffith, The Vindicationof aNationalPublicPolicy Underthe FederalEmployers' 
LiabilityAct, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 160, 163 (1953), cited in JOSEPH W. LrrrLE ET AL., 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (4th ed. 1999). 
350. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 885-86. 
351. Tom Brokaw &John Larson, False Claimfor Workers' CompensationDiscoveredby 
Hidden Camera (NBC Nightly News, May 30, 2000). 
352. Id. 
353. See id. 
354. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce circulated this figure, stating that it was based on 
estimates by the insurer-financed National Insurance Crime Bureau and Insurance Information 
Institute. See Stephen Blakely, Fighting Fraudin Workers' Comp, NATION'S Bus., Apr. 1, 
1998, at 14. However, the insurance industry appears to have derived this highly speculative 
number from surveys gauging popular attitudes about fraud rather than from direct evidence of 
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paying through higher premiums." 
355 
Why, in this view, does workers' gain-seeking from increased benefit claims count 
as "fleecing" the public, while insurers' and employers' gain-seeking from reduced 
benefit claims count as saving the public's money? These stories erase insurers' and 
employers' power to bargain in their own interest and instead identify their actions as 
passive reflections of neutral market processes that enhance aggregate gain.356 When 
insurers and employers deny claims as illegitimate, in these stories, they are not 
seeking to maximize their benefits at the expense of others; instead, they are simply 
impartially implementing an efficient market bargain-the basic quid pro quo of 
workers' compensation. By giving employers and insurers this passive role, these 
stories can then suggest that the gains from denying claims flow naturally to the public, 
including consumers (who get lower prices for insurance and other products) and other 
workers (who have more money left for legitimate claims), thereby promoting both 
efficiency and equity.357 
In contrast, these stories highlight workers' power to bargain for personal gains. 
When workers pursue questionable or contested injury claims, these stories emphasize 
that workers (and their lawyers and doctors) have the power not just to follow market 
rules, but also to manipulate the rules in their interest-exploiting uncertainties in the 
claims process to violate the terms of the efficient workers' compensation bargain. As 
a result, these stories obscure the possibility that workers' gains from maximizing their 
injury claims also might flow through to others. For example, through more pressure 
on employers and insurers to minimize other workers' injuries, through workers' 
willingness to accept offsetting wage decreases, or, more indirectly, through more 
spending power by injured workers that increases consumer demand for employers' 
products.35 s 
A more complete view of recent antifraud campaigns, however, shows that insurers 
and employers, as well as workers, exercise their self-interested power to reshape as 
well as follow the rules of the presumed workers' compensation bargain. Employers 
and insurers have promoted these popular stories about workers' fraud not simply out 
of abstract or altruistic concern for the public's well-being, but because stories 
portraying workers' compensation claimants as undeserving have been a politically and 
fraud. See Ruth Gastel, Insurance Fraud,INS. INFO. INST. INS. ISSUES UPDATE, Mar. 2002 
(repeating the $5billion figure and generally citing a series ofstudies in the 1990s showing the 
percentages of respondents who believe workers' compensation fraud is widespread or who 
believe it is often acceptable to stay out of work even after a doctor has authorized a return to 
work); AFL-CIO, Fraud,FraudandMore Fraud,WORKERS' COMP NOTES, Mar./Apr. 1998 (no 
pagination on electronic copy) (criticizing the $5 billion estimate for having "absolutely no 
relationship to fact" because it is based only on survey respondents' opinions that they know 
someone capable of working while receiving workers' compensation). 
355. Brokaw & Larson, supranote 351. 
356. See McCluskey, supranote 15 (explaining how neoliberal "economic" arguments rely 
on narrative strategies to construct employers, insurers, and elite executives as passive receptors 
of policy and workers as powerful agents). 
357. See Rhetoric of Risk, supra note 330, at 156 (discussing how recent workers' 
compensation reforms reflect an ideology embracing public solidarity with employers and 
insurers but not with workers, on the assumption that the public shares in employers' and 
insurers' gains but not in workers' gains). 
358. See id. 
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economically powerful strategy for increasing their profits at the expense of injured 
workers' arguably legitimate claims. That is, the recent political focus on claimants' 
moral hazard can be a form of employer and insurer moral hazard: a strategy for 
protecting them from paying the costs of claims for legitimate work injuries. In many 
states, subjective, exaggerated, and even false accounts of claimant fraud helped 
convince lawmakers to enact sweeping benefit cuts. 359 Employers' and insurers' efforts 
to combat worker moral hazard have served not so much to increase benefits for more 
deserving workers, but more to reduce claims in general-by increasing potential 
stigma and penalties attached to claims filing. 360 Indeed, most evidence suggests that 
the costs of claimant fraud are small (less than one percent of total claims costs) and 
are overshadowed by the problem of false reports of claims fraud (often for harassment 
361 
purposes). 
In sum, the neoliberal claim to restore efficiency through recent workers' 
compensation reforms instead should be understood as a claim to restore a vision of 
the good society as one in which employers and insurers, but not workers, are entrusted 
with the power to distribute the costs of work accidents to their benefit. To challenge 
this neoliberal citizenship vision, critics must reject rather than accommodate the 
underlying assumption that equates employers' and insurers' self-interest with the 
public good and workers' self-interest as a public threat. Defenders of strong workers' 
compensation protections will not escape the neoliberal double bind that makes 
workers' protections increase harm to both workers and to society as a whole without 
challenging the neoliberal double standard that makes workers, not employers, 
primarily responsible for sacrificing their self-interest for the public good. 
Though they do not specifically discuss workers' compensation reforms, Forbath, 
Fineman, and Roberts offer a different citizenship vision that makes human beings' 
physical and mental well-being, not just employers' and insurers' profit making, 
central to the public well-being. For example, in an article comparing social insurance 
programs for disability to welfare assistance for the nonearning poor, Dorothy Roberts 
359. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 873-86; Ted Rohrlich & Evelyn Larrubia, 
Anti-Fraud Drive Proves Costly for Employees Benefits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7,2000, at Al. 
360. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 887-93 (arguing that the main purpose and 
effect of the emphasis on claimant fraud has been to benefit insurers and employers at the 
expense of workers); Ted Rohrlich & Evelyn Larrubia, PublicFraudUnitFavors Those Who 
PrivatelyFund It, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2000, at Al (explaining that California's antifraud law 
giving insurers and employers a role in controlling and funding state criminal fraud 
investigations has worked to detract attention from employer and insurer fraud and to harass 
workers with legitimate claims). 
361. An insurance industry research institute using California state data found that 1000 
fraud referrals per quarter resulted in about 60 convictions, out of nearly 70,200 total quarterly 
disability claims. See Workers' Compensation Notes (AFL-CIO Dep't of Occupational Safety 
and Health, Washington, DC), May/June 2000, at 2 (citing the California Workers' 
Compensation Institute). A study by the state of Wisconsin found that "[m]ost claimant fraud 
allegations are made anonymously, by telephone, and from people who identify themselves as 
former friends or spouses, relatives, co-workers or neighbors of the person alleged to be 
committing claims fraud," and that in nearly a third of the allegations, the persons accused were 
receiving no workers' compensation benefits. See Allegations of Workers' Compensation 
Fraud,1999 Wis. Dep't of Workforce Dev. (2000) (studying an average of 60,000 annual lost-
time injuries from 1994 to 1998). 
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and coauthor Jennifer Pokempner criticize the theory (often violated in practice) that 
privileges workers' disability as deserving of government assistance but treats poverty 
a personal failing.362 Roberts and Pokempner recognize that public discourse has 
reconstructed disability benefit programs, like welfare programs, to emphasize benefit 
recipients' responsibility for minimizing their economic disadvantages. 363 In both, this 
focus on claimant moral hazard distracts attention from the others' protections 
institutionalized in the market structures that produce the (interrelated) economic 
disadvantages of both disability and family poverty.364 They note that in disability 
compensation as in welfare, the risks of economic loss-whether from occupational 
injury or poverty-are distributed not by neutral market processes or individuals' free 
contracting, but by a race, gender, and class status hierarchy institutionalized through 
law.36 5 They argue that both for disability and welfare, work will be better valued by 
and more valuable to society as a whole not by denying full citizenship to those unable 
to benefit from or contribute to the labor market, but by reenvisioning market labor so 
that it promotes health and well-being more equally. 366 
B. CommunitarianCitizenshipand Workers' CompensationReform 
Despite rhetoric celebrating the virtues of work and workers, communitarian 
messages about public morality tend to reinforce rather than resist the neoliberal vision 
of workers as subordinate citizens. In the prevailing communitarian approach to social 
citizenship, a viable welfare state must cultivate public morality by encouraging those 
in economic need to take personal responsibility for wage work. But by building on, 
rather than challenging, the neoliberal division between the market and morality, the 
emphasis on work's public virtue in even some of the more progressive strands of 
communitarianism cuts against workers. 
The most prominent communitarian writings define moral virtue as a question of 
individual character, shaped mainly by the family and other voluntary civil society 
institutions.367 As Martha Fineman and Dorothy Roberts each critically observe, most 
communitarian discussions of morality devote less attention to questions identified 
with "the market," such as the terms and conditions of employment.368 Accordingly, 
362. Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, WelfareReform, andthe Meaning 
of Disability,62 OHIo ST. L.J. 425, 426, 445-46 (2001). 
363. See id. at 429-30 (discussing examples of increasing perceptions of fraud and waste in 
Supplemental Security Income benefits for children with disabilities). 
364. See id. 
365. See id. at 430-45 (discussing the interrelatedness of poverty, race, gender, and 
disability); id. at 458 (concluding that "[tihe interplay of race, poverty, and disability, highlights 
the degree to which state action creates and intensifies patterns of illness and impairment that 
reflect inequitable social and economic structures"). 
366. See id. at 458 ("Welfare and disability programs have been superimposed upon a 
market structure that reflects the inequalities in our society.... [D]isability and antipoverty 
programs that leave these structures intact will neither help individuals escape poverty nor allow 
them to fully enter the political and social world as valued citizens."). 
367. See generally Benjamin Stein, Work Gets No Respect on TV, THE RESPONSIVE 
COMMUNITY: RTs. AND RESP., Vol. 3, Issue 4, Fall 1993, at 32-37 (discussing the role of 
television in shaping societies views of work). 
368. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Family in Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 
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workers' compensation reform (unlike AFDC's reform) has not been a significant 
subject for communitarian scholarship or policy analysis. 
369 
Despite this silence, the predominant communitarian vision of social citizenship 
sends a general message that reinforces the neoliberal double standard of moral hazard 
in recent workers' compensation reforms. The communitarian attempt to recenter 
society on moral responsibility rather than on market self-interest falters on its equation 
of morality with participation in a market structured to further employers' and wealthy 
capital owners' self-interest at the expense of many workers and communities. The 
most prominent communitarian visions assume that citizens have a moral responsibility 
not only to work, but ,also to work in an employment relationship that 
disproportionately sacrifices their interests to those of employers. 
1. Double Standard of Moral Responsibility 
Communitarian literature often portrays protection for workers, but not for 
employers, as the central threat to public well-being. As a result, the communitarian 
solution to occupational health and safety problems tracks the neoliberal solution by 
focusing on increasing workers' responsibilities. 
The Responsive Communitarian Platform ("Platform"), a public summary of key 
communitarian principles endorsed by many academic and policy leaders, 370 has a 
section titled "Public Safety and Public Health" that emphasizes individual worker and 
consumer behavior as the central threat to community well-being.37 The public health 
hazards it considers consist of alcohol abuse, gun violence, and AIDS . 372 To protect 
against these threats, the Platform recommends controlling individual freedom in the 
interest of public well-being. For example, it advocates drug and alcohol testing for 
workers such as pilots and train engineers who affect public safety.373 In contrast, the 
Platform says nothing about potential threats to public safety from managers, 
employers, shareholders, or from social or economic institutions. Nor does it consider 
furthering the public well-being through any comparable regulatory controls on 
businesses or capital owners, 374 such as recommending better regulation ofwork hours 
and conditions to ease occupational pressures for drug use, restoring tort liability for 
535-36 (2000); see generally Roberts, supra note 157, at 560-61. 
369. For example, the Responsive Community, a leading journal of communitarian ideas, 
lists no articles with titles addressing occupational health and safety, wage levels, or collective 
bargaining law, compared to numerous articles with titles focusing on matters such as family, 
education, AFDC, religion and immigration. 
370. This Platform is reprinted in AMrrAi ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 253-67 
(1993), availableat http://www.gwu.edu/-ccps/rcplatform.html. 
371. See id. at 264-65. 
372. Id. 
373. Id. 
374. The Platform does obliquely suggest some responsibilities on businesses when it says 
that certain privacy rights of carriers of sexually transmitted diseases like AIDS "should be 
scrupulously protected." Id. at 265. However, the passive voice avoids holding any particular 
actor responsible for this problem, and the failure to suggest any concrete regulatory strategy to 
control this threat underscores the primary emphasis on individual rather than business 
responsibility. See id. 
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employers who violate health and safety regulations, improving OSHA standards or 
enforcement powers, or denying corporate subsidies or tax breaks for companies that 
violate health and safety regulations. 
75 
In another example of a communitarian approach to workplace moral responsibility, 
the Christian Institute in Basic Life Principles specifically addresses workers' 
compensation issues through a widely promoted and well-funded moral education 
program called "Character First!" adopted by many private businesses, public schools, 
and local governments.376 Although the Institute takes a more overtly conservative 
approach than many academic proponents of communitarianism, its transparently 
hierarchical citizenship vision shares similar assumptions about whose personal 
responsibility-and whose freedom from responsibility-is most important to the 
public good. The "Character First!" program teaches that submission to authority is a 
central part of good character,*77 drawing on the Institute founder's theology of divine 
support for authority figures in church, government, and corporate management. 
378 
"Character First!" features a manager training program encouraging employers to 
evaluate workers' job performance by measuring their "character qualities." 
379 
Advocates of the "Character First!" program focus on high workers' compensation 
claims as evidence of character problems among employees, and they boast that the 
program leads to dramatic reductions in workers' compensation claims. 
38
0 
375. See David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slapson the Wrist, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at Al (reporting how weak regulatory oversight contributed to deaths and 
serious injuries in one corporation); Marc Breslow, Improve Corporate Standards, BANGOR 
DAILY NEWS, July 3, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 22129078 (reporting that several corporations 
heavily subsidized by Maine taxpayers in 1998 and 1999 have. repeatedly violated 
environmental, OSHA, or labor laws, and advocating legislation tying corporate welfare to 
higher standards of corporate citizenship). 
376. The Character First program has been officially adopted by the state of Oklahoma, as 
well as by cities such as Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Augusta, Georgia; and Aiken, South Carolina, 
leaders of the program say it has been presented (though not necessarily implemented) in over 
100 cities. Virginia Norton, MayorLaunchesCharacterProgram,AUGUSTA CHRON. (GA), May 
5, 1999, at C12, available at 1999 WL 17575656; see also Lisa Miller, CharacterFirst! 
Volunteers, with Links to Religion, Teach TraditionalValues, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at Al 
(discussing the "wave called 'character' education that's sweeping the nation's schools" 
including 600 schools using Character First! often funded by businesses and groups like the 
Kiwanis). 
377. Jenny Slater, CharacterCity ProgramTaking Root, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Spokane, 
WA), May 11, 2000, at At, available at 2000 WL 6761325 (reporting a Fresno, California 
official's defense of that city's Character First! program on the ground that "bringing the 
community back to an authority-based structure" makes life better). 
378. P.J. Lassek, CouncilorWants CharacterTaught to City Workers, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 
15, 2001 (reporting that the Character First! program adopted by numerous schools and city 
councils has raised concerns about the program's ties to the religious views of Institute leader 
Bill Gothard). 
379. Id. 
380. See Norton, supranote 376 (reporting program staff's claims that a carpet manufacturer 
reduced its workers' compensation claims from $476,000 to $47,000 in eighteen months after 
using Character First); Russ Pulliam, CharacterQualitiesDo Count, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 
19, 1999, at D2 (editorializing enthusiastically about the successes of the program); Julia 
Silverman, LR Mayor Backs Plan of Ministry, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAzETTE, Apr. 7, 2000 
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As one critic notes, the "Character First!" program implies that workers are morally 
obligated to avoid getting injured on the job or to shoulder the pain and income loss• • 381 
resulting from work injury. In contrast, the program appears silent about employers' 
possible moral duties to promote health and safety. Such duties might arguably include, 
for instance, paying compensation claims promptly, generously, and respectfully; 
refusing to relocate operations to states or nations with less stringent compensation or 
safety laws; complying with or exceeding OSHA standards; lobbying for better health 
and safety laws; or encouraging labor organizing and worker control of safety-related 
production decisions. Nor does this program appear to recommend that investors, 
financial analysts, or purchasers make comparable measures of moral characteristics in 
evaluating corporate stock or contractors' performance. The program does not appear 
to address the moral question of how managers or corporate shareholders should 
reconcile any conflicts between profit-maximizing and workers' health and safety.382 
2. Excusing Employers' Irresponsibility as the Market 
As in the neoliberal view, the prevailing communitarian view tends to portray 
employers' rights as economic and therefore natural and inevitable, while workers' 
rights are social and contingent on performance of social responsibilities. By 
identifying the interests of wealthy capital owners with the market, communitarian 
morality depersonalizes and universalizes their interests, thereby excusing them from 
moral responsibility. 
In a recent book advocating a 'Third Way" balance between state, market, and 
community, communitarian author Amitai Etzioni distinguishes his views from 
neoliberalism by asserting that "market forces" must sometimes be restrained to 
promote public well-being. 383 Nonetheless, he warns that concern for "social problems 
created by market forces" such as overwork or unemployment "should not blind us to 
the basic merit of strong economic growth" 384 and should not lead to state interventions 
that "disable the economic engines of innovation and change. '385 After a public talk on 
his "Third Way" approach to economic policy, Etzioni responded to an audience 
question about occupational health hazards by warning against the costs to employers
6 
of increased health and safety regulation. 
38 
Etzioni's analysis elides capital owners' interests and moral agency by portraying 
business profit-seeking as inhuman "engines" or "forces" that operate primarily to 
benefit the general public. He equates government support for multinational capital's 
interests, such as neoliberal international trade policies, with the growth-producing 
market and, therefore, with the community well-being. In contrast, he presents support 
(reporting a claim that one of the first employers to adopt the program reduced its workers' 
compensation claims by 80%). 
381. John Brummett, Back Off,Mayor, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Apr. 18, 2000, at B7. 
382. The program stresses that employee character-building increases productivity. See 
Editorial, Good Characteron the Job, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Apr. 15, 1999, at A14. 
383. AMITAI ETzIONI, THE THIRD WAY TO A GOOD SocIETY 43 (2000). 
384.Id. at 47. 
385. Id. 
386. Amitai Etzioni, The Future of the Third Way, Address at the Plenary Session of the 
12th Annual Meeting on Socio-Economics, London School of Economics (July 7, 2000). 
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for workers' interests-labor standards or security against unemployment-as "social" 
regulations that tend to run counter to the presumptively beneficial market.: 
87 
As invisible drivers of a basically virtuous market, in Etzioni's view, employers and 
shareholders can take their status as good citizens for granted. In contrast, Etzioni's 
vision suggests that good citizenship for individual workers and consumers requires 
them to take additional responsibility for avoiding or bearing costs that affect society. 
In his "Third Way" proposal for public health, Etzioni mentions that a good society 
requires that the state assume responsibilities such as vaccinations, water fluoridation, 
and food and drug safety:388 He then stresses that citizens also have the responsibility 
to contribute individual "changes in lifestyle" such as more exercise and less 
smoking.:3 9 As an example of the communitarian demand for responsibility "from all, 
for all," Etzioni mentions that people with quadriplegia should be expected to do tasks 
for themselves as much as possible rather than receiving public support for nursing 
assistants:.90 However, he omits any discussion of "the market's" or capital owners' 
responsibilities for public health.3 9' 
When Etzioni acknowledges the potential costs to workers from the global "private 
sector" and its pursuit of economic efficiency, he urges the state and civil society to 
take (limited) steps to ameliorate these costs, for instance, by retraining redundant 
workers, by targeting assistance to workers hurt by global job relocations, or by 
forming international coalitions to limit corporate law-breaking.3 92 He does not 
mention, however, any specific responsibility by the private sector (either businesses or 
capital owners) to avoid such problems. In a USA Today essay, Etzioni notes that 
President George W. Bush's proposal to change laws to permit arsenic in drinking 
water was not "especially encouraging" in light of communitarian ideals, but he 
concludes by approving what he sees as Bush's strategy of promoting community 
morality over market profits through modest symbolic exhortation rather than 
legislation:a93And while Etzioni advocates public shaming of some people to assert the 
priority of community standards over personal preferences, 394 he assumes community 
moral standards must defer to some others' freedom to make personal moral choices, 
however harmful to the community as a whole. He explains that vigorous attempts to 
require the wealthy to contribute to others' material well-being "will cause a flight of 
wealth and damage the economy in other ways." 395 As a result, Etzioni asserts that the 
387. ETzIONI, supra note 383, at 47. 
388. Id. at 42. 
389. Id. at 43. 
390. Id. at 30. 
391. Id. at 42-43. 
392. Id. at 47-48. 
393. Amitai Etzioni, Bush's Community-basedPlan Faces Bumpy Road,USA TODAY, Aug. 
30, 2001, at 13A. 
394. AMITAi ETZiONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY, at xv (2001) ("The good society is not a 
neutral one that leaves it up to its members to decide on their own whether or not they wish to 
pollute the environment, abandon their children, abuse their spouse, drink and drive, and so 
on."); AMITAi ETZIONI, NEXT: THE ROAD TO A GOOD SOCIETY 22-23 (2001) (arguing that a good 
society must curb some kinds of behaviors, preferably through approbation and censure rather 
than through government coercion). 
395. ErzIONI, supra note 383, at 56. 
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"tantalizing problems plaguing modem societies" must await a spiritual awakening 
through which
396 
"the affluent would be willing to support serious reallocation of wealth 
and power." 
In an essay on health policy, Etzioni argues that superior health care for the rich is 
unavoidable, asserting that "[n]either America nor any other country has ever been 
egalitarian. Those that tried-the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea-had to rely on the 
massive use of force." 397 He insists that the problem that some people lack health care 
or other basic needs is not caused by "hard-earned or inherited" gains by the rich or, 
for example, by physicians who substitute personal gain for principles of professional 
(or civic) morality. 398He explains, "[o]ur no. 1employment problem is not that some 
people are paid more than others, but that millions cannot find jobs. Our most urgent 
housing problem is not that some people buy mansions and summer houses, but that we 
have people who cannot afford even marginally adequate housing."399 Like the 
neoliberal efficiency-oriented vision, Etzioni's communitarian moral vision assumes 
that freedom from community responsibility for wealthy individuals and corporations 
is an inevitable fact of life in a free society that must be accommodated by others' 
increased suffering and community obligation. 
By conceding (like Etzioni) if not celebrating (like Character First!) the moral 
authority of those who gain the most from a market that sacrifices public health, the 
prevailing communitarian moral order ends up endorsing market inequality as a public 
virtue despite community harms. Martha Fineman offers a contrasting vision of how to 
recognize the public value of encouraging workers to take more responsibility for 
caring for their own health (physical and mental).4 She suggests restructuring market 
labor (with shorter hours and higher minimum wages, for example) so that employers 
do not require workers to sacrifice so much of their lives for work.4 °1 In contrast to the 
predominant communitarian revival of moral authority, Fineman-like Forbath and 
Roberts-sees the problem of the market's harm to communities not as a problem of 
individual workers' or employers' lack of good moral character, but as a problem of 
government distribution of market authority to promote the wrong moral order.40 2 
C. LiberalCitizenshipand Workers' Compensation 
The traditional no-fault theory of workers' compensation parallels the liberal 
justification for AFDC: government protection fosters individual autonomy when it 
396. Amitai Etzioni, The Good Society: GoalsBeyond Money, 35 THE FuTuRIST, July-Aug., 
2001, at 68. 
397. Amitai Etzioni, Criticsof "Boutique" DoctorCare Miss the Point,USA TODAY, Jan. 
24, 2002, at 15A (not discussing, for example, Scandinavian egalitarian policies). 
398. Id. (criticizing proposals to make second-rate care a violation of professional ethics or 
to tax premium care for the rich). 
399. Id. 
400. Fineman, supra note 144, at 1439. 
401. Id. 
402. See Roberts, supra note 157, at 581-82 (arguing that social inequities are "our chief 
moral problem" but that communitarians tend to reinforce a long tradition of defending those 
inequities in the name of community values). 
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ameliorates economic losses beyond individual control.4 °3 If work accidents are largely 
inevitable and random facts of industrial life, then a broad requirement that employers 
compensate work injury regardless of fault does not increase workers' moral hazard. 
The traditional liberal view distinguishes workers' compensation from AFDC as 
efficiency-oriented, not redistributive. Workers' compensation corrects a failure in the 
market system of individual contractual freedom. In the standard analysis, workers' 
compensation's no-fault principles of strict liability and limited compensation properly 
internalize the costs of work accidents to the inherently risky employment relationship. 
Accordingly, in this theory, no-fault compensation not only helps individual victims 
4but also benefits society overall by maximizing incentives for accident deterrence. 40 
1. Separating Compensation from Responsibility 
Nonetheless, in their book True Security, Graetz and Mashaw point out a tension in 
liberals' embrace of the efficiency rationale for no-fault protection from work injury 
costs. 40 5 By making responsibility for social well-being (deterring social harm) the 
basis of this social citizenship right, rather than individual need or entitlement the 
efficiency rationale brings back the problems of fault-based systems that workers' 
compensation was supposed to avoid. 
Graetz and Mashaw astutely observe that even when the goals of compensation 
(redistribution) and deterrence (efficiency) appear to coincide, as in the workers' 
compensation's no-fault rationale, deterrence goals will create pressure for reduced 
compensation in the long run.40 6 If social welfare programs aim to induce overall cost-
savings, those with the least market power will end up bearing the responsibility for 
that cost-savings, despite attempts to target incentive effects toward others. As a result, 
the focus on overall cost-savings will lead to less protection for those most vulnerable 
to market risks and will frustrate the goal of compensating those most in need. 
Consistent with the prevailing liberal strategy, Graetz and Mashaw accept as inevitable 
the conflict between efficiency-oriented deterrence-maximizing overall resources-
and distribution-oriented compensation-helping those who lose out from that overall 
resource-maximizing. They then try to resolve this conflict by defending compensation 
as a separate, supplementary redistributive goal worth a small loss in efficiency. 
Graetz and Mashaw summarize the history of workers' compensation as a bad deal 
that has delivered inadequate benefits at exorbitant administrative cost with dubious 
effects on occupational health and safety.40 7 In contrast to neoliberal reformers, 
however, they claim workers' compensation's flaw is an excessive rather than 
insufficient focus on efficiency. When workers' compensation replaced employers' old 
fault-based tort defenses with a strict obligation to (partially) compensate injuries, that 
403. See, e.g., Philip Harvey, Joblessness & the Law Before the New Deal, 6 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1(1999) (explaining the liberal view that joblessness islargely a structural 
problem beyond individual control). 
404. See Moss, supra note 304, at 60-74 (discussing the American Association for Labor 
Legislation's theory that workers' compensation would be a means of internalizing 
externalities). 
405. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 58, 82-87. 
406. See id. at 58, 85-86. 
407. See id. at 83-85. 
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change did not substantially diminish employers' labor market bargaining power 
relative to workers. As a result, workers' compensation left open other opportunities 
for employers to use their power to escape responsibility for sharing the costs of work 
injuries. 
Graetz and Mashaw explain that workers' compensation has not internalized work 
injury costs to the employment relationship, but instead has produced incentives for 
employers to reduce or resist compensation claims. 4 8 They observe that employers 
tend to avoid high workers' compensation insurance premiums not by reducing work 
accidents or by adapting the workplace to support injured workers, but by exploiting 
uncertainties about work injuries to avoid paying the high costs of work injuries. For 
example, employers may aggressively deny or discourage workers' injury claims, 
reduce wages for high risk work (especially for workers with few options), replace 
covered "employees" with noncovered "independent contractors," lobby state 
legislatures to reduce benefit levels, or threaten to move to states (or nations) with 
lower benefit costs. 40 9 As a result of these incentives for employer moral hazard, 
Graetz and Mashaw conclude that workers' compensation has failed both to increase 
deterrence and to adequately compensate injured workers. 
The lesson of Graetz and Mashaw's story of workers' compensation is that, in both 
the fault-based tort approach and the no-fault workers' compensation system, 
compensation gets sacrificed when tied to responsibility.4'0 Their solution is to give up 
on attempting to refashion social citizenship protections into an efficiency model, and 
to instead trim down social citizenship to fit the needs of individual compensation 
rather than overall responsibility (whether moral or economic). 
Accordingly, they propose a kind of super-no-fault approach that would offer 
workers minimal compensation for total disability regardless of work-relatedness and 
that would be funded by spreading more of the costs of disability from employers to 
workers and to taxpayers in general.41' In particular, they advocate replacing temporary 
workers' compensation benefits with a new federal temporary disability compensation 
limited to total work incapacity, whether work-related or not, lasting up to a year.4 2 
For permanent total disability, they propose partly replacing workers' compensation 
with the existing Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") scheme, supplemented 
for nonearners or for very low-earners
4 13 
with the existing means-tested Supplemental 
Security Insurance ("SSI") program. 
But Graetz and Mashaw's liberal plan for buttressing social citizenship by 
subtracting responsibility from workers' compensation has the same flaw as the 
communitarian plan for addingresponsibility. Both incorporate rather than challenge 
the neoliberal double standard of moral hazard that treats employers' cost-increasing 
408. See id. at 58 ("[Workers' Compensation's] effort to serve compensatory justice forces 
workers' compensation programs to adopt an inappropriate and inefficient adversarial process 
for deciding claims."). 
409. See id. at 86. 
410. See id. at 211-12 (stating that security and opportunity may be at cross-purposes, 
because of recipient moral hazard). 
411. See id. at 287 (explaining that this program would be funded by a tax on employers 
based on a percentage of payroll financing). 
412. Id. at 219-21. 
413. Id. at 221-23. 
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behavior as normal and workers' cost-increasing behavior as deviant. Both aim to 
accommodate rather than challenge a market structured to make overall accident cost-
savings disproportionately the personal responsibility of workers. As a result, this 
classically liberal claim to strictly separate security from responsibility instead serves 
to redistribute both: workers get less security and more responsibility, while capital 
owners get more security and less responsibility. Graetz and Mashaw miss their mark 
by viewing the ideological barrier to workers' security as the conflicting goal of 
"efficiency" rather than as a conflicting vision of workers' citizenship status. 
2. Double Standard of Responsibility 
First, Graetz and Mashaw shift deterrence requirements from employers to workers 
and call this shift a necessary feature of redistribution. Regulation of worker moral 
hazard is fundamental to their compensation proposal, even though this requires 
sacrifices in compensation. 414 They carefully tailor their proposed redistributive 
protections to minimize (though not eliminate) incentives for compensation of 
disability costs they attribute to workers' personal characteristics, like motivation and 
415 
skill. 
For example, their federal benefits proposal excludes compensation for permanent 
partialdisabilities, which account for the bulk of workers' compensation benefit costs 
and the vast majority of the claims for permanent disability.41 6 Because of the 
uncertainty of distinguishing this source of income loss from general personal 
"failures" such as "demoralization," "declining energy," or poor education, they leave 
these injuries to be compensated by a residual workers' compensation system where 
benefits are likely to be denied, delayed, or sharply limited. 7 The failure to improve 
this system means workers will retain a significant risk that disability will bring 
financial crisis and destitution sufficient to rob them of their homes, cars, savings, 
families, health, and even their lives. 
To receive the Social Security system's permanent totaldisability benefits, which 
Graetz and Mashaw present as an alternative to workers' compensation, workers must 
prove they are unable to perform any job in the national economy that provides
"substantial" income (in the late 1990s, defined as $500 a month). This strict eligibility 
requirement for permanent disability gives seriously injured workers responsibility for 
assuming the burdens of retraining, moving away from established connections with 
family, community, and medical providers, and accepting virtually any job no matter 
what the conditions, hours, or wages. Eligibility requirements for their proposed 
temporary disability insurance scheme are less stringent, requiring workers only to 
prove they are unable to perform their "usual" job, but this program still regulates 
worker behavior through requirements ofperiodic medical recertification, participation 
414. "We have attempted to design social insurance protections to minimize the 
disincentives that many aspects of today's U.S. social insurance policies embody." Id. at 297. 
They conclude that too much attention to "security" goals as opposed to "opportunity" goals 
leads to "runaway costs" and "withdrawal of individual work effort." Id. at 211. 
415. Id. at 213. 
416. Id. at 217. 
417. Id. at 218. 
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in rehabilitation, and a one-year time limit.
418 
In Graetz and Mashaw's plan, even workers compensated by the federal total 
disability programs must absorb a large portion of the costs of their injuries: both their 
temporary and permanent disability benefit proposals aim to provide subsistence-level 
income, not substantial wage replacement. Workers can expect to assume increased 
responsibility for financing this protection against the risk of permanent disability 
because the shift from workers' compensation to an expanded social security disability 
program would likely increase workers' payroll or general income taxes, or both.4 19 
In sum, Graetz and Mashaw impose steep responsibilities on injured workers for the 
costs of work disability in order to "balance" their need for security against efficiency-
420based deterrence concerns. Ironically, this liberal attempt to move away from 
workers' compensation to a more purely no-fault redistributive system instead ends up 
adopting some of the worker-fault provisions revived by the efficiency-oriented 
neoliberal workers' compensation reforms. 
In fact, when Graetz and Mashaw claim to shift the goal of disability protection 
from deterrence to compensation, they really mean that they aim to reduce employers' 
responsibility for disability costs. Why is deterring cost-increasing behavior by 
workers, but not by employers; integral to their system? Because they identify 
employers' cost-increasing behavior, but not workers', with an efficient market. When 
Graetz and Mashaw discuss the problem of workers' compensation's incentives for 
employers (or insurers) to manipulate the system's uncertainty by shifting work injury 
costs to workers and taxpayers, they do not explicitly name this behavior "moral 
hazard."i42 Instead, they use that term exclusively for workers' incentives for behavior 
that increases injury costs.4 22 They construct workers' opportunistic cost-shifting as 
personal gain-seeking at the expense of public well-being, produced by redistributive 
protections against market risk. For example, they explain that disability benefits 
encourage some workers to avoid work by "faking disability" or at least "accentuating" 
their impairments.423 
In contrast, they depersonalize capital owners' role in avoiding responsibility for 
preventing or mitigating the costs of work injuries and illnesses. They identify personal 
gain-seeking by workers, but not by employers, as a cause of work disability. They 
generalize risks resulting from employers', insurers', and shareholders' profit-seeking 
(or law-breaking)---or from workers' race and class status424--as "environmental" 
418. See id. at 220-21. 
419. Whether reduced workers compensation insurance rates will be passed on to workers 
depends on their bargaining power relative to insurers and employers. 
420. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supranote 232, at 211. 
421. See their discussion of employers' resistance to paying adequate workers' 
compensation benefits, id.at 85-86; employers' tendency to game the system when faced with 
benefit mandates, id. at 293-95; employers' tendency to "shift the costs of employer mandates," 
id. at 285. 
422. See id. at 296-99. 
423. Id. at 296. 
424. See Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 362, at 435 & n.44 (citing Gary King & David 
R. Williams, Race andHealth:A MultidimensionalApproach to African American Health, in 
SOCIETY AND HEALTH 93, 110 (Benjamin C. Amick et al. eds., 1995)). 
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factors or as abstract labor market structures. 425 Aside from workers' behavior, they 
describe the problem of work disabilities simply as a matter of the "inherent risks of4 26 
working and living in a market economy." 
Graetz and Mashaw similarly turn other forms of opportunistic cost-shifting by 
capital owners into background forces, sometimes using the passive voice to obscure 
the underlying human and corporate agency. For example, when they refer to 
employers' and insurers' strategic efforts to resist expansion of workers' compensation 
benefits, they state that "[o]ne state legislature after another has been importunedto do 
something about rising insurance rates",427 and that "states areforcedinto a race.., to 
the bottom in terms of the adequacy of workers' compensation coverage and 
benefits. 428 In addition, they blame flawed "systems" for the costly intervention of 
lawyers, doctors, and legislators, 429 obscuring the self-interested actions of the 
employers and insurers who fund or provoke this intervention through questionable or 
arbitrary claims denials and who also promote media campaigns to shift popular blame 
for high injury costs from employers or insurers to such "special interests. 430 
By portraying capital owners' incentives for moral hazard as a neutral fact of life, 
Graetz and Mashaw make it seem more reasonable to accommodate rather than to 
regulate that moral hazard. In contrast, by making workers' moral hazard seem to be 
the result of a contingent policy choice-the design of redistributive programs-
regulating that moral hazard by limiting compensation seems reasonable and politically 
practical. But their plan helps create the limits they presume are inevitable. Workers 
would not need to assume so much responsibility for the costs of work disability if 
there were other ways of minimizing those costs. With effective regulation of 
occupational health and safety and disability discrimination, and with widespread good 
wages and working conditions, generous compensation of permanent partial disability 
might seem much more practical and inexpensive.43' 
Indeed, Graetz and Mashaw do partially (and implicitly) recognize that regulating 
employers' moral hazard is critical to designing effective compensation systems. They 
insist on federalizing compensation programs, recognizing that fragmented systems 
increase employers' power to strategically avoid compensation by provoking a race to 
the bottom in state benefit levels. But their effort to control employer moral hazard is 
half-hearted because they defer to the dominant neoliberal view that capital owners' 
strategic cost-shifting is not an inefficient moral hazard, but a moral opportunity 
promoting efficiency. For example, Graetz and Mashaw acknowledge that trade 
policies deregulating the international movement of capital have increased employers'
bargaining power,42 and that such policies may have helped capital owners reap a 
425. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 213-14. 
426. Id. at 8. 
427. Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
428. Id. (emphasis added). 
429. Id. at 85. 
430. See generallyRohrlich & Larrubia, supra note 360. 
431. Some U.S. companies have taken this approach to reducing high workers' 
compensation costs of permanent partial disability, at least in the short term and at least with 
more skilled employees. See McCluskey, Illusion, supra note 12, at 923 n. 1117. 
432. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 285. 
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larger share of the gains from production than workers.433 But in contrast to their 
efforts to restrain a nationalrace to the bottom, they urge giving free reign to this 
internationalrace to the bottom. 434 Though they note that this market structure change 
has probably increased the risks they seek to compensate,435 they contradict that 
observation-and much outside evidence43 6-by asserting that unrestrained global 
capital power will bring the best protection to workers in the long run.437 That is, 
following the conventional neoliberal wisdom, Graetz and Mashaw identify capital 
owners' opportunity for strategic gains with public-spirited growth. They take on faith 
(despite recognizing evidence to the contrary) that those gains "ultimately" will trickle 
down to workers in the form of lower prices and more jobs.43 s 
This double standard of moral hazard built into their compensation proposal helps 
sap its strengths. In recent years, wealthy corporations and taxpayers often have used 
their growing political and economic bargaining power to advocate decreased federal 
funding for social welfare spending that would improve security for most workers and 
their families. 439 Graetz and Mashaw vaguely attribute this political movement against
"redistribution" to "[i]deological opponents," "economists," or "critics,"'44 who are 
motivated by abstract and altruistic principles such as "individual responsibility" and 
"economic productivity" rather than by personal gain.44 They hope to appease that 
opposition by fashioning protections that accommodate rather than threaten "efficient 
markets and high productivity. ' '4 42 But by presenting the interests of those who benefit 
433. See id. at 31-32. 
434. See id. at 284-85. 
435. See id. at 31-32. 
436. First, during the 1980s and 1990s, as international policy has increasingly followed 
neoliberal prescriptions for capital mobility and flexibility, economic growth has declined in 
most of the world compared to the 1960s and 1970s-with the exception of East Asia, 
particularly China. Mark Weisbrot, et al., Growth May be Goodforthe Poor-ButareIMF and 
World Bank Policies Goodfor Growth?:A CloserLook at the World Bank's Most Recent 
Defense of Its Policies (May 2001), at http://www.cepr.net/globalization/GrowthMay-Be-
GoodforthePoor.htm. Second, even if neoliberal policies increasing wealthy capital owners' 
bargaining power did promote economic growth, gains from growth may be distributed 
primarily to the rich. Id. at text between footnotes 7-9 and Fig. 3. In the United States, for 
example, per capita income has risen since 1973 while median wages and bottom-quintile 
income has fallen. Id. See also discussion infra Part III. 
437. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 285. 
438. They state that prices of many of the most important necessities have increased, Id. at 
36-37, and that the standard of living of many workers has fallen, Id.at 31 (implying that falling 
wages are not offset by falling prices). 
439. See David Callahan, $1 Billion for Ideas: Conservative Think Tanks in the 1990s, 
(National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, Mar. 12, 1999), athttp://www.ncrp.org/psrl 
pressreleases/thinktanks.htm (estimating conservative think tanks spent over $1 billion during 
the 1990s to argue for "privatization of the public sphere and elevation of the market as the 
prime mechanisms for social arbitration and resource allocation"); PERRUCCI &WYSONG, supra 
note 270, at 107-36 (describing many well-funded lobbying efforts aimed at resisting expansion 
of health insurance, occupational health and safety regulations, and other worker protections 
and redirecting government spending toward upper class interests). 
440. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 4-5. 
441. See id. at 23. 
442. Id. at 310. 
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from upward redistribution as public values to which workers' needs must be 
subordinated-rather than challenging these interests as private greed orpublic harm-
the liberal argument for workers' social citizenship instead supports its demise. 
3. Double Standard of Security 
By shifting the focus of deterrence from employers to workers, Graetz and 
Mashaw's liberal approach also ends up redistributing security from workers to capital 
owners. In effect, their proposal trades hopes for improved compensation for the 
largest group of workers with serious occupational injuries-those with permanent 
partial disabilities-for better temporary compensation for a wider range of injured 
workers. In keeping with the liberal view of "redistribution" as a market gap-filler, 
their compensation scheme provides transitional assistance to help smooth bumps in 
labor market participation rather than to replace market income. 
But again, Graetz and Mashaw rest their analysis of security on a double standard. 
After struggling with the question of what should count as redistributive social 
insurance," 3 they decide to narrow the concept to refer only to protections against loss 
of wage income for workers and their families, 444 not to government protections 
against risk of profit loss to employers and capital owners, like crop insurance 445 or 
general fiscal or monetary policies. 446 By leaving government security for corporate 
and capital interests off their "redistributive" table, they implicitly privilege 
compensation for these interests as part of the background rules of a normal market.447 
Because employers' protections do not count as redistributive social insurance, 
these protections need not be sharply limited in deference to competing "efficiency" 
values. For example, Graetz and Mashaw do not discuss whether tort immunity for 
employers should be eliminated as part of their plan to partially replace (and otherwise 
give up on) workers' compensation. Their analysis implies that this protection is a 
separate regulatory concern, rather than a form of social insurance for employers that 
raises moral hazard concerns comparable to disability compensation.
44 8 
Indeed, employer protections take on the guise of efficiency in conventional liberal 
analysis, which typically construes their resulting moral hazard as beneficial moral 
opportunity ("flexibility") that drives the market. In this analysis, protections of wage 
income confer private gain to workers, but protection of corporate profit spills over to 
benefit workers and the overall public. For example, Graetz and Mashaw assume that 
their plan to partly replace workers' compensation will result in "redirecting" resources 
to support disability benefits elsewhere. 449 But it seems as likely that advocates for 
443. See id. at 56-60. 
444. See id. at 58. 
445. See id. 
446. See id. at 56. 
447. See Martha T. McCluskey, Whose Risk, Whose Security?,THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, 
Jan. 31, 2000, at 38-41 (describing and criticizing neoliberal policies that increase social 
insurance for wealthy capital owners). 
448. See Baker, supra note 101, at 272-73 (explaining that insurance is a broad concept not 
limited to the products of traditional insurance companies, and that as a result, the moral hazard 
issues are correspondingly broad). 
449. GRAEMZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 224. 
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business and insurer groups, and others who seek gains from upward redistribution, 
will use their disproportionate political power to try to redirect any savings in workers' 
compensation benefits toward increased capital earnings (perhaps in the name of 
economic competitiveness and maintaining investor confidence).450 Graetz and 
Mashaw are not as willing to assume that gains in workers' security from, say, 
generous federally funded permanent partial disability benefits, might spill over to the 
public through increased productivity from better worker health and morale or through 
pressures for higher wages and safer workplaces. 
If, instead, capital owners' protections are as likely to produce moral hazard as 
workers' protections, then more security for capital owners will produce more 
incentives for further constraining workers' security. For example, Graetz and 
Mashaw's plan to protect employers against the costs of permanent partial disability 
will produce incentives for employers to shift more of those costs to workers through 
unsafe working conditions, with the result that workers will bear even more of the risks 
of permanent partial disability. And without an adequate alternative to wage income, 
injured workers will become less able to avoid the health costs of returning to work in 
jobs that exacerbate their injuries. In another example, Graetz and Mashaw reject 
regulation of employers' employment decisions as outside the scope of social 
insurance and part of employer "flexibility" necessary for "robust economic 
growth. ' '4 l But although laws protecting employers' freedom to fire workers may 
reduce risk of profit loss, this protection also gives employers more bargaining power 
with which to limit workers' access to disability benefits. In practice, employers' 
relatively broad freedom to fire workers will probably deter many workers from taking 
advantage of Graetz and Mashaw's proposed temporary disability protections, at least 
beyond the twelve-week period currently protected (for some workers) by the Family 
and Medical Leave Act. 
In sum, the liberal solutions to the problem of work disability show that protection 
for workers gets sacrificed when supposedly severed from efficiency as well as when 
tied to it. Graetz and Mashaw wisely recognize that the old social citizenship vision of 
workers' compensation failed because it did not sufficiently constrain employers' 
relative power to profit from workers' insecurity. But then they rest their hopes for 
reviving workers' social citizenship on yielding to that power, conceding a social order 
in which wage earners' security derives from and takes second place to security for 
capital owners. If policies promoting workers' security constitute protection for market 
losers, or even protection against market failures, while capital owners' security counts 
as protection within the beneficial market, then workers will retain subordinate 
citizenship status. 
450. In the 2000 Presidential campaign, both major party candidates made reducing 
government spending (and debt) a top priority, following the neoliberal economic theory that 
overall economic well-being depends on catering to wealthy global investors who fear rising 
interest rates or a falling dollar value. See Susan Page, When It Comes to Economics, the 
DifferencesAre Hardto Find,USA TODAY, June 26, 2000, at IA (discussing comments by Al 
Gore and George W. Bush). A survey of Fortune 500 executives found much stronger support 
for reducing taxes, especially individual taxes, and for reducing the federal debt than for new 
federal spending. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, How CEOs Will Vote: Almost All the Way with Bush, 
FORTUNE, Feb. 21, 2000, at 68 (describing phone survey of 195 CEOs in January, 2000). 
451. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 232, at 285. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, American law was the field of a struggle 
over the transformation of citizenship in a reintegrated and reconfigured national 
political economy. 452 The questions of how government should distribute the risks and 
gains of that economy, and whose market freedom should be central to a national 
economy built on and still entangled with slavery, were answered in part by Lochner-
era judicial rulings. Those rulings privileged some economic protections as 
fundamental citizenship rights central to both societal well-being and individual 
freedom, but jeopardized other economic protections by positioning these outside the 
bounds of good citizenship as the product of special interests and individual 
dependence.453 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, American law is again the field of a 
struggle over the transformation of citizenship in a reintegrated and reconfigured 
international political economy. The questions of how government should distribute 
the risks and gains of this economy, and whose market freedom should be central to a 
global economy grown from racialized colonialism, has been answered in part by a 
powerful neoliberal "Washington consensus" that has worked to restructure social and 
economic rights in developing countries. 454 As in the Lochner era, the recently 
triumphant free-market ideology promotes some government economic protections as 
fundamental personal freedoms essential to aggregate well-being, but disparages and 
jeopardizes other economic protections as special interest paternalism that endangers 
global welfare. 45 5 And, as in the Lochner era, the dominant wisdom insists that the 
452. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 4 (1992) (discussing "fantastic social and economic changes" that 
shaped the controversy between classical legal thought and progressive legal thought). 
453. See supra notes 22-53 and accompanying text. 
454. See YERGIN & STANISLAW, supra note 2, at 236 (identifying the "Washington 
Consensus" with free-market development policies first used in Latin America); Iglesias, supra 
note 2, at 384 (criticizing this supposed consensus as a contested ideology of subordination). 
The International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") neoliberal policies, shaped by the U.S. government, 
conditioned loans to developing countries on "structural adjustment" measures designed to 
protect international capital and reduce social spending. See Joseph Stiglitz, Thanks for 
Nothing, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2001, at 36 (describing how the IMF's undemocratic 
and "fundamentally unsound" policies penalized Ethiopia for directing aid to schools and health 
clinics and for reducing high-interest debt, rather than building up reserves to protect certain 
international investors); ROBIN HAHNEL, PANIC RULES: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 50-66 (1999) (explaining IMF policies and their failures); see generally 
GARY TEEPLE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM: INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (1995) (linking neoliberal structural adjustment policies to restructuring of economic 
rights and welfare state policies in developed nations like the U.S.). 
455. For example, New York Timeswriter and best-selling author Thomas Friedman belittles 
opponents of global neoliberalism as backward "turtles," incompetent workers, and irrational 
criminals who mistakenly perceive that their self-centered economic interests should count as 
rights. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION 271-75 (1999). In contrast, Friedman gives Enron as an example of the 
beneficial market forces driving the neoliberal global economy with "relentless, coherent, well-
funded, and efficient business plans." Id. at 242. He presents Enron as one of the transnational 
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greatest equality will eventually come from markets that are free to reward and 
reinforce the privileges and penalties of race, class, and gender stratification.456 
But as the neoliberal promise of a new global community of peace and prosperity 
horribly eludes much of the world,457 cracks in the supposed "free market" consensus 
corporate "Electronic Herd" that exercises global market power to pressure local governments 
for access to cheap labor and natural resources, tax breaks, and social spending cuts. Id. at 110-
13, 231. However, these demands represent not self-serving special interests or criminal greed, 
but a superrational democratic accountability that "turns the whole world into a parliamentary 
system," id. at 115, and that creates progress bringing "hope for salvation" to those it threatens, 
id. at 231. See generallyMcGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 5 (presenting critics of the World 
Trade Organization's supposed "free trade" policies as anti-democratic "special interests" who 
threaten global well-being with protectionist regulation and contrasting proponents of this new 
international regulatory body as public-interested and democratic advocates of freedom). 
In his book criticizing neoliberal policy, Gary Teeple explains that it represents a global 
movement for new government protection of property rights in the guise of "free market" 
deregulation. TEEPLE, supra note 454, at 76-94. For an in-depth deconstruction of the 
supposedly natural law of comparative advantage used to justify and mystify neoliberal "free 
trade" law, and the parallels to the Lochner-era mystification of freedom of contract, see 
Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free Trade 
Practice,GlobalEconomicsand TheirGoverningPrinciplesof PoliticalEconomy, 69 UMKC 
L. REV. 733,763-64 (2001). See also MaIjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization:Elevating 
PropertyInterestsAbove Human Rights,29 GA. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 427 (2001) (explaining the 
debate over so-called "free trade" as a conflict between competing views of fundamental legal 
rights). 
456. See Iglesias, supranote 2, at 384-86 (countering arguments that racial subordination 
and other human rights violations will follow from supporting neoliberal economic policies 
rather than human rights standards). For a brilliant exploration of the ways in which the late-
twentieth-century Supreme Court has used free market ideology to reverse the gains of the civil 
rights movement, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The 
PoliticalEconomy ofNon-Responsibility and the JudicialDisappearingof the Civil Rights 
Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247 (2000). 
457. One best-selling version of this promise was Francis Fukuyama's The End of History 
and the Last Man, which cheered on capitalism after the fall of the Soviet Union with a 
prediction that this new free market consensus would solve the world's conflicts once and for 
all. See generallyFRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). Others 
tempered this story by arguing that this progress would come more unevenly through a dialectic 
balancing of the dominant force of the neoliberal global market against countervailing pressures 
from government and tradition. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 455, at xvii-xviii (affirming 
Fukuyama's faith in the "new triumph of liberalism and free-market capitalism as the most 
effective way to organize a society" but noting a continuing threat from what he describes as old 
"power politics" rooted in an antiliberal tradition). Friedman presents the neoliberal promise as 
his "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention," which holds that "No two countries that 
both have McDonalds had fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald's." Id. 
at 195. He explains that neoliberal globalization constrains war-making because interdependent 
markets spread wars' costs more broadly and because neoliberal markets create large middle 
classes composed of people who "[do not] like to fight wars anymore, [because] they prefer to 
wait in line for burgers." Id. at 196-97. 
For descriptions of how and why this neoliberal promise deludes, see generally BENJAMIN R. 
BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD: How GLOBALISM AND TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD 
(1995) (arguing that neoliberal free-market policies exacerbate and even require increasing 
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have widened to admit new discussions about the societal benefits of other approaches 
to economic security.45s Nonetheless, most mainstream U.S. "experts" who discuss the 
global market's shortcomings remain critical of the prominent protests against the costs 
of the policies promoted by the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary 
Fund, and other organs of global market governance. 459 Though many share the 
concern for those left out of global market gains, many fear the protestors' concerns 
are misdirected. 460 Why challenge the market just because some are left out?461 In the 
prevailing wisdom, harm to market losers is best addressed by supplementing the 
market with protections that alleviate that harm while preserving the market's 
presumed overall benefits.462 
insecurity from sectarian conflict); Iglesias, supra note 2, at 385 (countering that the neoliberal 
strategy of making basic human rights subordinate to so-called market freedoms means that 
"Third World countries will remain susceptible to the cycles of military authoritarian 
dictatorships, government takeovers, and civil war, all of which destroy the free market ....); 
WIM DIERCKXSENS, THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM: AN APPROACH TO GLOBALIZATION WITHOUT 
NEOLIBERALISM (2000) (analyzing data showing how neoliberal global market policies have 
decreased economic growth and increased economic inequality); HAHNEL, supra note 454 
(showing that average world economic growth per capita along with the annual growth rates of 
most countries decreased during the neoliberal era-and that neoliberal policies create not a 
growing middle class but extreme inequality and poverty); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalism's 
Discontents,THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Special Supp. Winter 2002, at Al 6 (explaining that the 
few countries with increased economic growth and reduced poverty have succeeded by rejecting 
the Washington Consensus policies of market fundamentalism). 
458. See, e.g., Louis Uchitelle, Challengingthe DogmasofFreeTrade,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2002, at B7 (reporting that the World Economic Forum allowed a small group of experts to 
offer alternative strategies to neoliberal globalization but kept such discussions sharply limited); 
Louis Uchitelle, GlobalizationMarcheson, as U.S. Easesup on the Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
17,2001, at C 12 (reporting that "the economic theory that justifies globalization is increasingly 
debated these days" and that as a result the Doha meeting of the World Trade Organization 
included some concessions to opponents of neoliberal policies). 
459. See, e.g., Juan M. del Aguila, The PoliticsofFree Trade in Latin America, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 759, 762-63 (2001) (criticizing "violent protests" in Seattle, Washington D.C., Vienna, and 
Quebec for showing "appalling ignorance of what it takes to integrate weak economies into 
global processes" but acknowledging the need for more convincing evidence of the concrete 
benefits of neoliberal trade policies to appease the growing "hostility" among "important 
segments of Latin American societ[y]"); Susan Tiefenbrun, Free Trade and Protests: The 
Semiotics of Seattle, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L& COMP. L. 257,282 (2000) (characterizing protestors as 
"ancients" resisting modernity but arguing that unemployed workers who lose out from what she 
presumes are inevitable overall gains deserve some compensation). 
460. See, e.g., Editorial, Stopping the World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2000, at A16 (arguing 
that "misguided but heartfelt" protests against the neoliberal policies of the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization represent a "growing popular 
unease" that would be "dangerous to ignore," but that "there is no realistic--or beneficial-way 
to reverse or even slow the forces that are driving the world economy"). 
461. See Jim Chen, Globalizationand Its Losers,9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157, 216 (2000) 
(imagining neoliberal trade policies as part of a natural and inherently good evolutionary 
process so that, "In a world full of losers, the case for trade liberalization becomes all the 
stronger."). 
462. See, e.g., GARY BURTLESS ET AL., GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN 
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However, attempts to revive social citizenship as a complement or balance to the 
neoliberal market are caught within a double bind. In the mainstream view, the welfare 
state is both the only cure for the neoliberal market's devastating casualties and the 
critical disease the neoliberal market must constantly fight off.463 Protection against 
market losses always threatens to disrupt that market. 464 As a result, either the 
protection, or the market losers (or both) must be sharply restrained. 465 This double 
bind descends from the market fundamentalism ofLochner that still spooks the project 
of moving egalitarian economic protections from the margins to the center of 
TRADE 127-32 (1998) (denouncing attacks on neoliberal "globalization" as meritless and futile, 
but suggesting that the "winners share some of their gains with the losers"); Greenspan, supra 
note 4 (arguing that "those displaced by 'creative destruction"' should be assisted by private re-
training programs, or "[i]f necessary, selected income maintenance programs... where 
retraining is problematic" rather than "protectionism"); McGinnis &Movsesian, supra note 5, 
at 525 (asserting that "with the wealth generated by free trade, society can provide transfers to 
people with less income, including those for whom trade provides no advantage or even a net 
disadvantage"). 
463. For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan suggests the answer to the 
problem of neoliberal market "losers" is income support programs, not changes in trade or 
development policy. See Greenspan, supra note 4. But Greenspan has devoted his career to 
blocking increased government social spending by insisting that markets depend on reduced 
government debt (except for tax breaks for the wealthy) and on worker insecurity to prevent 
inflation. See Jeff Faux, Bait and Switch: How Alan GreenspanSnookeredthe Democrats,THE 
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Feb. 25, 2002, at 17-18 (analyzing Greenspan's contradictory positions 
on balancing the budget as a strategy to entice Democrats into supporting his underlying project 
of promoting upward redistribution); see also,Chen, supranote 461, at 166-67 ("Traditional tax 
and spend responses to globalization inflict 'Eurosclerosis,' a cure arguably worse than the 
disease of industrial decay."); TEEPLE, supranote 454, at 69-74 (explaining how neoliberalism's 
shift to monetarism through increasingly powerful central banks results in government's 
declining ability to finance the welfare state). 
464. See supranotes 103-146 and accompanying text (explaining that moral hazard effects 
can be redistributed, or revalued as moral opportunity, but not reduced or eliminated in an 
absolute sense); see also supra note 463; RhetoricofRisk, supranote 330, at 158-64 (analyzing 
how neoliberal policies depend on reducing government spending on social insurance for 
workers as acentral means of increasing investor security); Lucy A. Williams, Property, Wealth 
andInequalityThrough the Lens of Globalization:Lessonsfrom the United States andMexico, 
34 IND. L. REV. 1243, 1260 (2001) (advocating more analysis of the interrelationships between 
neoliberal welfare reforms in the U.S. and global economic policy). 
465. In response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, some commentators and policy 
experts suggested that the war on terrorism is at least in part a war on global market "losers" 
who oppose neoliberalism's "winners." Interview by Mike Schuster with Strobe Talbott, 
Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization and former deputy Secretary of State, 
Attacks on Sept. 11 Considered to Be Possible Attacks on Globalization, (All Things 
Considered, National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 14,2001), availableat http://search.npr.org. 
Many critics have noted the irony that neoliberal policymaking, despite its claim to represent 
voluntary choices made by free individuals, has become increasingly dependent on insulation 
from normal democratic processes (like fast-track trade authority) and restraints on free 
expression (relying on police state controls to reduce protests). See Matthew Rothchild, Why 
QatarWas Chosen as the Site of the Next World Trade OrganizationMeeting, (All Things 
Considered, National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 1,2001), availableathttp://search.npr.org 
(explaining that Qatar bans human rights organization and free speech). 
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citizenship. 
To escape this double bind, advocates of social citizenship must be willing to 
change rather than accommodate the neoliberal market and the race, gender, and class 
hierarchies it embraces. Social citizenship ideals cannot remain outside the market as 
complementary goals because those ideals are inextricable from the structures of 
government rights and responsibilities inevitably internal to markets. Helping market 
losers will always seem to threaten the public good if that good is identified with 
market winners' gains. Social citizenship ideals have been sidetracked by the debate 
between pro-welfare liberalism and communitarianism over whether to focus on 
protecting individuals or on protecting communities. Instead, we should focus on the 
underlying question of which individuals and whatkinds ofcommunities our markets 
should be structured to protect and to benefit. 
